Summary: In a “Dirt for Debt” Plan, the Chapter 11 Debtor’s proposed to surrender real property to Gateway. The Bankruptcy Court held that the proper basis for valuation for such tender was the fair market value standard, where Gateway had urged a liquidation value. On appeal, the District Court held that while 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) mandates use of the fair market or “replacement” value where the Debtor intends to retain the collateral for its own use, the same is not true where the Debtor intends to surrender the property.

Summary: The Bankruptcy Court, subsequently affirmed by the District Court, determined that the two liens held by Bank of America against real property were void pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) because of inaccurate property descriptions. See Meade v. Bank of America (In re Meade), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 4631, 2011 WL 5909398 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. July 29, 2011), and Bank of America v. Meade,Bank of Am. v. Meade, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96071 (E.D.N.C. July 9, 2012).

Summary: Rodgers had filed a complaint for claims arising from a real estate dispute. The Bankruptcy Court granted a judgment on the pleadings as to two defendants, but, in light of Sterns v. Marshall, the District Court returned the matter to the Bankruptcy Court for a determination of whether the issues raised were “core” or “non-core” and the basis for jurisdiction. (See: http://ncbankruptcyexpert.com/?p=1137) The Bankruptcy Court then found that the claims were “non-core” pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

Summary: After the Gatelys had filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy and provided written notice, Holly Hills Hospital sent the Debtors ten (10) billing statements and also threatening telephone calls for several weeks. As Mrs. Gately suffers from mental health issues (for which she had presumably received treatment from Holly Hills Hospital), these letters and telephone calls “informed the debtors that bankruptcy was futile” and caused Mrs.

Summary: Debtor brought an Adversary Proceeding against Defendants alleging unpaid invoices a little more than two months after its Chapter 11 plan was confirmed. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b) and 157(a) a matter “is within the jurisdiction of [a Bankruptcy] Court if it is ‘arising under,’ ‘arising in,’ or ‘related to’ the corresponding bankruptcy case.” Citing to In re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619, 625 (4thCir. 1997) (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3rdCir.

Summary: In a “vigorously litigated case”, the Debtor proposed to surrender certain parcels of real property to satisfy the claim of Capital Bank, i.e. “Dirt for Debt”. Based on the valuations of the real property at issue, the bankruptcy court held that those properties had sufficient value to fully satisfy the claim of Capital Bank, leaving it with no unsecured deficiency claim. Capital Bank nonetheless contended that it should not be subject to cram-down under 11 U.S.C. § 1129.

Summary: Having previously found that several claims brought by the Debtor against Bank of America were, pursuant to Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), core and subject to bankruptcy court jurisdiction, while others were “statutorily core, but did not qualify as constitutionally core”, the bankruptcy court retained the core issues and referred the non-core claims to arbitration.

Summary: Husband and Wife filed Chapter 7, with the Wife claiming both an equitable interest in a 2006 Lexus, despite not being listed as an owner on the title, and claiming an exemption. The Trustee objected, relying on In re Horstman, 276 B.R. 80 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2002), where the bankruptcy court held that a debtor could not claim an exemption in a vehicle, titled in her husband’s name only, based on the definition of “marital property.” This proposition was expanded in In re Thams, No. 10–33089, 2011 WL 863293, at *4 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. Mar.

Summary: In several related Chapter 7 cases, the Debtors exemptions included a provision relying on Schwab v. Reilly, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010), that they “intend[ed] to claim 100% of Debtors’ interest and 100% fair market value in each and every item listed, irrespective of the actual value claimed as exempt.” Following objections by the Chapter 7 Trustee, the Debtors, still seeking to maximize their exemptions, amended their exemptions to include a provision that contemplated three separate scenarios: 1.

Summary: The Debtors brought a Motion for Sanctions against Sun Trust, serving the motion by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the attention of the “Officer or Managing Agent” at the address listed on the Proof of Claim filed by Sun Trust, at the address listed on the billing statements and one additional address.