In re Bryant (I) — Strategic Disqualification Motions in § 523 Litigation
Summary
In the first January 2026 order, Judge Benjamin Kahn denied the pro se Chapter 7 debtors’ motion to disqualify the plaintiff’s counsel and stay proceedings in a nondischargeability action under § 523(a)(6).
The debtors asserted counterclaims and third-party claims against opposing counsel, arguing this posture created conflicts under North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7 and 3.7. Judge Kahn rejected those arguments, emphasizing that disqualification is a drastic remedy subject to strict scrutiny and frequently misused as a tactical device.
Because the debtors were not current or former clients of plaintiff’s counsel, they lacked standing to assert a concurrent conflict under Rule 1.7. The Court further held that conclusory speculation that counsel might be a witness did not satisfy Rule 3.7, and that a party cannot force disqualification simply by suing opposing counsel or expressing an intent to call that lawyer as a witness.
The motion was denied in full.
Commentary
Judge Kahn’s order is a practical, no-nonsense reminder that litigation strategy does not include manufacturing conflicts. In contentious nondischargeability litigation, debtors sometimes attempt to “flip the script” by asserting claims against creditor’s counsel, hoping to gain procedural leverage. This opinion firmly closes that door.
The key point is standing. Without an attorney-client relationship, most alleged conflicts are simply not cognizable. That rule matters in consumer bankruptcy, where emotions run high and pro se litigants may understandably perceive counsel’s aggressive advocacy as personal misconduct. Judge Kahn properly distinguishes between adversarial conduct and ethical conflict.
Equally important is the Court’s rejection of the “lawyer-as-witness” gambit. If merely naming opposing counsel as a witness sufficed, every aggressive defense would become a vehicle for disqualification. The opinion instead reinforces the governing test: necessity, materiality, and lack of alternative evidence—not mere speculation.
For practitioners, this case will be useful authority when faced with tactical disqualification motions in § 523 adversaries, particularly in the Middle District of North Carolina.
In re Bryant (II) — Futility, Judgments, and the Meaning of “Debt”
Summary
The companion order, issued the following day, again by Judge Benjamin Kahn, addressed the debtors’ attempt to “conditionally” withdraw prior counterclaims while adding a new counterclaim seeking a declaration that a prepetition confession of judgment was not a “debt” subject to exception from discharge.
Judge Kahn construed the filing as (1) a motion for leave to amend to dismiss existing counterclaims and (2) a notice of voluntary dismissal of the third-party complaint. Leave was granted only as to withdrawal; the proposed new counterclaim was denied as futile.
The Court reaffirmed that a judgment is a “claim” under § 101(5)(A) and that liability on that claim is a “debt” under § 101(12). Because the confession of judgment was undisputed, the plaintiff necessarily held a debt that could be tested under § 523(a)(6).
Judge Kahn also delivered a pointed reminder: parties, even pro se litigants, cannot assert “conditional” or speculative claims and rely on the Court to sort out their merit. Rule 9011 requires a reasonable inquiry before filing.
Commentary
This second opinion is doctrinally straightforward but procedurally important. Judge Kahn emphasizes a foundational bankruptcy principle that sometimes gets lost in litigation strategy: bankruptcy does not relitigate the existence of a debt already reduced to judgment. Instead, § 523 asks a narrower question—whether that debt is dischargeable.
For consumer bankruptcy practitioners, the ruling reinforces the distinction between state-court liability and bankruptcy dischargeability. Once a valid judgment exists, the focus shifts to willful and malicious injury, not to whether the judgment should exist at all.
The Court’s discussion of “conditional” pleading is also notable. In high-conflict adversary proceedings, especially involving pro se debtors, there can be a temptation to raise every conceivable argument and withdraw later if necessary. Judge Kahn makes clear that such an approach risks Rule 9011 consequences and imposes unnecessary costs on opposing parties and the court system.
Broader Significance
Taken together, Judge Kahn’s twin Bryant orders provide a useful playbook for managing pro se litigation in nondischargeability proceedings:
- Disqualification of counsel requires a real, material conflict—not strategic maneuvering.
- Naming opposing counsel as a defendant or prospective witness will not create a conflict where none otherwise exists.
- A prepetition judgment plainly constitutes a “debt” for purposes of § 523.
- Even pro se litigants must satisfy Rule 9011’s requirement of a reasonable prefiling inquiry.
In short, these decisions reflect Judge Kahn’s characteristic approach: patient with pro se litigants, careful in construing their filings liberally, but firm in enforcing the procedural and doctrinal boundaries necessary for the efficient administration of consumer bankruptcy cases in the Middle District of North Carolina.
To read a copy of the transcript, please see:
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