Summary: Ms. Roger inherited real property from her mother, which included a residence and a building originally used as a country store, which was subsequently renovated into a residential rental property. After obtaining a mortgage against the entire property, Ms. Rogers, with the consent of the lienholder, subdivided the residence and the rental properties. Upon filing Chapter 13, Ms.

Summary: During a period of financial distress and shortly before their divorce, Doreen Baum made repeated unauthorized withdrawals from the Martin Baum’s IRAs, and did not pay the mortgage on the couple’s beach house, using the funds for the support and maintenance of the family. When the Baums divorced, the parties entered into an consent orders for Alimony and Equitable Distribution.

Summary: Lendmark financed the purchase and installation of an HVAC unit for Ms. Hudgins’ home. All parties agreed that the HVAC unit was a “consumer good” as defined by N.C.G.S. § 25-9-102, that Lendmark held an automatically perfected purchase money security interest in the HVAC as chattel pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 25-9-309(1) and that Lendmark did not record a fixture filing. The Trustee argued that without the fixture filing Lendmark’s security interest fell to the hypothetical judgment lien creditor status of bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 544.

Summary: The IRS recorded two tax liens against real property and subsequently the Village of Sugar Mountain (“the Village”) obtain a third lien against the property for local property taxes. The Village ultimately sought to foreclose on its tax lien, but did not, despite the requirement in 26 U.S.C. § 7425(a), give notice to the federal government of the sale. The property was sold on November 13, 2013, in a judicial tax foreclosure for $6,673.73 to the Village. The following day, November, 14, 2013,the property was sold at a federal tax foreclosure to Mr.

Summary: Turnover of a vehicle held by a Raeford Collision and subject to a possessory mechanic’s lien was resolved subject to a Consent Order, which required the MacGregor to provide the title to the vehicle so that a lien could be recorded with the North Carolina DMV.

Summary: Following the re-opening of Ms. Washabaugh’s Chapter 7, the Bankruptcy Administrator sought revocation of her discharge. Ms. ’s motion to dismiss that complaint, alleging that the Bankruptcy Administrator lacked standing for such action, was denied by the bankruptcy court and Ms. Washabaugh sought leave to bring an interlocutory appeal to the district court. The district court began with 28 U.S.C.

Summary: Mr. and Mrs. Foley each had several life insurance policies which named as the beneficiary a testamentary trust created by virtually identical wills. These directed the estate trustee to use any income and principal from the trust “for the health, maintenance and support” of the surviving spouse or subsequently their son. A later provision, however, authorized the trustee to “compromise claims”.

Summary: Mr. Faison filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy seeking, among other things, to continue to develop real property against which Summit Bridge held several claims. Summit Bridge objected to confirmation of Mr. Faison’s (third) plan of reorganization based on infeasibility at it was a “visionary scheme” that was “based on speculation, hope and desire, and has no demonstrable objective fact or facts as its foundation.” While stating that it believed Mr. Faison could ultimately propose a feasible plan, the bankruptcy court found the current plan infeasible.

Summary: Mr. Daniel, together with the Chapter 13 Trustee subsequently added as a necessary Plaintiff, sought to avoid a pre-petition foreclosure by his homeowner’s association of his residence (in which the upset period had elapsed prior to filing of the bankruptcy) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1), as it had occurred within two years prior to the filing of the bankruptcy, had made the Debtor insolvent and provided less than “reasonably equivalent value” in exchange for the transfer.

Summary: The Trustee sought to recover a transfer made by the Debtor to James Smith, the principal of the Debtor, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 547 and 550(a). At issue was whether the Debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer. The Trustee argued that based on the Debtor’s tax returns and the presumption of insolvency during the 90 days preceding the filing of bankruptcy, that the Debtor was insolvent, whereas Smith asserted that based on the scheduled value of assets and amount of liabilities, the Debtor was solvent. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.