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Abstract: On March 4, 2011, the New York Times described a settlement ("settlement") proposed by a consortium of state attorneys general (AGs) to large mortgage servicers. The claims to be settled reportedly relate to failures to follow existing procedural rules relating to the foreclosure process. The settlement would make dramatic changes in those rules, and reportedly require a mortgage loan principal reduction program of $20 to 25 billion.

Summary:

Following an order denying the Debtor’s motion to dismiss, the Debtor sought certification of his appeal directly to the Court of Appeals, bypassing the District Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(B).  Direct certification is allowed under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A) if the court before which the matter is pending determines:

(i) the . . . order . . . involves a question of law as to which there is no controlling decision of

Summary: The Debtor sought to employ James McElroy & Diehl, P.A. ("JMD"), as counsel  under 11 U.S.C. §  327(a) for representation in various other matters, including litigation and other "future, discrete matters" in the bankruptcy cases.   Because JMD had received substantial compensation from two equity owners of the Debtor, who were also substantial creditors, the Court found that JMD could not be deemed to be disinterested as required under 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) and could not be approved.  Nor could JMD be approved under 11 U.S.C.

Summary: The Court examined the three options for determining household size for Means Test calculations.  Rejecting both the Census Bureau "heads on beds" approach and the IRS dependency test, the Court instead found that an analysis of  "economic unit" was appropriate. "Head on Beds" could be inaccurate "[i]f the debtor’s household includes an individual who  purchases these items from his own separate income, and contributes nothing to the debtor’s household for these items, then the deduction will include an unwarranted extra amount that wouldotherwise be part of the deb

Summary: The Debtors granted a Deed of Trust originally to Associates Financial, which was eventually sold or otherwise assigned to Citifinancial.   The Deed of Trust included a legal description of the collateral, but did not include an address.  Debtors later defaulted on a Deed of Trust.  The Substitute Trustee instituted foreclosure proceedings and attempted personal service by Sheriff at three different addresses.  When that failed, the Sheriff posted service at an address that was not for the collateral described in the Deed of Trust.  Unaware of the defects in service,

Summary: Coastal Federal Credit Union (CFCU) filed suit against the Debtors in May 2010 for following an alleged default on a retail sales installment contract for the purchase of a vehicle.  On June 18, 2010, after no answer had been filed, CFCU sought an entry of default and default judgment, both of which were allowed by the Clerk of Court  pursuant to North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(1). The Debtors subsequently sought to set aside the default judgment, arguing that they had made payment arrangements with the attorneys for CFCU.  As such, the Debtors argued t

Summary: The Debtors had initially disclosed in their petition that they anticipated receiving tax refunds for 2008 totaling $3,000.00.  The actually received $11,194.00, but failed to notify either the Chapter 13 Trustee or their attorney. After failing to obtain confirmation of their original Chapter plan, which sought to strip-off a junior mortgage held by State Employee's Credit Union,  a the Debtors proposed a plan releasing their residence to SECU.  Under the new plan, no funds would be paid to SECU, which accordingly sought and obtained an order allowing for adequate

Summary: The Debtor was a personal guarantor of 10 contracts between John Deere and his corporation, PEP, for the purchase of construction equipment.   Prior to filing bankruptcy, the Debtor sold 5 of the pieces of equipment to third parties, without the consent of John Deere. John Deere then instituted an action pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) to except from discharge this debt, asserting that it arose from a "willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity."  Following In re Buck, 406 B.R. 703 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.

Canovali-Relief from Chapter 11 Confirmation Order under Rule 60(b)Summary:  The Debtors had a two mortgage against their home, initially valued in the amount of $1,068,000.00,  with Bank of America, a first with a balance of $988,000.00 and second with a balance of $368,000.00. The Debtors proposed a Chapter 11 plan that recognized that there were two notes and Deeds of Trust, but that both such claims would be paid as a single clai

Summary: The Debtor filed Chapter 13, during which Friedman’s Jewelers filed a Proof of Claim, asserting that it was secured in the amount of $300.00 and unsecured for the balance.  The Debtor subsequently converted to Chapter 7, then re-converted to Chapter 13, eventually confirming a plan treating Friedman’s as secured in the amount of $300.00. Friedman’s itself filed bankruptcy and its assets were liquidated, with the Debtor’s account being purchased by Merchant’s Acquisition Group, L.L.C.  (MAG).  MAG retained BRM Recovery Services to collect on this account.  The sale o