Summary:
In , the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether servicemembers could sue the Maryland governor or Supreme Court Justices for alleged violations of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA).
The plaintiffs—active-duty servicemembers and their spouses—had default-type judgments domesticated and enforced against them in Maryland without the SCRA’s required protections (such as affidavits regarding military status and appointment of counsel). As a result, their bank accounts were garnished and frozen before the judgments were later vacated.
Rather than suing only the creditor, the plaintiffs brought claims against:
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the Governor of Maryland, and
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the Justices of the Supreme Court of Maryland,
arguing those officials failed to ensure Maryland’s procedures complied with federal law.
The Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court’s ruling and dismissed the case for lack of standing, holding that:
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although the plaintiffs suffered a real injury,
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their injuries were not “fairly traceable” to the named defendants,
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because the harm was caused by independent actions of state court clerks who issued the writs.
The court emphasized that federal courts cannot hear claims unless the plaintiff sues the proper party responsible for the injury, and here, the connection between high-level officials and the alleged violations was too attenuated.
The Fourth Circuit’s Move: Not Wrong—Just No One to Blame (Legally Speaking)
The Fourth Circuit didn’t say the SCRA wasn’t violated. In fact, it essentially assumed violations occurred.
Instead, the court held: you sued the wrong people.
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The Governor? Not involved in judicial enforcement.
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The Justices of the Maryland Supreme Court? They didn’t cause the violations.
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Administrative judges and clerks? Still not enough causal connection and potential protected by judicial or quasi-judicial immunity
The problem, according to the court, is Article III standing—specifically traceability. The harm (frozen accounts) was caused by third parties (clerks issuing writs), and the plaintiffs couldn’t show that the named defendants caused those clerks to violate federal law.
Put bluntly:
Federal courts cannot be used to “remind” state actors to follow federal law—at least not by suing high-level officials who didn’t directly commit the violation.
Result: vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
The Dissent: Congress Meant What It Said
Judge Roger Gregory dissented, and—true to form—he went straight to first principles:
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Congress enacted the SCRA under its war powers, which carry unusual constitutional weight.
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That authority can override state sovereign immunity (see Torres v. Texas DPS).
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The statute imposes mandatory duties on courts—not optional guidelines.
His key point:
If state courts systematically fail to implement those duties, someone must be accountable, and the state judiciary—through its rulemaking authority—is the logical place to look.
A Bigger Constitutional Undercurrent: War Powers vs. State Sovereignty
Here’s where things get more interesting.
The SCRA isn’t just another federal statute passed under the Commerce Clause. It is rooted in Congress’s Article I war powers, which historically allow broader incursions into state sovereignty.
That matters.
As even the dissent notes, the states effectively pre-consented at the Founding to a deeper level of federal intrusion in military-related matters. In that sense, the SCRA represents a more aggressive federal override of state autonomy than your garden-variety regulatory statute.
And yet—despite that expanded federal authority—the Fourth Circuit declined to push Maryland’s judiciary into compliance via this lawsuit.
That tension is hard to ignore.
Judicial Restraint—or Judicial Deference?
There may also be a quieter dynamic at play.
The Fourth Circuit’s opinion reads less like a rebuke of Maryland and more like a careful sidestep. Rather than dictate how the Supreme Court of Maryland should structure its rules or supervise its clerks, the panel emphasized standing doctrine and exited stage left.
That suggests a degree of institutional comity—a reluctance of federal appellate judges to tell a state’s highest court how to run its house.
In other words:
This may be less about constitutional incapacity and more about judicial etiquette.
The Practical Reality: This Is Now a Legislative Problem
The decision effectively punts the issue to the political branches.
And Maryland has options—easy ones, in fact:
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Virginia Code § 8.01-15.2 explicitly requires SCRA compliance procedures.
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N.C.G.S. §127B-28 went further with the North Carolina Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, adding enforcement teeth and state-level remedies.
Maryland could do the same:
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mandate affidavits before judgment or enforcement,
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require clerk-level screening,
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impose penalties for noncompliance.
Instead, it currently relies on federal law alone—and this case shows how that can fail in practice.
The Odd Silence from Annapolis (and Annapolis Courts)
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of this case is what didn’t happen.
The Supreme Court of Maryland has broad authority over procedural rules. It could have:
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adopted a rule incorporating SCRA requirements,
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issued administrative guidance, or
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required compliance protocols for clerks.
Other states have done exactly that.
Yet here, the system apparently allowed repeated, identical failures—multiple clerks, multiple cases, same statutory violation.
That’s not a one-off mistake. That starts to look systemic.
Practice Pointer (Because This Will Show Up Again)
For consumer practitioners—especially in border states or federal practice:
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Don’t assume SCRA compliance is baked into state procedures.
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Scrutinize foreign judgment domestications and post-judgment remedies (garnishments, executions).
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Raise SCRA violations early—and often.
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And if necessary, go after the actual actor (creditor or clerk), not just supervisory officials.
Because after Rouse, the Fourth Circuit has made one thing clear:
You may have a great SCRA claim—but if you can’t trace it to the right defendant, you don’t have a federal case.
Bottom Line
The Fourth Circuit didn’t weaken the SCRA.
It just made it much harder to enforce—at least against systemic failures.
And by declining to step in, it has effectively told Maryland:
Fix this yourself.
Whether Annapolis—or its courts—take that invitation remains to be seen. Pressure from consumer groups, including NACA, NACBA, and NCLC, along with veteran's and servicember organizations, is vital.
https://ncbankruptcyexpert.com/sites/default/files/2026-04/the_future_of_bankruptcy_exemptions_in_north_carolina_expanding_debtors_ability_to_exempt_the_eitc.pdf
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