Summary:
Bestwall sought to have a Personal Injury Questionnaire ("PIQ") sent to all asbestos claimants pursuant to Rule 2004 to which the Claimants Committee objected. The bankruptcy court found that the PIQ created no undue hardship and was consistent with other similar orders and overruled the objection. The Claimants Committee appealed.
Summary:
Summary:
Ms. Carter brought suit against her bank, Capital One, for complying with an IRS levy by taking $1,279.41 from her account, arguing that Capital One had violated the FDCPA. Finding that "an obligation to pay that 'arises solely by operation of law' is not a debt covered by the FDCPA" the district court dismissed the case.
Commentary:
Summary:
The online payment website for Freedom Mortgage will not accept payments made after 11:00 p.m., in order to allow its cash department to process payments received that day. If a borrower attempts to pay after 11:00 p.m., an error message pops up and the borrower is required to postdate the payment to the next day.
Summary:
Summary:
Chris Miller, appearing pro se, appealed a ruling from the bankruptcy court but failed to file a designation of items from the bankruptcy docket for inclusion on the appellate record. After explicitly providing Mr. Miller 30 additional days to file the designation the court held that before dismissing an appeal pursuant to Rule 8003(a)(2), least one of the following steps must be taken:
During Ms. Boykin’s Chapter 13 case, the bankruptcy court held that the claim by the United States arising under the Affordable Care Act ("Obamacare") out of her failure to obtain health insurance was a non-priority penalty and not a tax. While this appeal by the government was pending, Ms. Boykin voluntarily converted her case to Chapter 7, in which all parties agreed there would be no insufficient assets for any distribution to creditors.
Mr. Tyler obtained a mortgage against his home and eventually fell delinquent and faced foreclosure proceedings. Mr. Tyler then filed a pro se Chapter 7 bankruptcy and commenced an adversary proceeding challenging the foreclosure on host of the usual grounds.
After filing Ch. 11, during which case Bank of America filed a Proof of Claim asserting that it was secured by a Deed of Trust owned by Mr. McGowan and occupied by his then minor daughter, McGowan converted to Ch. 7, received a discharge and the real property was abandoned.
Ms. Broughton, a persistent and likely pernicious debtor and appellant, filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proposing to sell for the benefit of her secured creditors the real property she claimed to own in “fee simple absolute; and as trustee for trust for the benefit of her heirs.” When this plan was rejected, her case was converted to Chapter 7. The Trustee subsequently obtained an order to sell the property free and clear of liens, but by then Ms. Broughton opposed such sale, arguing that her sole interest