Summary: In their Chapter 7, the Youngs agreed, in a court approved settlement,  to allow the sale of their residence, splitting the net proceeds  equally with the Trustee and were to keep “only those furnishings necessary to furnish their new residence”, with the remainder of their personal property  to be auctioned.  After initially identifying the property they were to retain with the Trustee’s auctioneer, the Young sold all of their additional property with a different auction company, using the funds to pay for moving costs.  It appears that the

Abstract: In 1978, Congress made it illegal for government employers to deny employment to, terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment against a person who has filed bankruptcy. In 1984, Congress extended this prohibition to private employers by making it illegal for such employers to terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment against a person who has filed bankruptcy.

Summary: Ms. Redding’s Chapter 11 plan was confirmed providing that she was to have six months in which to market and sell her principal residence and was required to make adequate protection payments on the mortgage claim of $1,000.00 per month during that time. After failing to do either, Ms.

Summary: The Bankruptcy Administrator sought dismissal of Mrs. Gonyo’s Chapter 7 arguing that she improperly excluded several of her non-filing husband’s expenses as “marital adjustments” from her Current Monthly and also failed to include both the couple’s tax refund and her husband’s incentive pay in that calculation. In reaching the later conclusion, the bankruptcy court defined “income” as “a gain or recurrent benefit . . . that derives from capital or labor.” In re Sanchez, No. 06-40865, 2006 WL 2038616, at *2 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.

Summary: The Ohnmachts, having completed their Chapter 11 plan and received a discharge, sent a demand letter to Commercial Credit Group demanding that the judgment against them be cancelled. When CCG declined, they re-opened their bankruptcy and brought an adversary proceeding asserting breach of contract, violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-239 and § 75-1.1 et seq, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence and seeking relief under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act (“FDJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).

Summary: Mr. Barth commenced an adversary proceeding seeking a declaratory judgment that various state court actions by Mr. Spoor could have been brought by the bankruptcy trustee, who had previously signed a release of such actions, and that Mr. Spoor should be required to dismiss those actions. The bankruptcy court instead dismissed Mr. Barth’s adversary proceeding on the grounds that such relief was prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The bankruptcy court declined, however, to award the sanctions sought by Mr.

Abstract: Bankruptcy reform in 2005 restricted debtors’ ability to discharge private student loan debt. The reform was motivated by the perceived incentive of some borrowers to file bankruptcy under Chapter 7 even if they had, or expected to have, sufficient income to service their debt. Using a national sample of credit bureau files, we examine whether private student loan borrowers distinctly adjusted their Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing behavior in response to the reform.

Summary: Through a complicated series of transactions and guarantees, Georgia Spiliotis sought to subrogate to the rights of Bank of North Carolina against the debtors, Nicolas & Mary Spirakis. The bankruptcy court first differentiated between conventional subrogation, “is founded upon the agreement of the parties.” Joyner v. Reflector Co., 176 N.C. 274, 276, 97 S.E.

Summary: Ms.  Morgen brought suit alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and Student Loan Finance (“SLF”) moved for a change of venue to South Dakota based on a forum selection clause in the contract. Ms.  Morgen’s initial objection that the loan applications and promissory notes proffered by SLF  had no affidavits from record keepers   denied as the court held that such would be precluded as evidence in a consideration of a motion for summary judgment, but, in part because “there is no plausible contention that these documents are inaut

Summary: The bankruptcy court granted the Motion for in rem relief sought by Wells Fargo pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4), as to Mr. Clark and his wife, further barring Mr. Clark from filing any bankruptcy in the Eastern District of North Carolina for one year. In denying the Mr. Clark’s motion for stay pending appeal and for a writ of supersedes, the district denied such finding the Mr. Clark had not made a clear showing that he had a likelihood of success in the appeal and agreeing with the bankruptcy court that Mr.