Summary: Carolina Internet had an oral agreement to pay O’Dell 6.5% of its sales from its largest customer, believing that O’Dell could take that account away. When Carolina Internet filed Chapter 11, however, it did not list O’Dell as a creditor. That failure notwithstanding, O’Dell was aware of the bankruptcy, both as it was being planned and after it was filed.

Summary: The Debtor purchased two gas stations, against which Petromax held Deeds of Trust, including against fixtures, in the amount of more than $2.4 million. Upon filing Chapter 11, the Debtor valued the gas stations at $1.3 million. The Debtor’s second proposed plan had eight classes of claims, but Class 7, which consisted of only $5,760.52 in unsecured claims, was the sole impaired class in favor of the plan, with the City of Greenville, holding a claim for $915.42, being the lone claimant to vote.

Summary: Walter sought discovery relating to communications between Waffle House and Jonathan Waller, who had served as general counsel to Waffle House since 2001. Waffle House, asserting attorney-client privilege, directed Waller not to respond. The difficulty, however, was that Waller provided legal services for Waffle House in Georgia, but only held an inactive law license in Illinois and no where else.

Summary: Mr. Jarrett held a one-half remainder interest in real property, with the other one-half remainder interest held by his sister and the life estate in favor of his mother. The tax value of the property is $118,500, with a $42,362 mortgage. Mr. Jarrett valued his fractional interest at $7,110 and exempted $4,568.28. The Court held that Chapter 7 Trustee could not sell an entire interest in the property free and clear of the interest of the life tenant. See In re Sargent, 337 B.R. 661 (Bankr. N.D.

Summary: The Debtor served a copy of a Motion to Avoid the Judgment Lien held by Main Street Acquisition Corp. at its place of business and also by serving its attorney in the state court action.

Summary: The Debtors were delinquent on their Chapter 13 plan payments, which included disbursements to Green Tree for a mobile home and land. Accordingly, on February 5, 2014, Green Treee filed a Motion for Relief from Stay. On February 1, 2014, however, Green Tree sent to the Debtors directly a letter offering to provide assistance with delinquent payments.

Summary: The Trustee alleged fraudulent conveyances by the Debtor to his non-filing spouse and sought to recover the transfers. In her answer, Ms. Houseman asserted, and the Trustee disputed, her 7th Amendment right to a jury trial. Her answer did not explicitly raise any counterclaims, but did assert a right of “setoff” or “credit” for funds she contributed, as well as asserting both that the transfers were made in good faith and for value under N.C.G.S.

Summary: McGinnis brought suit in state court against Fantone for two notes that Fantone had guaranteed with MSC. Following court ordered mediation, the parties agreed that Fantone would execute a modification of loan agreement for $200,000.00 with interest at six percent (6%) per year, would substitute himself as the obligor debts owed by executed by MSC, and would sign a Confession of Judgment for $200,000. Less than three weeks later, Pantone filed a voluntary Chapter 13 bankruptcy.

Summary: Prior to her bankruptcy, Ms. Mitchell and the defendant, Mr. Keesee, were involved in divorce litigation in the District Court for New Hanover County, North Carolina, wherein they agreed to an equitable distribution of their property which provided that Ms. Mitchell transfered her interest in specific property to Mr. Keesee, who agreed to pay Ms. Mitchell $750,000 from any future sale of that property. Following filing her Chapter 11 bankruptcy, Ms. Mitchell brought an adversary proceeding against Mr.

Summary: Prior to the Stephenson’s bankruptcy filing, Camp Flintlock filed an action in state court against asserting claims of fraud, constructive fraud, conversion, and unfair trade practices. The bankruptcy court granted a motion for relief from stay to allow entry of a judgment reflecting the previously rendered jury verdict, but reserved the enforcement of any monetary judgment.