Summary:
Smithville Crossings’ Chapter 11 plan was confirmed wherein the Richardsons, the Debtor’s sole equity owners, agreed to grant a lien to creditor Rialto of unencumbered real estate, if the Richardsons were able to retain their ownership in Smithville Crossings. The plan provided that the Richardsons would pay $10,000 to purchase that ownership interest and invited competing bids. The highest bidder, however, was neither the Richardsons nor Rialto, but a subsidiary of Rialto.
The bankruptcy court held that such an equity auction following confi
Summary:
After Wells Fargo commenced foreclosure, the Debtor filed an action against Wells Fargo first in North Carolina Superior Court, which was then removed to the Middle District Court. (This series of events actually occurred twice.) When the Debtor eventually filed bankruptcy in the Eastern District, venue in her case against Wells Fargo was transferred.
Following a Motion to dismiss the Debtor’s complaint, the Debtor sought to voluntarily dismiss her Chapter 13 case, requesting that the Complaint against Wells Fargo then be remanded to either the Eastern D
Summary:
The Male Debtor executed a promissory note in favor of Option One Mortgage, the predecessor to Wells Fargo, and at the same time both Debtors executed a Deed of Trust. Subsequently, the Male Debtor defaulted on the note and the property was sold at foreclosure. A Substitute Trustee’s Deed was then recorded, conveying the property to Wells Fargo.
Later, the Clerk of Court was informed that the Notice of Sale had not been included in the foreclosure file and Clerk set aside the foreclosure sale. Wells Fargo then transferred the property to Male Debto
Summary:
The Debtor filed Chapter 13 in 2009, subsequently converting to Chapter 7 on May 9, 2011. This conversion was one day prior to a hearing to determine the status of the claim of the Debtor’s ex-wife, Ms. Day.
Ms. Day argued that the conversion was only done in an attempt to avoid paying her claim through the Debtor’s Chapter 13 plan, which otherwise only required $21.50 to complete. Additionally, Ms. Day alleged that the Debtor self-reported environmental hazards on their property, in an effort to reduce the value. Accordingl
Outside of bankruptcy, the right of a secured creditor to "credit bid" allows the secured creditor to compete with cash bids in foreclosure to assure that the secured creditor’s collateral is not sold for less than the secured creditor thinks it is worth.
This Essay, which was written for a Law and Contemporary Problems symposium on Stanley Hauerwas, tries to develop an account of public engagement in Hauerwas’ theology. The Essay distinguishes between two kinds of public engagement, "prophetic" and "participatory." Christian engagement is prophetic when it criticizes or condemns the state, often by urging the state to honor or alter its true principles.
Summary:
In foreclosing on a Deed of Trust, the Trustee was paid costs and expenses consisting of a commission, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 45-21.15(a), of 5% of the highest bid and Trustee's attorneys fees of 15% of the outstanding promissory note on which behalf he was acting. This resulted in third lien-holder receiving only partial payment and the fourth lien-holder receiving nothing. The third lien-holder filed a motion with the Clerk of Superior Court arguing that under N.C.G.S.
On April 20, 2005, President Bush signed into law the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). BAPCPA was hailed by some as a sensible overhaul of the bankruptcy code aimed towards decreasing repeat bankruptcy filing rates. In this article, the authors consider specific changes that BAPCPA made to the Bankruptcy Code. Some of these changes were specifically targeted at the congressional view that repeat bankruptcy filings are largely the result of strategic and irresponsible behavior.
This paper is inspired directly by two articles coauthored by Professors Bebchuk and Fried, which comprehensively questioned the efficiency of the bankruptcy priority awarded to secured claims. It starts by pointing out the following efficiency benefit of such priority largely unmentioned in the legal literature, including the Bebchuk and Fried articles: the priority of secured debts undermines borrowers’ incentives to pursue excessively risky investment projects under certain circumstances.
