Summary: In a “Dirt for Debt” Plan, the Chapter 11 Debtor’s proposed to surrender real property to Gateway. The Bankruptcy Court held that the proper basis for valuation for such tender was the fair market value standard, where Gateway had urged a liquidation value. On appeal, the District Court held that while 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) mandates use of the fair market or “replacement” value where the Debtor intends to retain the collateral for its own use, the same is not true where the Debtor intends to surrender the property.

Summary: The Bankruptcy Court, subsequently affirmed by the District Court, determined that the two liens held by Bank of America against real property were void pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) because of inaccurate property descriptions. See Meade v. Bank of America (In re Meade), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 4631, 2011 WL 5909398 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. July 29, 2011), and Bank of America v. Meade,Bank of Am. v. Meade, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96071 (E.D.N.C. July 9, 2012).

Summary: Rodgers had filed a complaint for claims arising from a real estate dispute. The Bankruptcy Court granted a judgment on the pleadings as to two defendants, but, in light of Sterns v. Marshall, the District Court returned the matter to the Bankruptcy Court for a determination of whether the issues raised were “core” or “non-core” and the basis for jurisdiction. (See: http://ncbankruptcyexpert.com/?p=1137) The Bankruptcy Court then found that the claims were “non-core” pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

Summary: United Marketing Solutions (UMS) obtained a judgment against the Fowlers for $106,076.82. Subsequently, Rees Associates obtained a judgment against UMS for $172,194.94. Rees then initiated garnishment proceeding against the Fowlers, but then entered into a Settlement and Release with the Fowlers which called for the Fowlers to pay Rees “the sum of $ ___ upon execution of this Agreement in full and complete satisfaction of the Garnishment.

Summary: Following conversion from Chapter 13, the Debtor sought to redeem a motor vehicle based on the NADA trade-in value from the commencement of the bankruptcy case. Finding that BAPCPA amendments in 2005 to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) abrogated the previous rule as stated in In re Murray, No. 00-10603, slip op. at 5-6 (Bankr. M.D.N.C.

Summary: After the Gatelys had filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy and provided written notice, Holly Hills Hospital sent the Debtors ten (10) billing statements and also threatening telephone calls for several weeks. As Mrs. Gately suffers from mental health issues (for which she had presumably received treatment from Holly Hills Hospital), these letters and telephone calls “informed the debtors that bankruptcy was futile” and caused Mrs.

Summary: Following City of Perth Amboy v. Custom Distrib. Serv., Inc. (In re Custom Distrib. Serv., Inc.), 224 F.3d 235, 243-44 (3d Cir. 2000), the bankruptcy court held that a Debtor must “must have properly requested [a] tax refund ... in order for [a bankruptcy] court to have the jurisdiction to determine and order the payment of such refund.” The Debtor applied for a tentative carry back adjustment to the IRS pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6411, by completing Form 1139.

Summary: Debtor brought an Adversary Proceeding against Defendants alleging unpaid invoices a little more than two months after its Chapter 11 plan was confirmed. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b) and 157(a) a matter “is within the jurisdiction of [a Bankruptcy] Court if it is ‘arising under,’ ‘arising in,’ or ‘related to’ the corresponding bankruptcy case.” Citing to In re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619, 625 (4thCir. 1997) (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3rdCir.

Summary: In a “vigorously litigated case”, the Debtor proposed to surrender certain parcels of real property to satisfy the claim of Capital Bank, i.e. “Dirt for Debt”. Based on the valuations of the real property at issue, the bankruptcy court held that those properties had sufficient value to fully satisfy the claim of Capital Bank, leaving it with no unsecured deficiency claim. Capital Bank nonetheless contended that it should not be subject to cram-down under 11 U.S.C. § 1129.

Summary: The Chapter Trustee sought denial of Spiers’ discharge, exemptions, and monetary relief on the grounds that Spiers had intentionally failed to disclose numerous assets and transfers of assets he owned or had an interest in at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, attempted to suborn perjury from another witness, and failed to cooperate with the Trustee to the point that the Trustee forced to expend a substantial amount of time and resources in attempting to obtain an accurate portrayal of Spier’s finances and to recover for the benefit of his creditors.