Summary: In 2005, David Allison approached Elizabeth McKinny with an investment opportunity in Venture Capital In Motion (“VCIM”), wherein McKinny would, as an “approved investor”, obtain irrevocable bank guarantees for her $500,000 investment. When VCIM failed and the funds were lost, McKinny brought suit against Allison alleging claims for breach of the promissory note, common law fraud, and securities fraud, alleging violation of 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b- 5.

Summary: The Debtor was the manager and majority member of IYB Properties (“IYB”), where he executed and personally guaranteed a promissory note in favor of Prestige Wealth Management (“Prestige”) for $1.5 million. The Debtor owned an 85% interest in IYB, with Prestige holding 15%, with the purpose of acquiring and developing specific real property to expand the recycling operation owned by the Debtor.

Summary: Petromax sought to prohibit the use by the Debtor of cash collateral of all of the profits produced by convenience stores, or at least a portion of the funds attributable to rent payments, due to an assignment of “rents and emoluments from the premises” provision in a Deed of Trust. In the present case, the bankruptcy court drew a distinction between income generated by the real property itself, which would constitute “rents”, and sales and services, which are merely sold or performed at the location, even if those services and sales relied on improvements on the re

Summary: Following a objections to a Chapter 11 plan by the bankruptcy administrator, First Citizens Bank and other creditors, the Debtor negotiated confirmation, which provided, in part pertinent to this decision, that it would be allowed 11 months to actively market and sell to parcels of real property, against which First Citizens held liens. Failure to sell the collateral during that time would allow First Citizens to foreclose.

Summary: Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 548, the Chapter 7 Trustee sought to recover transfers made for the benefit of Bacchus within two years of the bankruptcy filing, arguing that the transfer were a fraudulent conveyance. Bacchus disputed the allegations that the Debtor received less that the reasonably equivalent value, as the payments were for an obligation owed by the debtor to Bacchus’ deceased father for the purchase of grain, which had been stored on the debtor’s property.

Summary: The Register of Deeds for Guilford County (ROD) brought suit against MERS, LPS and most of the large mortgage servicers asserting that the various practices of the mortgage industry violated the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 45-36.9, were unfair and deceptive trade practices, and constituted an unjust enrichment. The Defendants sought dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and (6). N.C.G.S.

Abstract: Filing for bankruptcy is the primary legal mechanism by which homeowners in foreclosure can exert control over ownership of their home, yet little is known about the interplay between bankruptcy chapters, mortgage servicers, state foreclosure laws, and home foreclosure auctions. We analyze 4,280 lower-income homeowners in the United States who were more than 90 days late paying their 30-year fixed-rate mortgages. Two dozen organizations serviced these mortgages and initiated foreclosure between 2003 and 2012.

Summary: The Debtor filed Chapter 7 in 1998 and received a discharge shortly thereafter. In 2009, the Debtor commenced litigation in Florida regarding 24,000 shares of SafeCard, Inc. stock, purchased for approximately $120,000.00 in November 1977, upon which the Debtor had never received distributions or dividends. The Debtor had not listed this asset in his petition and accordingly, the Chapter 7 Trustee reopened the case in September 2012, but took no subsequent steps to administer the asset.

Summary: The Debtor had since 1998 complied with the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 105-306 to list for taxes the personal property owned in Wake County. The Debtor was required to file such a disclosure between January 1st and 31st of 2009, but failed to do so, instead filing bankruptcy on February 18, 2009. On September 30, 2009, Wake County subsequently sent the Debtor a notice that it had assessed taxes at a “discovered value” of 125% of the value from the previous year and that the Debtor had, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 105-312(d), thirty (30) days to contest this value.

Proposed opinion examines the ethical duties of a lawyer representing both the buyer and the seller on the purchase of a foreclosure property and the lawyer’s duties when the representation is limited to the seller. Editor's note: This opinion supplements and clarifies 2006 FEO 3. Inquiry #1: Bank A foreclosed its deed of trust on real property and was the highest bidder at the sale. Bank A listed the property.