Summary: Ms. Jones brought suit against the College of Southern Maryland under the Family and Medical Leave Act and subsequently filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, eventually listing the lawsuit as an asset in her schedules. The Trustee then settled the lawsuit with the College of Southern Maryland for $75,000, with $25,000 to the attorney, as she was the only party having standing to pursue the claim. Ms.

Summary: Mr. Hutton’s vehicles were seized in a levy by the Onslow County Sheriff’s Department in executing on a judgment obtained by Principis. After filing bankruptcy, Mr. Hutton sought turnover of the vehicle and asserted that the possessory lien held by Principii had not been perfected by recordation with the North Carolina DMV. In narrowly construing and distinguishing several decisions from the North Carolina Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, the bankruptcy court rejected the argument by Principis that recordation is required to perfect a lien under N.C.G.S.

Summary: After the death of her Melvin Clayton, Wells Fargo accelerated the reverse mortgage note and sought to foreclose on the residence still owned by Mrs. Clayton. The Court of Appeals held that even though Mrs. Clayton was identified as a “borrower” on the Deed of Trust, Melvin Clayton was “the only contemplated borrower to the reverse-mortgage agreement, as he alone executed [those] documents and was obligated under them.” Mrs. Clayton was, due to her age, ineligible to be a borrower under the reverse mortgage, which, pursuant to N.C.G.S.

Summary: In determining whether Mr. Green was eligible, under 11 U.S.C. § 109(e), to be a Chapter 13 debtor due to debt limitations, the bankruptcy court reviewed several types of claims to determine whether each was “noncontingent” or “liquidated”. While determination of whether a debt is “noncontingent” or “liquidated” is a question of law, See In re Goralnick, 81 B.R. 570, 571 (9th Cir. BAP 1987) the amount of a debt is a question of fact.

Summary: Mr. Rusnack and his then-wife, opened a home equity line of credit (HELOC) with Cardinal Bank in August 2003. Between 2003 and 2006, the Rusnacks periodically drew on the HELOC using checks issued by Cardinal Bank. On June 22, 2006, shortly after the Rusnacks separated, Mr. Rusnack directed Cardinal Bank in writing to freeze further advances from the HELOC and Cardinal Bank acknowledge such freeze. Despite this, Cardinal Bank honored two checks each in the amount of $10,000 from Ms. Rusnack on July 26, 2006, and September 12, 2006.

Summary: The Daughterys purchased their home in 1999, with a 15-year balloon note payable in July 2014 in the amount of $82,666.36.  In 2012, the Daughterys had fallen $6,128.39 behind on the regular payments and Ocwen, who had become the mortgage servicer after the first default by the Daughterys, commenced foreclosure, reporting accurately the delinquency and foreclosure proceeding.

Summary: In a case involving a hog farm and related claims of environmental pollution, Sound Rivers, Inc.’s and Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. sought an order confirming that the automatic stay does not apply or, in the alternative, for relief from the automatic stay in order to continue their lawsuit filed in the federal district Court.

Summary: Mr. and Mrs. Regenhardt sought to claim their residence and the adjacent property as fully exempt under the available homestead exemption, with the Trustee asserting that the adjacent property was not part of the homestead and only partially exempt using their wildcard. In reviewing the case law from the district, specifically In re Stox, No. 10-08123-8-RDD, 2011 WL 5902882, at *6 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. May 27, 2011) and In re Rogers, No. 16-02884-5-JNC, 2016 WL 5794707, at *4 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct.

  Summary: Default Judgment was entered in favor of Ms. Deal for violations of the FDCPA by Trinity Hope Associates, which failed to respond to the Complaint. Commentary: The only aspect that is interesting is that this is a 10-page opinion finding default, where the defendant did not answer. For a copy of the opinion, please see: Deal v.

Summary: Ms. Mungo-Craig brought suit against Navient, first in state court and then after removal in federal district court, alleging violations of the FDCPA and North Carolina Debt Collection Act. The district court denied her motion to remand, finding that it did have federal question jurisdiction to hear claims brought under the FDCPA and supplemental jurisdiction for the other state law claims, as they arose from the same common nucleus of facts. It then granted the Motion to Dismiss brought by Navient finding that Ms.