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Bankr. E.D.N.C.: In re Simpson — Mortgage Servicers Must Explain Their Fees, Not Just List Them, and Debtors’ Attorneys Must Give Proper Notice Before Seeking Damages

Profile picture for user Ed Boltz
By Ed Boltz, 17 November, 2026

Summary

North Carolina now has bankruptcy decisions from all three federal judicial districts addressing the intersection of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3002.1, N.C.G.S. § 45-91, and mortgage servicers’ practice of maintaining two sets of accounts for borrowers in Chapter 13 bankruptcy.

In In re Simpson, Judge Pamela McAfee joins Judges J. Craig Whitley, Laura Beyer, and Benjamin Kahn in rejecting mortgage servicing practices that obscure whether fees are actually owed, have been waived, or are being preserved for collection if the debtor’s Chapter 13 case is dismissed rather than discharged.

The September 9, 2026 decision against MidFirst Bank, whose mortgage was serviced by Midland Mortgage, follows the earlier decisions in In re Saeed, In re Owens, In re Peach, and In re Rogers. Together, these cases establish an increasingly consistent body of North Carolina bankruptcy law requiring transparency in mortgage servicing.

There is, however, an equally important lesson for consumer bankruptcy attorneys: Even when a mortgage servicer violates North Carolina's fee disclosure requirements and the fees are disallowed, the debtor may lose the ability to recover additional damages and attorney's fees if counsel fails to provide proper advance notice of the claimed errors under N.C.G.S. § 45-94.

Judge McAfee disallowed the disputed fees and awarded the debtors' counsel $1,000 in attorney's fees under Rule 3002.1, but declined additional sanctions. The shortcomings in the debtors' prelitigation notice figured prominently in that result.

Background: The foreclosure, the bankruptcy, and the fees

Ricky Craig Simpson and Angelika Moss Simpson filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy on May 15, 2025, one day after a foreclosure sale of their Fayetteville home. Their filing prevented that sale from becoming final.

Their confirmed Chapter 13 plan provided for monthly mortgage payments of $764.64 through the Chapter 13 trustee and the cure of approximately $22,214 in mortgage arrears.

MidFirst filed a proof of claim that included $1,234.39 in prepetition foreclosure expenses, comprising foreclosure publication costs, mailing expenses, and substitute trustee fees. A separate $25 property inspection fee was subsequently waived.

The trouble started when the debtors received a June 16, 2025 mortgage statement listing five transactions described simply as "fees billed."

Four entries concerned foreclosure-related expenses. The fifth showed $1,225 in bankruptcy-related legal fees.

Then, on October 30, 2025, MidFirst filed a Rule 3002.1 notice seeking only $450 for attorney plan review and proof-of-claim preparation, despite attaching documentation reflecting the $1,225 charge.

MidFirst explained that $1,225 was the amount approved under Fannie Mae's bankruptcy fee guidelines, while $450 was the amount it actually intended to recover during the bankruptcy, consistent with local practice.

What MidFirst never clearly explained was whether it intended to waive the remaining $775 permanently or keep that amount in reserve to collect if the Chapter 13 case was dismissed.

That is precisely the sort of hidden mortgage fee problem Rule 3002.1 was enacted to prevent.

1. Foreclosure fees incurred before bankruptcy remain prepetition fees, even if billed afterward

The debtors argued that the foreclosure-related charges should have been disclosed under Rule 3002.1 because the June mortgage statement assigned those charges postpetition transaction dates.

Judge McAfee disagreed.

Following In re Raygoza, 556 B.R. 813 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2016), the court distinguished between when a fee is incurred and when it is actually billed or assessed.

The foreclosure services had been performed before the bankruptcy petition was filed. The fact that the substitute trustee invoiced MidFirst after bankruptcy did not convert those expenses into postpetition fees.

Accordingly, they were properly included in the proof of claim rather than requiring a separate Rule 3002.1 notice.

This distinction is significant. Servicers and debtors' attorneys must examine when the underlying services were rendered, not merely when the creditor's accounting system posted the expense.

But being properly classified as a prepetition fee does not establish that the charge is collectible. As the court subsequently held, even those foreclosure expenses were subject to North Carolina's independent disclosure requirements.

2. The $450/$1,225 dual-booking practice violated Rule 3002.1

Judge McAfee rejected MidFirst's attempt to disclose the full $1,225 on supporting documentation while formally seeking only $450 under Rule 3002.1.

Disclosure of two different amounts without explaining whether the larger amount would ever be collectible did not satisfy the Rule.

The court recognized that the servicer might have legitimate reasons for paying its attorneys more than it was entitled to recover from the borrower. But paying an attorney $1,225 does not necessarily mean that the homeowner owes $1,225.

If the servicer intends to waive the difference permanently, it should plainly say so.

If the servicer intends to collect the full amount after dismissal, that asserted liability must be properly disclosed and subjected to scrutiny under Rule 3002.1.

The court concluded that the unexplained dual accounting appeared designed to preserve a future right to collect fees without obtaining a determination of their lawfulness during the bankruptcy.

Both the $450 noticed charge and the $1,225 alternative amount were disallowed.

3. "Fees billed" is not a clear and conspicuous explanation

This may be the most broadly applicable portion of Simpson.

Under N.C.G.S. § 45-91, a mortgage servicer must assess fees within the applicable statutory period and explain them clearly and conspicuously in a statement mailed to the borrower within 30 days after assessment, subject to specified exceptions.

The statute provides an alternative to a separate mailed fee notice where the charge is included in a periodic mortgage statement complying with 12 C.F.R. § 1026.41(b), (c), and (d).

MidFirst contended that its monthly statement substantially followed the CFPB's approved Chapter 13 mortgage statement format.

Judge McAfee acknowledged that the forms were substantially similar. But a compliant format does not excuse incomprehensible content.

The model statement specifically explains the reason for a late fee. MidFirst's statement, in contrast, provided only the generic label "fees billed."

The court noted that the servicer could have complied with a simple description such as "notice of foreclosure sale" for the $990 publication expense.

Further confusing matters, the fees appeared as negative numbers, which could reasonably suggest that they were credits rather than charges.

The debtors could only determine what the amounts represented by comparing their periodic statement against the bankruptcy proof of claim and Rule 3002.1 notice.

Judge McAfee rejected the notion that borrowers should have to reconstruct their mortgage accounts from separate bankruptcy filings to determine what they owe.

The court held that MidFirst failed to provide the clear and conspicuous disclosures required under § 45-91 and that the foreclosure and bankruptcy-related fees were waived under § 45-91(3).

In re Simpson (1).pdf

4. Attorney's fees were warranted, but the debtors' prelitigation notice was deficient

The debtors sought disallowance of the charges, damages, attorney's fees, and sanctions.

On November 4, 2025, their paralegal had emailed the attorney who filed MidFirst's proof of claim, requesting copies of the notices supposedly sent to the debtors under N.C.G.S. § 45-91.

The email cited Saeed, set a December 9 deadline, and warned that failure to supply the requested documentation would result in a claim objection and a request for attorney's fees.

What it did not do was expressly identify the charges themselves as disputed or explain the alleged servicing errors.

This distinction mattered.

N.C.G.S. § 45-94 requires borrowers or their representatives to give the servicer written notice of the claimed errors or disputes at least 30 days before commencing a civil action for damages under the statute. That notice must identify the borrower and loan account and be sent to an address designated on the servicer's written communications.

The debtors' email, according to Judge McAfee, was essentially a request for documentation rather than a proper notice identifying the disputed charges. MidFirst's counsel responded by transmitting the mortgage statement.

The subsequent motion could not retroactively satisfy the condition precedent for damages.

Judge McAfee nevertheless found that MidFirst's failure to adequately explain its dual accounting warranted an award of $1,000 in attorney's fees under Rule 3002.1(h). She declined additional sanctions and did not award damages under § 45-94.

In re Simpson (1).pdf

The distinction is crucial: The failure to comply with § 45-94 did not excuse MidFirst's violations or prevent disallowance of its fees. It did, however, undermine the debtors' independent statutory damages claim.

A developing statewide consensus: Saeed, Owens, Peach, Rogers, and now Simpson

Simpson does not stand alone. It extends a line of cases that has been developing for more than fifteen years.

In re Saeed, No. 10-10303, 2010 WL 3745641 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Sept. 17, 2010), established an early foundation for enforcing North Carolina's fee-notice requirements. Habitat for Humanity included substantial legal fees in its proof of claim without adequately explaining the services or sending the statutorily required notice to the borrower. The court held that the proof of claim did not satisfy § 45-91 and disallowed the fees.

See the Owens blog discussion, which links to the Saeed opinion. The original Saeed decision is also hosted on the site.

In re Owens, No. 12-40716, 2014 WL 184781 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 2014), addressed a servicer's attempt to preserve postpetition charges for possible collection after dismissal while avoiding Rule 3002.1 notice requirements during the Chapter 13 case. Judge Whitley rejected that approach. A creditor cannot avoid disclosure merely by promising to collect later.

Previous coverage: In re Owens — Rule 3002.1 Applies to Mortgage Fees Even if Collection Is Not Currently Attempted.

In re Peach, No. 21-30390, 2025 WL 930363 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. Mar. 25, 2025), involved Shellpoint's unexplained mortgage fees and dual tracking of charges. Judge Beyer disallowed the fees, awarded $8,592.50 in attorney's fees and $1,000 in damages, and warned that future similar conduct could warrant substantially greater sanctions.

Previous coverage: In re Peach — Sanctions for Dual Tracked Mortgage Fees.

Your North Carolina Bankruptcy Expert

 

In re Rogers, 677 B.R. 635 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2025), confronted a servicer that filed a Rule 3002.1 notice for $400 while simultaneously notifying the nonfiling spouse of $951.69 in bankruptcy-related fees. Judge Kahn held that § 45-91 does not require the assessment or disclosure of fees that will never be charged to the borrower and prohibited collection of the disputed amounts.

Previous coverage: In re Rogers — Postpetition Fees, Rule 3002.1, and N.C.G.S. § 45-91.

Your North Carolina Bankruptcy Expert

The progression is worth emphasizing. Saeed established that fees must be properly disclosed under state law. Owens rejected conditional collection after bankruptcy as a means of avoiding Rule 3002.1. Peach and Rogers applied those principles to modern mortgage servicing systems that maintain conflicting balances. Now Simpson confirms that even a formal Rule 3002.1 filing will not cure unexplained inconsistencies or deficient statements.

And although these are bankruptcy court decisions rather than binding statewide appellate precedent, their consistency across all three districts should leave servicers with very little room to argue that the applicable requirements are unclear.

Practice points for mortgage servicers: How to comply with Rule 3002.1, N.C.G.S. § 45-91, and CFPB regulations

The lesson for mortgage servicers is not that they must choose between complying with federal bankruptcy rules and North Carolina's Mortgage Debt Collection and Servicing Act.

They must comply with both.

That should be achievable without maintaining conflicting accounts, sending confusing mortgage statements, or reserving undisclosed fees for collection after bankruptcy.

1. Understand the different deadlines

Requirement

Deadline

N.C.G.S. § 45-91(1)(a)

Assess fees within 45 days after they are incurred

Foreclosure attorney and trustee expenses

Assess within 45 days after the attorney or trustee charges the servicer

N.C.G.S. § 45-91(1)(b)

Clearly explain assessed fees in a mailed statement within 30 days after assessment, subject to statutory exceptions

Bankruptcy Rule 3002.1(c)

File and serve notice of recoverable postpetition charges within 180 days after they are incurred

CFPB Regulation X, § 1024.35

Generally acknowledge a qualifying Notice of Error within five business days and respond within 30 business days, subject to exceptions and permitted extensions

The 180-day bankruptcy deadline is not a substitute for North Carolina's shorter requirements.

Nor does filing a Rule 3002.1 notice automatically satisfy the state's mailed-statement requirement.

2. Maintain one accurate account, not two versions of the mortgage debt

Servicers may legitimately maintain separate accounting fields for investor expenses, corporate advances, and borrower obligations.

But those systems must clearly distinguish between expenses borne by the lender and amounts recoverable from the borrower.

A $1,225 attorney invoice does not automatically create a $1,225 borrower obligation.

If the servicer is only recovering $450, it should make an affirmative determination about the remainder:

  • Permanently waive the additional $775, with no right to collect it from the borrower or property in the future; or

  • Clearly assert the larger amount as potentially recoverable, properly disclose it under Rule 3002.1, and permit judicial review of its contractual and legal validity.

An internal account marked "suspended," "deferred," or "corporate advance" should not become a backdoor mechanism for collecting the difference after dismissal or discharge.

3. Explain each fee in plain English

Generic descriptions such as "fees billed," "other fees," "legal fees," or "corporate advances" are unlikely to withstand scrutiny where they do not identify the nature of the charge.

For example, a mortgage statement should describe a $990 expense as "Foreclosure sale publication expense" rather than simply "Fees billed."

For attorney charges, descriptions such as "Bankruptcy proof of claim preparation" or "Chapter 13 plan review" give borrowers meaningful information.

Each entry should identify the transaction date, amount, and reason for the charge, and explain whether it is actually owed by the borrower.

Using the correct CFPB form is only half the job. As Simpson demonstrates, a perfectly formatted statement containing incomprehensible information is still a defective statement.

4. Comply with Regulation Z, not merely its sample format

Under 12 C.F.R. § 1026.41, periodic mortgage statements must contain the required transaction information, including brief descriptions of account activity.

The regulation also provides special disclosure requirements for borrowers in bankruptcy, including modified Chapter 13 periodic statements.

Particularly important is § 1026.41(d)(4), which requires a description of each transaction affecting the amount currently due.

The CFPB's official interpretation also recognizes that servicers may defer imposing certain postpetition charges until completing Rule 3002.1 procedures.

That is a far more sensible approach than charging borrowers first and trying to explain the amounts later.

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

5. Take Notices of Error seriously

RESPA, Regulation X, and 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35 establish procedures for addressing mortgage servicing errors.

Importantly, § 1024.35(b)(5) includes the imposition of a fee or charge that the servicer lacks a reasonable basis to impose.

That provision should be read alongside 12 U.S.C. § 2605(k)(1)(E), which prohibits servicers from failing to comply with obligations imposed by CFPB regulation.

When a borrower disputes fees, the servicer should investigate the underlying transactions, identify the contractual authority, determine whether the fees were properly assessed and disclosed, correct errors, and provide a substantive written response.

Simply forwarding another copy of the same mortgage statement is unlikely to resolve a sufficiently identified servicing error.

Practice points for consumer debtors' attorneys: Put the servicer on notice before asking for damages

Simpson also provides a useful correction to how debtors' attorneys should approach mortgage fee challenges.

A request for information is not necessarily a Notice of Error. Nor is a warning that an objection will be filed if documents are not provided necessarily sufficient notice of the underlying dispute.

The better practice is to make the dispute explicit from the beginning.

1. Send a combined Notice of Error and Request for Information early

When potentially improper mortgage fees are identified, counsel should consider sending a written Notice of Error under 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35 and a Request for Information under 12 C.F.R. § 1024.36, while expressly identifying the notice as satisfying N.C.G.S. § 45-94.

That correspondence should specify the challenged fees, the dates and amounts, the allegedly defective disclosures, and the legal basis for disputing the charges.

It should also request the transaction histories, invoices, fee assessments, corporate advance ledgers, and documentation necessary to establish whether the charges are recoverable.

Importantly, the attorney should state that the borrower is disputing the charges—not merely asking for copies of earlier notices.

2. Send notice to the proper address

This is another potential trap highlighted by Simpson.

Regulation X permits servicers to establish a designated address for receiving Notices of Error and Requests for Information. When properly designated, that address must be used to invoke the applicable regulatory procedures, subject to the regulation's requirements.

N.C.G.S. § 45-94 separately requires written notice sent to an address designated on the servicer's bills, statements, invoices, or other written communications.

A bankruptcy attorney who only emails opposing counsel runs the risk of failing to satisfy these requirements.

The safest practice is to send the correspondence by trackable mail to the designated Notice of Error address, and, where the statutory requirements or relevant addresses differ, send additional copies to the appropriate addresses. Counsel for the servicer can certainly be copied, but that should supplement rather than replace proper notice.

3. Allow the full 30-day statutory period before pursuing damages

Under N.C.G.S. § 45-94, the notice must precede the filing of a civil action for damages under the statute by at least 30 days.

The notice should therefore be sent sufficiently early that the servicer has the statutory opportunity to investigate, correct the errors, and compensate the borrower for resulting fees or charges.

I would recommend allowing more than the statutory minimum to account for delivery and avoid disputes over when notice was received. Maintain proof of delivery.

Counsel should also distinguish that state-law notice period from Regulation X's generally longer business-day response periods. Where practical, wait for the regulatory response or the expiration of the applicable response period before deciding whether additional claims are warranted.

Of course, an impending bankruptcy deadline or other urgent matter may require a claim objection or fee-determination motion sooner. Such relief should be considered separately from any claim for damages requiring advance statutory notice.

4. Expressly warn of fees, damages, and further relief

The notice should identify not only the disputed charges but also the consequences if the servicer fails to correct them.

For example, the following language could be incorporated into a Notice of Error:

Suggested Notice of Error language

This correspondence constitutes formal written notice of disputed mortgage servicing errors under N.C.G.S. § 45-94 and, to the extent applicable, a Notice of Error under 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35. Our clients expressly dispute the assessment, validity, amount, and collectibility of the fees identified above, including whether those charges were timely assessed and clearly and conspicuously disclosed as required by N.C.G.S. § 45-91.

Unless the errors are timely corrected and our clients are compensated for any resulting fees or charges, they reserve the right, following expiration of the applicable statutory notice period, to pursue disallowance and waiver of the charges, actual damages, reasonable attorney's fees and expenses, and any other available relief under N.C.G.S. §§ 45-91 and 45-94, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3002.1, RESPA, and other applicable law.

This does not guarantee an award of damages or fees, but it makes the dispute, statutory notice, and potential consequences much harder to misunderstand.

5. Remember that fee disallowance and damages are different remedies

A failure to comply with § 45-94's condition precedent for a damages action does not necessarily deprive the debtor of other remedies.

Counsel should separately consider an objection to the mortgage proof of claim, a motion under Rule 3002.1(e), disallowance and waiver under § 45-91(3), and sanctions or expenses under Rule 3002.1(h) where appropriate.

The current Rule 3002.1(e) generally requires a motion challenging a noticed postpetition charge within one year after service of the notice, absent a court-ordered shorter period. The rule also now provides procedures for assessing mortgage status during an ongoing Chapter 13 case. These provisions reflect the amendments effective December 1, 2025.

Waiting until the final cure notice or until a borrower receives a surprise foreclosure demand after bankruptcy is usually a poor substitute for monitoring the account during the plan.

6. Document the borrower's actual injuries

One of the more important aspects of Peach was the bankruptcy court's consideration of the borrower's time, frustration, and efforts to understand the mortgage charges.

Consumer attorneys should document actual financial losses, time spent contacting the servicer, costs incurred in resolving the errors, and other provable injuries.

Such documentation may support damages under state law, RESPA, or other applicable consumer protection statutes, subject to each statute's requirements.

It is also worth recalling that Peach awarded substantially more in attorney's fees than the underlying disputed mortgage charges.

A $450 improper mortgage fee can become a much more expensive problem for a servicer when it refuses to correct the error and forces unnecessary litigation.

Commentary: The real problem is that the homeowner never knows what the servicer thinks is owed

There is an unfortunate familiarity to the facts in Simpson.

Mortgage servicers insist that their accounting systems require them to track expenses differently depending on whether the borrower is in bankruptcy, whether a discharge is entered, or whether the case is dismissed.

Those internal accounting considerations may be legitimate. But there is no legitimate reason why the homeowner, the bankruptcy trustee, and the bankruptcy court should receive contradictory information about the amount actually owed.

North Carolina law gives servicers 45 days to assess most fees and 30 days thereafter to explain them. Bankruptcy Rule 3002.1 provides 180 days for notice of recoverable postpetition charges. CFPB regulations provide specific requirements for periodic statements and error resolution.

None of these statutes or regulations is particularly mysterious.

As I observed in discussing Peach, permitting servicers to maintain one accounting balance during a Chapter 13 plan and another, considerably less favorable balance to be imposed following dismissal would largely defeat the protections that Rule 3002.1 was designed to provide.

And the risk is not limited to dismissal. Hidden or improperly assessed mortgage fees can survive in servicing records, be transferred to successor servicers, or suddenly reappear when the homeowner seeks a loan modification, refinancing, payoff, or sale.

The peculiar consequence is that a borrower who successfully makes years of Chapter 13 payments may find that the mortgage servicer's records nevertheless claim a default.

That is not a fresh start. It is a delayed foreclosure trap.

Simpson also reminds us that consumer bankruptcy attorneys must pay close attention to procedural prerequisites. A creditor's failure to comply with the law does not excuse counsel from complying with the notice requirements for recovering statutory damages.

The court's criticism of counsel's failure to clearly identify the disputed fees is well taken. A demand for proof of compliance may strongly imply suspicion of wrongdoing, but that is not the same as expressly identifying an error and giving the servicer a meaningful opportunity to correct it.

Indeed, the notice period under § 45-94 has a useful purpose. If servicers corrected their errors, waived improper fees, and compensated borrowers when first notified, much of this litigation would be unnecessary.

But when servicers fail to do so, a properly documented Notice of Error can strengthen the eventual claim for damages and attorney's fees.

There is one further point. With Owens, Peach, Rogers, and now Simpson, servicers have considerably less room to claim that they were confused about their obligations. These decisions do not mean that every subsequent violation automatically warrants punitive sanctions, treble damages, or attorney's fees. Those remedies have distinct requirements.

They do, however, provide increasingly persuasive evidence that the relevant obligations have been explained repeatedly by North Carolina's bankruptcy courts.

For mortgage servicers, the prudent response is a systematic review of their bankruptcy servicing procedures, periodic statements, and accounting for corporate advances and legal expenses—not merely corrections to the individual accounts involved in these decisions.

For consumer debtors' attorneys, the corresponding response should be a systematic review of Rule 3002.1 notices, monthly mortgage statements, and postpetition fee ledgers, coupled with early, properly addressed Notices of Error that preserve claims under both state and federal law.

Four bankruptcy judges, three federal districts, and more than a decade of litigation have now delivered essentially the same instruction: Mortgage servicers must disclose what the homeowner actually owes, explain why it is owed, and provide a timely opportunity to dispute it before those charges become the basis for another foreclosure.

It should not take another decade—or a class action—to make that ordinary practice.

To read a copy of the transcript, please see:

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