While this decision is, on its face, a fairly ordinary residential rental dispute—replete with mold allegations, maintenance requests, and implied-warranty skirmishing—the part that should actually catch the attention of consumer and bankruptcy attorneys is the Court’s treatment of the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act and its companion Debt Collection Act provisions.

In Roach v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the North Carolina Court of Appeals again draws a hard line between conduct that feels unfair and conduct that is legally actionable under Chapter 75. The court affirmed summary judgment for Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., holding that the borrowers’ grievances — however sympathetic — did not amount to unfair and deceptive trade practices.

This is a foreclosure case with a long backstory, and that backstory matters.

At first blush, Zuleger v. Clore looks like a pure state-law property dispute about life estates, remainders, and an aging house that no one can afford to fix. But for bankruptcy practitioners—especially in North Carolina—it quietly sharpens an issue we wrestle with all the time:  

How do you value a life estate or remainder interest when the law allows liquidation in theory, but the market reality says otherwise?

In re Clark is not just a means-test case. It is also a reminder that even if a debtor stumbles into Chapter 7 eligibility math, § 707(b)(3) still looms large—and can be dispositive—when the court looks at bad faith and the totality of the circumstances.

Judge Pamela W. McAfee used both tools, methodically and unapologetically.

In re Clark is not just a means-test case. It is also a reminder that even if a debtor stumbles into Chapter 7 eligibility math, § 707(b)(3) still looms large—and can be dispositive—when the court looks at bad faith and the totality of the circumstances.

Judge Pamela W. McAfee used both tools, methodically and unapologetically.

In Williams v. PennyMac Loan Services, LLC, the Middle District of North Carolina once again refused to let a mortgage servicer wriggle out of Pay-to-Pay fee litigation at the pleading stage. The Court denied PennyMac’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion in a detailed opinion that should feel very familiar to anyone who has been watching this line of cases develop since Alexander v. Carrington and, closer to home, Custer v. Dovenmuehle.

The Chapter 7 case of James and Sharon Bryant and the related adversary proceeding brought by Eastwood Construction Partners, LLC is not notable because it breaks new doctrinal ground. It is notable because it shows—almost clinically—how civil litigation spillover, aggressive creditor strategy, and pro se overconfidence (amplified by generative AI) can collide inside a consumer bankruptcy case.

Summary:

The Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment against DiStefano, a TastyKake distributor terminated after receiving three breach notices in three months for leaving expired product on shelves and failing to meet store service requirements. The contract explicitly allowed termination after more than two notices in a 12-month period, and DiStefano admitted it had no evidence the notices were wrong.

Summary:

In a case that reads like The Wolf of Wall Street meets Fixer Upper, the Fourth Circuit waded into an international fraud, a botched lis pendens, and a high-cost lender accused of acting as the “getaway driver” for a Baltimore restaurateur who managed to siphon nearly $7.8 million from a member of the Kuwaiti royal family.

Available at:  https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sulr/vol49/iss1/4/