Ms. Collins, representing herself pro se, in an action alleging multiple claims arising from a mortgage lending scheme by the defendants failed to comply with multiple orders regarding discovery. Upon the motions of the defendants, the district court (lamenting that no attorneys from the Pro Bono Panel had stepped up to assist Ms. Collins) applied the four-part test from Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 348 (4th Cir. 2001) to determine what sanctions to impose:
1) whether the non-complying party acted in bad faith;
(2) the amount of prejudice that noncompliance caused the adversary;
(3) the need for deterrence of the particular sort of non-compliance; and
(4) whether less drastic sanctions would have been effective.… Read More
In previously ruling on the foreclosure by power of sale on this property, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld that foreclosure, finding that the Deed of Trust contained a sufficient description to identify the real property. See In re Foreclosure of a Deed of Trust Executed by Reed, 233 N.C. App. 598, 758 S.E.2d 902, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 381 (2014). Subsequently, but before the foreclosure sale was completed, Mr. Howse and Ms. Reed brought a separate suit in Superior Court, raising equitable grounds to enjoin the foreclosure. Bank of America successfully argued that this was an impermissible collateral attack on the foreclosure by power of sale.… Read More
Ms. Burwick denied certain allegations in her answers to Interrogatories but her response to a set of Admissions, sent pursuant to Rule 36, with similar questions was fourteen (14) days late. As such, those admissions were deemed, pursuant to Rule 36 ((b), “conclusively established,” despite any contradiction in the Interrogatories and summary judgment was granted to Pilkerton as there were no genuine disputes of material fact.
The opinion notes that Burwick did move to withdraw her untimely admissions, but the district court did not seem to address this in granting summary judgment. Rule 36(b) does allow for the withdrawal or amendment of admissions, but not necessarily an after-the-fact extension.… Read More
The Trustee sought to recover a transfer made by the Debtor to James Smith, the principal of the Debtor, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 547 and 550(a). At issue was whether the Debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer. The Trustee argued that based on the Debtor’s tax returns and the presumption of insolvency during the 90 days preceding the filing of bankruptcy, that the Debtor was insolvent, whereas Smith asserted that based on the scheduled value of assets and amount of liabilities, the Debtor was solvent.
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A), insolvency is defined as a “financial condition such that the sum of such entity’s debts is greater than all of such entity’s property, at a fair valuation….” Following In re Heilig-Meyers Co.… Read More