Summary: Rudlow, the attorney for WFS, brought a replevin action against Rawlinson and her nephew, for a vehicle which the nephew owned, subject to a lien held by WFS.  Rawlinson was not a party to the note, but Rudlow believed Rawlinson either had possession of the vehicle or knew its location, since her nephew lived with her.  Rawlinson brought a FDCPA claim in response. The 4^th Circuit began by holding that, just as, following Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, PLLC, 443 F.3d 373, 375-76 (4th Cir.

 Summary:

Finch leased a room from Campus Habitat and asserted that Campus Habitat breached their lease, causing her to move out.  Campus Habitat responded and counterclaimed, receiving judgment for damages and, pursuant to the lease, attorneys’ fees.

Summary: At the foreclosure hearing before the New Hanover County Clerk of Court, the Pughes filed an Election of Arbitration.  The Clerk of Court did not act on this, instead finding that the Substitute Trustee had meet the six statutory requirements to proceed with foreclosure.  The Pughes appealed to Superior Court, where the judge again found that the requirements for foreclosure had been met and declined to rule on the request for arbitration. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that both the Clerk of Court and, on appeal, the Superior Court had scope only

Summary: Deertrack Investors, L.L.C.

Summary: Watkins provided a letter to Latigo Investments and the other plaintiffs, that he owned RDS Diversity Capital Corp ("RDS"), which had obtained $30 million in financing from Waddell and Reed, Inc., for the purchase of an ownership interest in MB2, a NASCAR team.   RDS had never, in fact, been organized, did not have the ability to close the financing with Waddell and Reed, and had no ability to obtain other financing. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court found that Watkins had acted "with substantial certainty that harm would re

Summary: Dark brought an adversary proceeding seeking to have the debt of Thomas declared nondischargable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).  Thomas moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal,  129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949,  (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

Summary:

Prior to the Debtor’s discharge, the Tortoretes  were granted two extensions of time for the purpose of reviewing documents provided in connection with the Rule 2004 Examination of Cornerstone and to consider filing a complaint objecting to discharge.   When no objection was filed, the Debtor was granted a discharge.  Nearly one year later, the Tortoretes sought to reopen the Debtor’s case to o

Summary: Jacobsen Construction entered into a contract with Kiddco to perform subcontract work on a project at Wake Technical Community College.  On May 7, 2004, Kiddco submitted an invoice to Jacobsen for $90,625.27 for grading work at the site and on June 2, 2004, submitted a second invoice for another $102,366.70.   On June 10, 2004, Jacobsen paid Kiddco $35,000 and then on June 29, 2004, Jacobsen paid another $55,625.27.   On September 24, 2004, Jacobsen filed Chapter 7, and the Trustee ultimately sought to avoid all of the payments to Kiddco as p

Summary: Doral agreed in an Interim Servicing Agreement ("ISA") to take over servicing of Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac") mortgages previously serviced by R&G Mortgage Corp.  (R&G).  R&G, however, successfully block this assignment.  Even though it never actually serviced these mortgages and incurred actual costs of only $124,588.00,  Doral then sought 24-months of servicing fees as compensation, as required under the ISA.  Freddie Mac argued that Doral was not entitled to such fees, as Freddie Mac had never determin

Summary: Epps purchased a vehicle from Thompson Toyota subject to a retail sales installment contract ("RIC")  that provided, among other things, that it was subject to federal and Maryland law, including the Maryland Closed End Credit Provisions ("CLEC").  The note was later assigned to Chase.  When Epps later defaulted, Chase repossessed the vehicle and notified Epps of its intent to sell the vehicle.  Contrary to the provisions of CLEC, however, Chase did not notify Epps of the current location of the vehicle or where and when it was to be sold.  E