Summary: Mr. Talford received medical treatment at the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital (“CMH”), but was unable to pay the asserted $14,419.57 bill.

Summary: FIA Cards sued the Debtor seeking recovery of $46,311.81 outstanding on a credit card.  The trial court granted summary judgment to FIA Cards and the Debtor appealed arguing that FIA Cards had failed to prove the existence of an account. The Court of Appeals agreed finding that FIA Cards has only provided three credit card statements from the months surrounding the default.  Further, there was no evidence in the record on appeal that even these statements were verified.  As such, FIA Cards had failed to comply with the requirements of N.C.G.S.

Summary: Real property was titled as "Margaret D.  Smith and D.  Reed and wife, Judy C.  Reed Joint Tenants with rights of survivorship."  Only Ms.  Reed signed the Deed of Trust and mortgage note with Countrywide.  After Ms.  Smith died and the mortgage was in default, Countrywide sought reformation of the Deed of Trust. The Court of Appeal held that originally Ms.  Smith owned a one-half interest in the property with the Reeds as Joint Tenants with the rights of survivorship.  The Reeds owned their one-half interest as tenants b

Summary: Plaintiff brought a complaint against Defendant for monies allegedly owed on a credit card.  Defendant answered and raised counterclaims, to which Plaintiff failed to reply.  Consequently,  default was entered on the counterclaims with $4,500.00 in actual damages, plus $17,912.11 in costs, including attorneys’ fees.  Defendant appealed, questioning, among other things, the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeal  held that the standard for reviewing an award of attorneys’ fees was that "the record must contain findings of

Summary: The pro se Debtor attacked a foreclosure on several fronts, first appealing the Clerk of Court authorization of the foreclosure to the Superior Court and then to the Court of Appeals.  The Debtor did not file a motion to stay the foreclosure pending the appeal and the property was sold at auction. The Court of Appeals held that the foreclosure auction mooted the subsequent appeal, leaving nothing to be heard. For a copy of the opinion, please see:

Summary: Plaintiff Harris did not disclose any ownership interest in T-WOL, which had been incorporated in 2000,  when he filed bankruptcy in 2001.  Following suit in 2009, the Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that Plaintiff Harris should be judicially estopped from asserting ownership in T-WOL. The purpose of judicial estoppel is "to protect the integrity of the judicial process by prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment."  Whitacre P’Ship v.  Biosignia Inc., 358 N.C.

 Summary:

Finch leased a room from Campus Habitat and asserted that Campus Habitat breached their lease, causing her to move out.  Campus Habitat responded and counterclaimed, receiving judgment for damages and, pursuant to the lease, attorneys’ fees.

Summary: At the foreclosure hearing before the New Hanover County Clerk of Court, the Pughes filed an Election of Arbitration.  The Clerk of Court did not act on this, instead finding that the Substitute Trustee had meet the six statutory requirements to proceed with foreclosure.  The Pughes appealed to Superior Court, where the judge again found that the requirements for foreclosure had been met and declined to rule on the request for arbitration. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that both the Clerk of Court and, on appeal, the Superior Court had scope only

Summary: While working as a bookkeeper for Teague & Glover, P.A., (T&G) Ms.  Gibbs embezzled substantial amounts.  In addition to criminal prosecution and imprisonment, in 2010, T&G obtained a civil judgment against Mr.  and Mrs.  Gibbs for $800,000.  T&G subsequently agreed to accept all of the Gibbses real and personal property in exchange for a reduction in the amount of the judgment. The property at issue in the present dispute consists of Tract A (0.6 acres) and Tract B (0.7 acres and the Gibbses primary residence).  In 1999

Summary: Songwooyarn Trading Company (STC) obtained a judgment against Defendant Ahn, among others.  Ahn filed a Motion to Claim Exempt Property, to which STC objected, specifically contending that Ahn had failed to list all non-exempt property, had undervalued property, and attempted to exempt property beyond that allowed by North Carolina law.  The trial court held that Ahn had failed to comply with the statutory requirements for claiming exempt property, but allowed Ahn the opportunity to refile his claimed exemptions.  STC again objected and subpoenaed docu