Summary: Under North Carolina’s New Motor Vehicles Warranties Act, N.C.G.S. § § 20-351, a motor vehicle manufacturer is required to either repurchase or refund the purchase price if “after a reasonable number of attempts” the vehicle cannot be repaired to conform with express warranties. N.C.G.S. § 20-351.5 creates a presumption that the manufacturer has failed if it attempts to repair the vehicle four or more times. The consumer must have notified the manufacturer in writing of the defect and allowed up to fifteen (15) days to make repairs.

Summary: Having previously found that several claims brought by the Debtor against Bank of America were, pursuant to Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), core and subject to bankruptcy court jurisdiction, while others were “statutorily core, but did not qualify as constitutionally core”, the bankruptcy court retained the core issues and referred the non-core claims to arbitration.

Summary: Husband and Wife filed Chapter 7, with the Wife claiming both an equitable interest in a 2006 Lexus, despite not being listed as an owner on the title, and claiming an exemption. The Trustee objected, relying on In re Horstman, 276 B.R. 80 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2002), where the bankruptcy court held that a debtor could not claim an exemption in a vehicle, titled in her husband’s name only, based on the definition of “marital property.” This proposition was expanded in In re Thams, No. 10–33089, 2011 WL 863293, at *4 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. Mar.

Summary: In several related Chapter 7 cases, the Debtors exemptions included a provision relying on Schwab v. Reilly, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010), that they “intend[ed] to claim 100% of Debtors’ interest and 100% fair market value in each and every item listed, irrespective of the actual value claimed as exempt.” Following objections by the Chapter 7 Trustee, the Debtors, still seeking to maximize their exemptions, amended their exemptions to include a provision that contemplated three separate scenarios: 1.

Summary: The Debtors brought a Motion for Sanctions against Sun Trust, serving the motion by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the attention of the “Officer or Managing Agent” at the address listed on the Proof of Claim filed by Sun Trust, at the address listed on the billing statements and one additional address.

Summary: The creditor had obtained a judgment against the debtor, with such judgment still being on appeal. The creditor, nonetheless, filed a Proof of Claim in the debtor’s Chapter 11 case, to which the debtor objection. Read together, 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) and 1126(a) prohibit a claimant from voting on a Chapter 11 plan if the debtor has objected to the claim. Bankruptcy Rule 3018(a), however, allows the bankruptcy court, at its sound discretion, to temporarily allow the claim for purposes of accepting or rejecting the proposed plan.

Summary: ESA Environmental Specialists, Inc. (ESA) was an engineering firm that had various constructions projects under contract with the federal government. As such, ESA was required to obtain surety bonds to secured completion of the contracts and pay vendors and subcontractors. ESA originally obtained eight surety bonds from Hanover in 2006. In April 2007, ESA borrowed $12.2 million from Prospect Capital to fund operations. Shortly, thereafter, ESA sought seven additional surety bonds from Hanover.

Summary: The Debtor contested large portions of the Domestic Support Obligation (DSO) claim filed by his ex-wife, who was also seeking dismissal of his Chapter 13 plan. The bankruptcy court held that the Indiana Superior Court where this claim originated was best suited for deciding the issues, See Caswell v. Lang, 757 F.25 608, 610 (4th Cir.

Summary: Quicksilver purchased an apartment complex in 1992, with $4.6 million in financing from the seller and $550,000 from the Charlotte Falk Irrevocable Trust (Falk Trust). Quicksilver later executed a promissory note and Deed of Trust to the Falk Trust, which was recorded on October 28, 1994. Quicksilver defaulted on the note in December of 1994 and, despite several payments in the intervening years, failed to remedy the default. On July 2, 1999, Quicksilver entered into a promissory note and Deed of Trust with Wachovia Bank.

Summary: The first indorsement in a chain of transfers of a mortgage note was simply a stamp, without an accompanying signature or initials. After falling behind on mortgage payments, Bass, relying on Econo-Travel Motor Hotel Corp. v. Taylor, 301 N.C. 200 (1980), challenged the standing of U.S. Bank as the holder of the note, arguing that it had not been properly indorsed. The North Carolina Supreme Court rejected this argument relying on the broad definition of “signature” in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), at N.C.G.S.