Summary: Following a Motion for Relief from Stay filed by ASC, the Debtor argued that ASC was not a a “party in interest” and lacked standing as there was neither an endorsement on the note nor an allonge affixed and presented in support of the Motion. \ Avoiding this issue, the Bankruptcy Court held “that a confirmed Chapter 13 plan, which represents a new contractual agreement between debtors and their creditors, is res judicata on the issue of a creditor’s rights as a party in interest with standing to seek relief from the stay.” In re Jeter, No.

Summary: In addition to a misstatement regarding their residency in the Western District of North Carolina, the Debtors failed to disclose in their Chapter 7 petition that they had transferred real property to their daughter within one year of their bankruptcy filing. Upon discovery by the Trustee (and likely facing avoidance of the transfer) the Debtors sought to convert to Chapter 13, amending their petition to include the transfer and also including additional income from the Female Debtor. Beginning from Marrama v.

Summary: McCauley raised state law claims against Home Loan Investment Bank (“Home Loan”) for unconscionability and fraud, due to multiple factors, including a hurried closing, the inducement by inflated appraisal, the disparity between the size of the loan and the value of the home, and an “exploding” ARM. Home Loan moved to dismiss on the basis that the Home Owner’s Loan Act (“HOLA”) and related regulations at 12 C.F.R.

Summary: The standard for a stay pending appeal requires a showing of all of the following: (1) That the movant is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) That the movant is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction; (3) That the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) That the injunction is in the public interest. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2009) vacated on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 2371 (2010).

Summary: The Debtor had filed four case within nine months. The first was dismissed for failure to obtain credit counseling, although no schedules had been filed either nor had the Debtor attended the §341 Meeting of Creditors. The second case was dismissed for failure to file schedules, attend the §341 Meeting of Creditors, or make any payments. The third case was voluntarily dismissed following partial payment of the filing fee and filing of schedules, but still without attendance at the §341 Meeting of Creditors or any plan payment.

Summary: In a “Dirt for Debt” Plan, the Chapter 11 Debtor’s proposed to surrender real property to Gateway. The Bankruptcy Court held that the proper basis for valuation for such tender was the fair market value standard, where Gateway had urged a liquidation value. On appeal, the District Court held that while 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) mandates use of the fair market or “replacement” value where the Debtor intends to retain the collateral for its own use, the same is not true where the Debtor intends to surrender the property.

Summary: The Bankruptcy Court, subsequently affirmed by the District Court, determined that the two liens held by Bank of America against real property were void pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) because of inaccurate property descriptions. See Meade v. Bank of America (In re Meade), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 4631, 2011 WL 5909398 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. July 29, 2011), and Bank of America v. Meade,Bank of Am. v. Meade, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96071 (E.D.N.C. July 9, 2012).

Summary: Rodgers had filed a complaint for claims arising from a real estate dispute. The Bankruptcy Court granted a judgment on the pleadings as to two defendants, but, in light of Sterns v. Marshall, the District Court returned the matter to the Bankruptcy Court for a determination of whether the issues raised were “core” or “non-core” and the basis for jurisdiction. (See: http://ncbankruptcyexpert.com/?p=1137) The Bankruptcy Court then found that the claims were “non-core” pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

Summary: United Marketing Solutions (UMS) obtained a judgment against the Fowlers for $106,076.82. Subsequently, Rees Associates obtained a judgment against UMS for $172,194.94. Rees then initiated garnishment proceeding against the Fowlers, but then entered into a Settlement and Release with the Fowlers which called for the Fowlers to pay Rees “the sum of $ ___ upon execution of this Agreement in full and complete satisfaction of the Garnishment.

Summary: Following conversion from Chapter 13, the Debtor sought to redeem a motor vehicle based on the NADA trade-in value from the commencement of the bankruptcy case. Finding that BAPCPA amendments in 2005 to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) abrogated the previous rule as stated in In re Murray, No. 00-10603, slip op. at 5-6 (Bankr. M.D.N.C.