Summary: Debtor brought an Adversary Proceeding against Defendants alleging unpaid invoices a little more than two months after its Chapter 11 plan was confirmed. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b) and 157(a) a matter “is within the jurisdiction of [a Bankruptcy] Court if it is ‘arising under,’ ‘arising in,’ or ‘related to’ the corresponding bankruptcy case.” Citing to In re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619, 625 (4thCir. 1997) (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3rdCir.

Summary: In a “vigorously litigated case”, the Debtor proposed to surrender certain parcels of real property to satisfy the claim of Capital Bank, i.e. “Dirt for Debt”. Based on the valuations of the real property at issue, the bankruptcy court held that those properties had sufficient value to fully satisfy the claim of Capital Bank, leaving it with no unsecured deficiency claim. Capital Bank nonetheless contended that it should not be subject to cram-down under 11 U.S.C. § 1129.

Summary: The Chapter Trustee sought denial of Spiers’ discharge, exemptions, and monetary relief on the grounds that Spiers had intentionally failed to disclose numerous assets and transfers of assets he owned or had an interest in at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, attempted to suborn perjury from another witness, and failed to cooperate with the Trustee to the point that the Trustee forced to expend a substantial amount of time and resources in attempting to obtain an accurate portrayal of Spier’s finances and to recover for the benefit of his creditors.

Summary: Bridgetree successfully sued, among others, Redf Marketing and its president and 50% owner, Roselli, for trade secret misappropriation, obtaining a judgment of $678,292 in federal district court. Following the entry of the judgment, Roselli and Redf made representations to the district court that they could neither post a bond nor continue operating without bankruptcy. In response, Bridgetree filed an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy for Redf and Roselli, who sought dismissal of the involuntary bankruptcy. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.

Summary: In November of 2005, Arlington Hills executed a promissory note and Deed of Trust for $596,345, with such currently being held by Wells Fargo. Thereafter, John & Beverly Cobb, Max & Christy Smith, and Mark Carpenter executed personally guarantees for the note in order to obtain renewals and modifications of the terms. When Arlington Hills defaulted the balance on the note was nearly $2 million, Wells Fargo initiated both a foreclosure and suit against both Arlington Hills and the several guarantors.

Summary: Perry executed a note and Deed of Trust in favor of American Home Mortgage (AHM), with two individuals named as Trustees and MERS named as the beneficiary and “solely as nominee” for AHM. Citimortgage acquired the mortgage through an endorsement by AHM.

Summary: On June 17, 2010, Waddington Ridge HOA filed a claim of lien against Dong’s residence and then filed a notice of foreclosure hearing on July 22, 2010. At that hearing, the Clerk of Court allowed the foreclosure to proceed and the sale was held on November 2, 2010, with the foreclosure deed being recorded on February 17, 2011. Dong filed a motion for relief from the foreclosure order on October 31, 2011, and the trial court ultimately concluded that Dong had not received proper notice and, pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P.

Summary: Under North Carolina’s New Motor Vehicles Warranties Act, N.C.G.S. § § 20-351, a motor vehicle manufacturer is required to either repurchase or refund the purchase price if “after a reasonable number of attempts” the vehicle cannot be repaired to conform with express warranties. N.C.G.S. § 20-351.5 creates a presumption that the manufacturer has failed if it attempts to repair the vehicle four or more times. The consumer must have notified the manufacturer in writing of the defect and allowed up to fifteen (15) days to make repairs.

Summary: Having previously found that several claims brought by the Debtor against Bank of America were, pursuant to Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), core and subject to bankruptcy court jurisdiction, while others were “statutorily core, but did not qualify as constitutionally core”, the bankruptcy court retained the core issues and referred the non-core claims to arbitration.

Summary: Husband and Wife filed Chapter 7, with the Wife claiming both an equitable interest in a 2006 Lexus, despite not being listed as an owner on the title, and claiming an exemption. The Trustee objected, relying on In re Horstman, 276 B.R. 80 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2002), where the bankruptcy court held that a debtor could not claim an exemption in a vehicle, titled in her husband’s name only, based on the definition of “marital property.” This proposition was expanded in In re Thams, No. 10–33089, 2011 WL 863293, at *4 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. Mar.