Summary: While Ms. Sparrow’s civil action for equitable distribution was pending in state court, she file a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The primary assets of her bankruptcy estate consist of a fee simple interest in a house and lot located in Durham, North Carolina and a one-half undivided tenant-in-common interest in five tracts of real property located in Granville County, North Carolina, the stated intention being that the plan would liquidate these assets and pay creditors, potentially in full. Ms. Sparrow first commenced an Adversary Proceeding against Mr.

Summary: Following In re: Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors for Dornier Aviation (North America), Inc., 453 F.3d 225 (2006), the Court of Appeals affirmed the recharacterization by bankruptcy court of an equity investment as debt.

Summary: Following the disclosure in more than 4,200 Proofs of Claim by Wake Med of personal identifying information, several Debtors sought sanctions for violations of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9037, HIPAA, and 11 U.S.C. §107. The bankruptcy court held that it was not a “HIPAA compliance tribunal” and might not have jurisdiction to decide such claims. Further, “[t]he case law overwhelmingly holds that there is no private right of action under HIPAA or §107 ”, leaving Rule 9037 as the primary remedy.

Summary: This is the latest of a line of decisions resulting from a complicated set of commercial transactions (which this consumer bankruptcy blog will leave for others to explicate). It does, nonetheless, have few nuggett of use in consumer cases, specifically in Footnote 1 which recognizes that “it is possible that the Counterclaim constitutes a claim filed against the estate.” Cf. Carroll v. Farooqi, 486 B.R. 718, 722-23 (Bankr. N.D.

Summary: This case involved a valuation duel between Ms. Sweeney and Ditech over a 1999 Horton Mirage II 24' x 52' mobile home, which all parties agreed was personal property. At the valuation hearing. Ms. Sweeney testified both as to her belief that the property suffered from “extensive water damage” and general disrepair, having a value of $10,000-$11,000. Ms. Sweeney based this on the county tax value of $9,850. Ditech presented Mr.

Summary: Bankruptcy Court Characterization of Equitable Distribution Awards Cheryl Jones brought motions against the Debtor, her ex-husband, Sean Jones, seeking relief from the stay and for determination of Domestic Support Obligation, with the primary question being whether the family court’s Equitable Distribution Order award of $116,182 from the debtor’s 401(k) plan and $63,736 from the debtor’s retirement account were in the nature of a domestic support obligation, pursuant to §§ 101(14A) and 523(a)(5), or

  Summary: While factually complicated, this case presents two issues of first impression under North Carolina law, first regarding the interpretation of the term “transfer” the North Carolina Uniform Voidable Transactions Act, N.C.G.S.

Summary: The parties in this case, where the Plaintiff alleged that personal identifying information had been disclosed in a Proof of Claim, reached a settlement but sought a Motion to Seal in order so that such settlement would not be construed as binding for similar claims. The bankruptcy court, however, found that 11 U.S.C.

Summary: After the filing of her Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the Debtor found a cashier’s check payable to her ex-husband in the amount of $11,000.00. This check was not listed as an asset in the Debtor’s schedules, but her ex-husband was listed as holding a priority claim for $0.00 for alimony. The Debtor contended that this was for unpaid alimony and her ex-husband, in fact, had the sole allowed DSO priority claim for $15,000.00 in the case.

Summary: The bankruptcy court in this opinion begins by distinguishing between the judicial notice that a court may take of pleadings and proceedings in other courts and judicial estoppel. The bankruptcy court held that while a court cannot take judicial notice of the truth of facts alleged in those pleadings, it can nonetheless take judicial notice that such allegations were made. From the fact that such allegations had been made, the bankruptcy court then turned to determine whether such allegations judicially estopped a party in later proceedings.