Ms.  Musenge rented a set of tires from Smartway, signing a lease that included permission to contact her, through live and automated calls, through her mobile telephone and further agreeing that she “waived the protections of all rights to privacy laws.”  When she fell behind on payments, Smartway not only began sending text messages for collection but also promotional advertisements.  Ms.

In apparent connection with a foreclosure,  Richardson, acting pro se, brought and FDCPA suit for failure to adequately verify debts under 15 U.S.C.  § 1692(g) against Shapiro & Brown, Nationstar Mortgage and Rushmore Loan Management.  In a very terse one-page memorandum opinion, the district court dismissed the case due to res judicata and the statute of limitations.  It can be surmised  only from the brief filed by Nationstar at the district court with its Motion to Dismiss, that Richardson had previousl

In two nearly identical cases, pro se consumers brought suit pursuant to 15 U.S.C.  § 1681g(a)(1),  alleging that Experian Information Systems (“EIS”)and/or Transunion were credit reporting agencies under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and that both had, despite specific requests, only provided copies of their credit report and not their entire credit file, based on a belief that information regarding credit reporting hacks and identify disclosures were contain in the more complete file.  In both cases the defendants brought M

The Randles fell behind on their car payments and Saga Auto Sales repossessed the Randles’ 2011 Cadillac Escalade.  Upon payment of $2,100, Saga returned the vehicle on December 2, 2017.  With their next payment due on December 9,   2017, the Randles filed Chapter 13 on December 8, 2017.  Saga again repossessed the vehicle on December 10, 2018, also taking possession of Ms.

Mr.

On remand from the 4th Circuit, where Jason McDonald and MDC first raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the bankruptcy court held that the actual debtor in this case held an ownership interest in MDC, such was, even under the broad “related to” jurisdiction,  insufficient to allow the bankruptcy court to determine what assets were  owned by that corporate entity.  Otherwise:

Under such an expansive interpretation of “related to” jurisdiction, if a debtor owned a single share of a corporation

Even though the Debtors admitted that they did not meet th venue requirements of 28 U.S.C.  § 1408, the bankruptcy court held that Rule 1014 required dismissal or transfer of a case filed in an improper district only on the filing of “timely” objection by a party in interest.  Here, First New York Federal Credit Union did not object to venue until after the  §341 Meeting of Creditors, payments had been collected through wage garnishment, and a proposed plan was pending, and then only on the 2nd to last day to object to Confir

Following a trial (which the bankruptcy court described as more akin to a Summary Judgment Hearing), which was preceded by what can almost described as a remand by the bankruptcy court  to the state domestic court to clarify the nature of its award of 50% of the Debtor’s retirement to his ex-wife, the bankruptcy court held that such award was not equitable distribution, which would have been dischargable in the Debtor’s Chapter 13, but a non-dischargable domestic support obligation.

The bankruptcy court applied a

Koepplinger, as a putative class representative, alleged that Seterus would send North Carolina residents who were more than 45 day delinquent on mortgage payments its “NC Final Letter”, which stated, in pertinent part, that:

“If full payment of the default amount is not received by us . . .