Summary: Sixteen months after filing Chapter 13, the Debtor converted to Chapter 7. Capital One, the lienholder against the Debtor’s vehicle, sent the Debtor a reaffirmation agreement, which would have required immediate and full payment of the $16,149.46 balance. Debtor’s counsel requested Capital One negotiate payment terms, but received no response. No reaffirmation on the original contract terms was offered.

Summary: The Manuels fell behind on their mortgage and engaged the assistance of Secure Property Solutions (“SPS”) (which is not a party to this action) and Gembala, an attorney licensed in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, in what the Manuels eventually regarded as a “mortgage modification scam.” The Manuels initially filed suit in federal district court alleging various RICO and North Carolina state law violations.

Summary: The Debtor’s Chapter 13 plan proposed the surrender of an ATV, but she nonetheless took a deduction, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii), for the payments due on this secured obligation. Finding that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464 (2010), allows a bankruptcy court to “ account for changes in the debtor’s income or expenses that are known or virtually certain at the time of confirmation." Id. at 2478 (Emphasis added), the 4th Circuit disallowed the deduction from the Debtor’s “projected disposable income” under 11 U.S.C.

Summary: Automotive Fiannce provided Ward’s car dealership with floor plan financing, which permitted the dealership to borrow funds to purchase cars for sale. The Automotive Finance would then hold a lien on such car, until the car, was sold and the dealership was required that it pay off the lien within 72 hours. Ward individually guarantied the obligations of the dealership under the floor plan agreement. At the time of filing the bankruptcy, the dealership had sold 4 car without paying of the liens.

Summary: Trustee brought a preference action against Johnson Concrete Company (“JCC”) , a subcontractor of the Debtor on several construction projects. JCC argued that the “indirect transfer” theory of the “new value” defense to preferences in § 547(c)(1), as it would have filed a claim against the payment bonds in place for the projects. Starting from Angell v. Pennington, Inc. (In re Partitions Plus of Wilmington, Inc.), No. 06-00148-8-JRL (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar.

Summary: A tangle of multiple cases- Thomas Brown, Michael Barns , W. Watson Barns and David Woodard were directors of Brown Oil. Brown filed Chapter 11 on August 3, 2007, but that case was dismissed on November 30, 2011. An involuntary Chapter 7 was filed for Brown Oil on October 19, 2010. Michael Barnes filed Chapter 13 on July 19, 2011. Etheridge Oil brought an adversary proceeding against Brown seeking to have his debt declared nondischargable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) and (a)(6).

Summary: Janice Willis had two sons, Eddie and Anthony. In December 2004 she drafted a will bequeathing “any interest that I may own in my home place” to Eddie, expressing her “wish” that, if she conveyed the property to Eddie before her death and he decided to sell it, Eddie would divide the proceeds with his brother Anthony. The will also bequeathed the residue of her estate to Eddie and Anthony in equal shares, to pass to their children per stirpes if either or both predeceased her. Mrs.

Summary: In 2002, the Toomey sold real property located at 1124 Berwyn Way, Raleigh, to the Postons. At the time of the sale, the Property was encumbered by a deed of trust and, in addition, by a home equity line of credit (“HELOC”) with Central Carolina Bank (“CCB”), which was secured by a second deed of trust. At the closing of the sale, the first deed of trust was paid off and canceled of record. The Toomeys’ HELOC with CCB was paid down to zero but, unfortunately, the deed of trust securing the HELOC was not canceled and the HELOC account was not closed.

Summary: The Debtor had, after purchasing a 3rd parties interest in an Illinois home, been given title to the home by his then fiance, Ms. Ward, subject to an agreement that he would reconvey the real property to her in the event he pre-deceased her or their relationship ended. So, of course, their relationship ended and he declined to reconvey the property to her. Ms. Ward then commenced a lawsuit in Illinois against the Debtor seeking reconveyance of the property and damages for breach of contract. The Debtor filed Chapter 7, during which Ms.

Summary: In the Debtor’s first Chapter 13 case, the Debtor and his homeowner’s association entered into a consent order denying the homeowner’s motion for relief, subject to the Debtor complying with specific conditions. Failure to comply would result in the lifting of the automatic stay. The Debtor’s bankruptcy was shortly thereafter dismissed and the Debtor refiled. The homeowner’s association contended that the consent order in the previous case was res judicata and it was thereby entitled to relief from the automatic stay in the second case.