Summary: Mr. Ennis filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, including First Federal as a creditor. While First Federal did activate a bankruptcy block to discontinue past due notifications, its continued to send computer generated monthly statements to Mr. Ennis, listing the balance, accrued interest and amount past due. Mr. Ennis’ counsel did send notices to First Federal regarding the bankruptcy filing and the extent of the automatic stay, but did not describe any specific wrong doing. These notices were sent to First Federal at its street address, rather than its mailing address.

Summary: More reasonably equivalent value discussions in the Tanglewood Farms case. Commentary: Not every order granting avoidance of a judgment lien or for relief from the stay on a car are treated as a written opinion,  but maybe since these  reasonably equivalent value cases are becoming nearly as common, they will stop being treated as such. For a copy of the opinion, please see: Ange

Summary: Following the confirmation of its Chapter 11 plan and closure of the bankruptcy, the Debtor was sued in state court for a pre-petition debt by a creditor that was unknown at the time of filing of the bankruptcy and unlisted in the schedules. The state court directed the Debtor to re-open the bankruptcy case for a determination of whether the debt was discharged.

Summary: The Debtor, 71 years old, was married until her husband died in 1999. At the time of his death, he was the sole owner of a house and land, purchased in 1962, with a mortgage signed by both the Debtor and her husband, and which the Debtor later inherited, pursuant to his will. Upon filing bankruptcy, the Debtor sought to claim the increased “widow’s” exemption of $60,000 in the property, based on N.C.G.S.

Summary: In a case involving multiple corporations and transfers back and forth from the Debtors’ household bank accounts and corporate accounts, the Trustee and a major creditor sought a denial of discharge against the debtors under 11 U.S.C. § 727. After reviewing and finding that the Debtors displayed several of the “badges of fraud”, see West v. Abdelaziz (In re Abdelaziz), 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 591, at *7-8 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Feb.

Summary: Fritz closed his account with Duke Energy when he moved, but was one week late in paying the final bill, so it was referred to a debt collector. He did pay the balance to Duke Energy, who applied the amount to the balance on his new utility bill. The debt collector was not informed of the payment and two months later, reported Fritz as delinquent to the three major credit bureaus, resulting in a 77 point decline in his credit score. Fritz brought suit against Duke Energy (as well as the debt collector under other bases) under N.C.G.S.

Summary: As evidence of the insolvency of the Debtor in support of a long-running preference action, the Trustee sought to introduce Affidavits from his paralegal, from the Director of Financial Services of one of the Debtor’s largest creditors, from the Examiner appointed in the case and from himself.

Summary: Prior to filing bankruptcy, the Meabons first consulted with an attorney who informed them that they would need to disclose, as an asset in his bankruptcy schedules, Richard Meabon’s interest in a trust. As a result of the first attorney’s advice, the Meabons chose to file with another attorney, to whom they did not disclose the existence of the trust. After filing Chapter 7 without disclosure of the trust either in their petition or at the §341 Meeting of Creditors, the deadline to object to discharge passed on June 1, 2010.

Summary: Creditor, Two Olives, Inc., sought denial of the debtors’ discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A) , asserting that“the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor . . . has permitted to be transferred . . .

Summary: Confirmation of the Debtor’s Chapter 13 plan was delayed for 15 months due to an adversary proceeding to cram-down a residential mortgage held by JPMorgan Chase. Following dismissal of the adversary proceeding, the Debtor proposed a plan that would have run for 60 months from confirmation. Because that plan would have run for a total of 75 months from the first §341 Meeting of Creditors, the Trustee objected. Finding that this issue had already been addressed by the 4th Circuit in West v. Costen, 826 F.2d 1376, 1378 (4th Cir.