Summary: Ms. Mungo-Craig brought suit against Navient, first in state court and then after removal in federal district court, alleging violations of the FDCPA and North Carolina Debt Collection Act. The district court denied her motion to remand, finding that it did have federal question jurisdiction to hear claims brought under the FDCPA and supplemental jurisdiction for the other state law claims, as they arose from the same common nucleus of facts. It then granted the Motion to Dismiss brought by Navient finding that Ms.

Summary: Mr.

Summary: Mr. and Dr. Edwards, whose combined monthly gross income as health care professionals is $25722.67, filed Chapter 7, listing nearly $850,000 in general unsecured debts, which were primarily business debts. Dr. Dori Thomas, with whom Dr. Edwards had previously been in medical practice and was a co-guarantor, and Wells Fargo, which held a third lien for $695,000 against property, sought dismissal of the case under 11 U.S.C. § 707(a), as § 707(b) did not apply since the Edwards did not have primarily consumer debts. Following In re Marino, 388 B.R.

Summary: In a counter to McDuffie v. West (In re West), No. 5:15-CV-557-FL, 2016 WL 4186853 (E.D.N.C. July 15, 2016), where the debtor testified solely as to the tax value for property, "but ... failed to provide any competent independent knowledge to establish as a basis for a court to accept the third-party assessment appraisal as the actual value of the subject property", in the present case Ms. Ward started by stating the tax value.

Summary: In an unfulfilled business agreement, over a period of fourteen (14) years, Medflow, Inc. never made any royalty payments, never provided a written sales reports ,and never obtained consent for restricted sales. When Christenbury Eye Center, P.A. brought suit for such, the trial court dismissed the case as the various claims were stale under the applicable Statutes of Limitations.

Summary: Before filing a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy, Ms. Washabaugh was employed by Wake Forest Baptist Health/N.C. Baptist Hospital, where she made personal purchases using her employer’s credit card without reimbursement, also using that credit card and gift cards to make purchases from her own Thirty-One handbag business for gifts for volunteers and other employees. Ms. Washabaugh was terminated for these purchases, with the hospital filing an employee dishonesty claim with National Union Fire Insurance for $1,009,347.00. When Ms.

Summary: In previously ruling on the foreclosure by power of sale on this property, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld that foreclosure, finding that the Deed of Trust contained a sufficient description to identify the real property. See In re Foreclosure of a Deed of Trust Executed by Reed, 233 N.C. App. 598, 758 S.E.2d 902, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 381 (2014). Subsequently, but before the foreclosure sale was completed, Mr. Howse and Ms. Reed brought a separate suit in Superior Court, raising equitable grounds to enjoin the foreclosure.

Summary: Following the filing of Ms. Murphy’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy, her ex-husband, Mr. Kozek, brought an adversary proceeding against her for malicious prosecution, seeking both monetary damages and a determination that any such award was nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). After a bench trial, to which both parties explicitly consented, the bankruptcy court found Ms. Murphy liable to Mr. Kozek in the amount of $8,274.94, which was nondischargeable. While the written judgment was pending, Ms.

Summary: Leaving aside the multiple foreclosure proceedings and subsequent appeals, Mr. Garvey eventually filed a short-lived, pro se Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Attorneys for Seterus filed a Notice of Appearance and Objection to Confirmation. Mr. Garvey then sent a demand to the attorneys, as debt collectors, pursuant to 15 U.S.C.

Summary: Ms. Bronikowski disclosed a potential employment bonus in her November 11, 2016, bankruptcy petition, asserting that it was not an asset of her bankruptcy estate, as the award of the bonus was at the complete discretion of the employer, and, in the alternative and out of caution, claimed it as exempt as wages of the debtor under N.C.G.S. § 1-362.