M.D.N.C.: Keller v. Experian II – No Standing to Sue, Even for a “Suspicious Mail Policy” Delay

Summary:

In this sequel to Keller v. Experian I, 2024 WL 1349607 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2024), Judge Thomas Schroeder once again dismissed Eric Keller’s Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) suit against Experian—this time for lack of Article III standing rather than for failure to state a claim.

Background

Keller’s saga began when a refinancing snafu between Truist and TD Auto Finance led to erroneous late payment reporting on his car loan. After Experian flagged Keller’s initial dispute letter as “suspicious mail,” it delayed forwarding the dispute to Truist. Once Experian eventually did so, Truist confirmed—incorrectly—that the loan was delinquent.

In Keller I, Judge Loretta Biggs held that this was a legal dispute, not a factual one, and thus outside Experian’s reinvestigation duties under 15 U.S.C. §1681i. She dismissed Keller’s individual FCRA claims, leaving only a putative class action claim challenging Experian’s “suspicious mail policy.”

Keller II: The Standing Showdown

Experian next argued that Keller lacked Article III standing because his alleged injury—a delay in processing his dispute—was not “fairly traceable” to any inaccuracy in his credit file. Judge Schroeder agreed.

While Keller alleged he was denied a mortgage loan due to Experian’s inaction, the court found that the delay itself did not cause that injury. Even if Experian had promptly acted, Truist would have repeated its same erroneous report, and Keller’s credit file would have remained unchanged. The harm flowed from Truist’s records, not from Experian’s temporary hesitation.

The court also noted Keller could have directly disputed the information with Truist under 12 C.F.R. §1022.43, further breaking the causal chain. The court thus found no injury “fairly traceable” to Experian—and therefore no standing.

Amendment Futility

Keller’s proposed Second Amended Complaint alleged multiple duplicative tradelines and data conflicts within Experian’s report. Judge Schroeder was unmoved, finding these allegations simply restated the same underlying dispute with Truist—still a legal disagreement, not a factual inaccuracy a CRA could resolve. The amendment would be futile.

Class Action Dismissal

Because a named plaintiff without standing cannot represent a class, the entire case was dismissed without prejudice. The court declined to allow substitution of another representative since no class had been certified and no other injured party had been identified.

Commentary

Keller II closes the loop on a dispute that began with Experian’s overzealous fraud-screening policy. Where Keller I held that Experian wasn’t responsible for resolving legal disputes between borrower and lender, Keller II finds that even if Experian’s internal procedures delayed a reinvestigation, no actionable injury resulted.

This decision exemplifies how, post-TransUnion v. Ramirez and Spokeo, courts in the Fourth Circuit continue to demand a concrete and traceable injury—not just a statutory violation or procedural misstep—before FCRA plaintiffs can proceed.

For consumer attorneys, Keller II reinforces two key lessons:

1. Causation matters—even procedural delays or CRA negligence require a clear factual link to a real-world credit denial.

2. Parallel disputes with furnishers should be pursued directly and promptly under §1022.43, especially when the CRA’s role is limited.

And for CRAs, Keller II provides further validation that their “suspicious mail” safeguards, though frustrating to consumers, are unlikely to result in standing-worthy claims absent concrete harm.

See prior coverage: M.D.N.C.: Keller v. Experian I – Reinvestigation Duties Limited to Factual, Not Legal Disputes (July 15, 2024).

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