Summary: Mr. Barth commenced an adversary proceeding seeking a declaratory judgment that various state court actions by Mr. Spoor could have been brought by the bankruptcy trustee, who had previously signed a release of such actions, and that Mr. Spoor should be required to dismiss those actions. The bankruptcy court instead dismissed Mr. Barth’s adversary proceeding on the grounds that such relief was prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The bankruptcy court declined, however, to award the sanctions sought by Mr.

Summary: Through a complicated series of transactions and guarantees, Georgia Spiliotis sought to subrogate to the rights of Bank of North Carolina against the debtors, Nicolas & Mary Spirakis. The bankruptcy court first differentiated between conventional subrogation, “is founded upon the agreement of the parties.” Joyner v. Reflector Co., 176 N.C. 274, 276, 97 S.E.

Summary: The bankruptcy court granted the Motion for in rem relief sought by Wells Fargo pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4), as to Mr. Clark and his wife, further barring Mr. Clark from filing any bankruptcy in the Eastern District of North Carolina for one year. In denying the Mr. Clark’s motion for stay pending appeal and for a writ of supersedes, the district denied such finding the Mr. Clark had not made a clear showing that he had a likelihood of success in the appeal and agreeing with the bankruptcy court that Mr.

Summary: After initially filing Chapter 13, Mr. Sheikh converted to Chapter 7 and Mssrs. Mouhtadi and Khalioui commenced an adversary proceeding asserting claims of common-law fraud, violations of the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (the “UDTPA”), N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 75-1.1 to 75-145, and eeking a determination that the debts related to the case were excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2) or (a)(4). Mr. Shaikh filed an answer to the complaint, but then failed to respond to numerous discovery requests, including admissions. When Mr.

Summary: Mr.  Myrick brought suit against Equifax under the FCRA for willfully failing to verify the discharge of a debt in his Chapter 7 bankruptcy.   In light of Daughterty v.  Ocwen Loan Servicing, the district court reconsidered its

Summary: Ms. Hamilton-Conversano filed Chapter 7 without her husband. Other than the couple’s secured debts, Mr. Conversano had no debts of his own and Mrs. Hamilton-Conversano had one American Express card, with a balance of $46,669.52, which they had jointly used to pay for all household expenses. In completing her Means Test, Ms. Hamilton-Conversant took a “marital adjustment” to her husband’s contribution to her Current Monthly Income including $417.86, for the full monthly cost of their child’s private school.

Summary: Ms. Hector, a realtor with income subject to fluctuation dependent on sales, filed Chapter 7, but did not include her Domestic Partner in her household size nor any income contribution, as their finances and expenses were neither commingled nor shared. Ms. Hector did not assist her Domestic Partner with housing expenses, but did pay all for all groceries and cleaning supplies for both. As such, Ms. Hector claimed deductions for housing and utility expenses on the Means Test.

Summary: Mr.  Matusak’s plan provided, obviously among things, that he was required to produce  verified updated Schedules of income and expenses during the 36 months Applicable Commitment Period of his plan whenever such were requested by the Chapter 13 Trustee or Ms.  Brown,  his ex-wife and a creditor.  Based on that financial information, Ms.  Brown filed a motion to modify Mr.  Matusak’s plan in November 2016, seeking both an increase in the monthly payment and an extension of the plan from 36 to 60 months. Prior to the hearing on the Motion to Modify

Summary: In determining whether 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) was applicable, the bankruptcy court held that despite the debtors having thirteen consumer debts totaling $296,775.43 and eight business debts totaling $294,595.56, “[b]ecause of how easily a mortgage can skew the claims in favor of consumer debt” the debt secured by real property should be excluded from this consideration. In re Jones, 2009 WL 102442, *1 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 2009) (citing In re Booth, 858 F.2d 1051, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998)).

Summary: On March 23, 2017, the bankruptcy lifted the automatic stay for Peak Leasing with regard to one of four trailers Mr. Price had obtain from Peak and took under advisement whether the remaining claims were “true leases” or disguised PMSIs.