Law Review: Elengold, Kate, It's All Debt To Me (February 01, 2026). U.C. Davis. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2027),

By Ed Boltz, 11 May, 2026

Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6497639 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6497639

Abstract:

Michelle owes $15,000 to a bank for credit card debt. Reid owes $15,000 to Memphis Memorial, a private hospital. Shirley owes $15,000 to the Raleigh Housing Authority. Josh owes $5,000 to the state of Louisiana and $10,000 to the Internal Revenue Service. Each debtor owes the same amount. None of them can afford to pay. From their perspective, the debt is the same. But the law does not treat these four debtors the same. The law provides them with widely divergent protections and affords their creditors different collection tools. Michelle, Reid, Shirley, and Josh experience their debt and its collection differently because the "law of individual debt" is comprised of aspects of various doctrines, including contract, tort, consumer, civil rights, bankruptcy, tax, and constitutional law. This Article reveals and explains how relevant aspects of these doctrines combine to allow for divergent experiences for four similarly-situated debtors. This Article then argues that the law of individual debt is organized around (1) the identity of the creditor and (2) whether the creditor voluntarily contracted to extend credit to the debtor. With that context, it offers an organizational structure to describe this phenomenon—a "debt ladder" comprised of (1) private voluntary debt, (2) private involuntary debt, (3) public voluntary debt, and (4) public involuntary debt. Mapping debtor protections and creditor powers across the four rungs leads to a shocking conclusion: when descending the debt ladder, legislators have simultaneously decreased debtor protections while increasing creditor powers. This places public involuntary debtors at the bottom of the ladder in an untenable position—suffering under crushing debt and subject to punitive collection tools. After having excavated the law, developed the scaffolding, and mapped the effects, this Article challenges scholars and policymakers to consider whether the whole is worth the constituent parts.

Summary:

This article takes what most consumer debtors instinctively understand—that a dollar of debt is not treated equally under the law—and gives it a rigorous framework.

By walking through four hypotheticals (credit card, medical, public housing, and tax debt), the author demonstrates that the legal consequences of debt are driven less by amount owed and more by who the creditor is and how the debt arose. That insight leads to the “debt ladder,” organized along two axes:

Public vs. Private Creditors
Voluntary vs. Involuntary Debt

From there, the article maps how legal protections shrink—and collection powers expand—as one descends the ladder:

Category	Debtor Protections	Creditor Powers
Private Voluntary (e.g., credit cards)	Strong (FDCPA, defenses, bankruptcy discharge)	Limited
Private Involuntary (e.g., medical debt)	Moderate	Growing
Public Voluntary (e.g., student loans)	Weakening	Expanding
Public Involuntary (e.g., taxes, fines)	Minimal	Extremely strong

The conclusion is stark: those least able to avoid debt (public involuntary debtors) face the harshest collection regimes and the fewest protections.

Commentary:

This is one of those articles that feels obvious once you read it—and then you realize just how uncomfortable the implications are.

1. The “Debt Ladder” Is Real—And Bankruptcy Lawyers See It Daily

Consumer bankruptcy practice has always been the proving ground for this kind of theory.

Credit card debt? Dischargeable, negotiable, regulated.
Medical debt? Increasingly aggressive, but still somewhat constrained.
Student loans? Welcome to adversary proceedings and DOJ “guidance.”
Taxes? Non-dischargeable (mostly), priority, and backed by sovereign power.

The Bankruptcy Code doesn’t just reflect the ladder—it codifies it. Sections like § 523(a), priority claims under § 507, and collection tools outside bankruptcy (offsets, garnishments, license suspensions) all reinforce the hierarchy.

And, as the article correctly notes, the further you move toward public, involuntary debt, the more the system starts to look less like contract law and more like punishment.

2. A Missing Third Axis: Location, Location, Location

The article’s two axes are compelling—but in practice, there is a third axis that may be just as determinative:

Where the debtor (and the debt) is located.

This is not a minor refinement—it is often outcome determinative.

North Carolina vs. Other States

Take North Carolina as an example:

Chapter 75 (UDTPA) often effectively extends FDCPA-like protections even to original creditors.
That is not always the norm nationally.

In contrast, states like:

The Terrible Two: Michigan & Rhode Island have been gutted by court decisions that interpret the statute as being applicable to almost no consumer transactions. These decisions were issued over ten years ago, yet the state legislatures still have not corrected them.
Exempt Most Original Creditors: Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Virginia protect most lenders and creditors from UDAP statutes, while another 14 leave significant gaps or ambiguities in their coverage of creditors.

are frequently cited as providing limited or no UDAP/consumer protection coverage for original creditors.
(See National Consumer Law Center, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices, 50-state survey.)

That means collection efforts, even extending to abusive harassment and lies, for Michelle’s $15,000 credit card debt are treated very differently depending on where she lives—not just what type of debt it is.

3. Statutes of Limitation: A Quiet but Powerful Divider

Even more concrete examples:

North Carolina: 3-year statute of limitations on most consumer debt based on a written contract.
Tennessee: 6 years.
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wyoming: 10 years.
Maine: 20 years.

That’s not just a procedural footnote—it fundamentally alters leverage:

In NC, time is often the debtor’s ally.
In TN, creditors have twice as long to pursue collection, in Maine nearly 7 times as long.

And the kicker?

The governing law may depend on where the debtor lives now, not just where the debt was incurred.

So this “debt ladder” isn’t just vertical—it’s also geographic, with state lines acting as trapdoors or safety nets

Hint for all of you debtors in Maine, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wyoming- If you have debts (including private student loans) that have been in default for more than 3 years, move from to North Carolina for 91 days and those will be disallowed in your Chapter 13 bankruptcy as stale. Our beaches and mountains are lovely, as is our Statute of Limitations.

4. Bankruptcy: The Only System That Attempts to Flatten the Ladder (But Doesn’t Quite Succeed)

Bankruptcy is supposed to be the great equalizer.

And to some extent, it is:

Automatic stay halts collection across all categories
Chapter 13 creates a structured repayment environment
Discharge wipes out most private debt

But even here, the ladder persists:

Student loans (§ 523(a)(8))
Taxes (§ 507, § 523(a)(1))
Domestic support obligations (priority + nondischargeable)

5. The Most Troubling Insight: The System Targets the Least Voluntary Debtors

The article’s most powerful—and unsettling—conclusion is this:

The less choice a debtor had in incurring the debt, the harsher the legal treatment.

That flips traditional notions of fairness on their head.

Medical debt (involuntary)? Less protection.
Government fines or taxes (often unavoidable)? Even less.
Criminal justice debt? Practically none.

This isn’t accidental—it’s structural.

6. Where This Goes Next (And Why It Matters for Practitioners)

For consumer bankruptcy attorneys, this framework is more than academic—it’s a roadmap:

Case strategy: Identify where a client sits on the ladder.
Venue strategy: Consider relocation, exemptions, and state law differences.
Litigation strategy: Use UDAP/FDCPA where available—but recognize jurisdictional limits.
Policy advocacy: Push for reforms that flatten the ladder, particularly for public involuntary debt.

And for policymakers, the challenge is even clearer:

Is a system that systematically strips protections from the most vulnerable debtors actually serving any coherent public purpose?

Final Take

This is a preliminary draft—but already a significant contribution.

The “debt ladder” is a powerful organizing principle. But once you add the third axis of geography, the picture becomes even more complex—and more troubling.

Because at that point, the question isn’t just: