Summary: After the Gatelys had filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy and provided written notice, Holly Hills Hospital sent the Debtors ten (10) billing statements and also threatening telephone calls for several weeks. As Mrs. Gately suffers from mental health issues (for which she had presumably received treatment from Holly Hills Hospital), these letters and telephone calls “informed the debtors that bankruptcy was futile” and caused Mrs.

Summary: Debtor brought an Adversary Proceeding against Defendants alleging unpaid invoices a little more than two months after its Chapter 11 plan was confirmed. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b) and 157(a) a matter “is within the jurisdiction of [a Bankruptcy] Court if it is ‘arising under,’ ‘arising in,’ or ‘related to’ the corresponding bankruptcy case.” Citing to In re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619, 625 (4thCir. 1997) (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3rdCir.

Summary: In a “vigorously litigated case”, the Debtor proposed to surrender certain parcels of real property to satisfy the claim of Capital Bank, i.e. “Dirt for Debt”. Based on the valuations of the real property at issue, the bankruptcy court held that those properties had sufficient value to fully satisfy the claim of Capital Bank, leaving it with no unsecured deficiency claim. Capital Bank nonetheless contended that it should not be subject to cram-down under 11 U.S.C. § 1129.

Summary: Having previously found that several claims brought by the Debtor against Bank of America were, pursuant to Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), core and subject to bankruptcy court jurisdiction, while others were “statutorily core, but did not qualify as constitutionally core”, the bankruptcy court retained the core issues and referred the non-core claims to arbitration.

Summary: Husband and Wife filed Chapter 7, with the Wife claiming both an equitable interest in a 2006 Lexus, despite not being listed as an owner on the title, and claiming an exemption. The Trustee objected, relying on In re Horstman, 276 B.R. 80 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2002), where the bankruptcy court held that a debtor could not claim an exemption in a vehicle, titled in her husband’s name only, based on the definition of “marital property.” This proposition was expanded in In re Thams, No. 10–33089, 2011 WL 863293, at *4 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. Mar.

Summary: In several related Chapter 7 cases, the Debtors exemptions included a provision relying on Schwab v. Reilly, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010), that they “intend[ed] to claim 100% of Debtors’ interest and 100% fair market value in each and every item listed, irrespective of the actual value claimed as exempt.” Following objections by the Chapter 7 Trustee, the Debtors, still seeking to maximize their exemptions, amended their exemptions to include a provision that contemplated three separate scenarios: 1.

Summary: The Debtors brought a Motion for Sanctions against Sun Trust, serving the motion by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the attention of the “Officer or Managing Agent” at the address listed on the Proof of Claim filed by Sun Trust, at the address listed on the billing statements and one additional address.

Summary: The creditor had obtained a judgment against the debtor, with such judgment still being on appeal. The creditor, nonetheless, filed a Proof of Claim in the debtor’s Chapter 11 case, to which the debtor objection. Read together, 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) and 1126(a) prohibit a claimant from voting on a Chapter 11 plan if the debtor has objected to the claim. Bankruptcy Rule 3018(a), however, allows the bankruptcy court, at its sound discretion, to temporarily allow the claim for purposes of accepting or rejecting the proposed plan.

Summary: The Debtor contested large portions of the Domestic Support Obligation (DSO) claim filed by his ex-wife, who was also seeking dismissal of his Chapter 13 plan. The bankruptcy court held that the Indiana Superior Court where this claim originated was best suited for deciding the issues, See Caswell v. Lang, 757 F.25 608, 610 (4th Cir.

Summary: Sea Horse Realty, which is wholly owned by Richard Mercer, is the owner of a parcel of real property located in Nags Head. In 2005, Mercer executed a promissory note, currently held by Citimortgage (to whom reference will be made, regardless of whether the party was Citimortgage or its predecessors), for $1.5 million, pledging the property as collateral. The Deed of Trust was originally to list Sea Horse Realty as the grantor, but this was changed at the request of the mortgage broker to list Mercer as the grantor. Mercer filed Chapter 11 in 2009.