Summary: While Ms. Sparrow’s civil action for equitable distribution was pending in state court, she file a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The primary assets of her bankruptcy estate consist of a fee simple interest in a house and lot located in Durham, North Carolina and a one-half undivided tenant-in-common interest in five tracts of real property located in Granville County, North Carolina, the stated intention being that the plan would liquidate these assets and pay creditors, potentially in full. Ms. Sparrow first commenced an Adversary Proceeding against Mr.

Summary: Following the disclosure in more than 4,200 Proofs of Claim by Wake Med of personal identifying information, several Debtors sought sanctions for violations of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9037, HIPAA, and 11 U.S.C. §107. The bankruptcy court held that it was not a “HIPAA compliance tribunal” and might not have jurisdiction to decide such claims. Further, “[t]he case law overwhelmingly holds that there is no private right of action under HIPAA or §107 ”, leaving Rule 9037 as the primary remedy.

Summary: This case involved a valuation duel between Ms. Sweeney and Ditech over a 1999 Horton Mirage II 24' x 52' mobile home, which all parties agreed was personal property. At the valuation hearing. Ms. Sweeney testified both as to her belief that the property suffered from “extensive water damage” and general disrepair, having a value of $10,000-$11,000. Ms. Sweeney based this on the county tax value of $9,850. Ditech presented Mr.

Summary: Bankruptcy Court Characterization of Equitable Distribution Awards Cheryl Jones brought motions against the Debtor, her ex-husband, Sean Jones, seeking relief from the stay and for determination of Domestic Support Obligation, with the primary question being whether the family court’s Equitable Distribution Order award of $116,182 from the debtor’s 401(k) plan and $63,736 from the debtor’s retirement account were in the nature of a domestic support obligation, pursuant to §§ 101(14A) and 523(a)(5), or

Summary: The parties in this case, where the Plaintiff alleged that personal identifying information had been disclosed in a Proof of Claim, reached a settlement but sought a Motion to Seal in order so that such settlement would not be construed as binding for similar claims. The bankruptcy court, however, found that 11 U.S.C.

Summary: The Alvarezes purchased their home in 2007 and refinanced in 2009 with PNC Mortgage servicing the loan for Fannie Mae. At that time the mortgage documents provided that the Alvarezes would maintain homeowner's insurance and property taxes directly, without an escrow account. The Alvarezes began to have financial difficulties in 2012, but were denied mortgage assistance by PNC.

Summary: The Phillips filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy and successfully avoided the judgment lien held by McInnis. The Order allowing the avoidance provided that: 3. The Judgment lien of the McInnises is declared to be void and shall be removed of record upon the completion of the Chapter 13 Plan of the Debtors and entry of the discharge in this case pursuant to Section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code. 4.

Summary: In his Chapter 7 petition, Mr. Fields listed a 1987 Porsche 911 as non-operational and worth $500. The Trustee, however, obtained a on-site appraisal, which found the vehicle to be operable and worth between $12,000 and $30,000. After the Trustee declined to object, Mr. Fields did receive his discharge, but was unable to buy the vehicle from the Trustee. Instead he sought to have his discharge revoked and to convert to Chapter 13. Relying on In re Marrama, 549 U.S. 365 (2007), the bankruptcy court held that due to both Mr.

Summary: The Coopers had a home equity line of credit with First Bank. They refinanced their home with AHMS, which directed First Bank to close the line of credit, but the closing attorney failed to do so.

Summary: Grimes owns real property with her husband as tenants by the entireties. After filing bankruptcy, she sought to avoid the fixing of three judgments at any later point against that property should it later cease to be held as tenants by the entireties, for example due to divorce or her husband’s death. The bankruptcy court, dissenting from In re Corey, 2013 WL 3788239 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2013), held that 11 U.S.C.