Summary:
A quit claim deed, recorded with the Buncombe Register of Deeds on May 14, 2009, was blank as to the legal description and only included the handwritten entry “Parcel #960704498200000.”. On April 29, 2010, a “Affidavit of Correction” was recorded including the legal metes and bounds description.
The Court of Appeals held that the quit claim deed was void as it inadequately described the property, holding that a tax PIN alone was insufficient. The Court distinguished Fisher v. Town of Nags Head, ___ N.C. App.
By Ed Boltz, 5 August, 2014
Summary:
Following failed Chapter 11 bankruptcy, Five Wins obtained a declaratory judgment against Iris finding that Iris owed $894,711.24 to redeem real property from foreclosure. After Five Wins bid $875,000.00 for the properties, WA Ventures made a successful upset bid at the subsequent foreclosure in the amount of $918,750.00 and then assigned the bid to Five Wins.
By Ed Boltz, 20 May, 2014
Summary:
FIA brough suit against Caviness for a credit card debt in the amount of $10,150.19. Lacking the actual credit card agreement, it present as evidence monthly billing statements from November 2008 through March 2011, copies of checks from Caviness (and his business), as well as from a third party, and an affidavit from its authorized representative.
By Ed Boltz, 6 May, 2014
Summary:
Hensel had student loans of more that $90,000. In November 2012, he received two bills for late fees in the total amount of $68.28. In response, on December 9, 2012, Hensel sent XBS a check for $68.28 attached to a letter that asserted the late fees violated the FDCPA, that assessment of the late fees had harmed his ability to purchase a home, and proposing to release his claims if XBS cancelled his remaining student loans, with cashing of the $68.28 to constitute acceptance.
By Ed Boltz, 2 May, 2014
Summary:
In 2006, Devane executed a promissory note and Deed of Trust in favor of Aurora. Aurora subsequently, erroneously asserted that Devane violated the repayment terms of the note on six occassions. In September 2010, an agent of Aurora informed Devane that it had misapplied payments made by Devane to another account. At that time, Devane was place on a new payment plan, but her original payments were still not applied.
By Ed Boltz, 1 April, 2014
Summary:
Wells Fargo sought a reformation of a Deed of Trust, which it discover, after the borrowers defaulted and Wells Fargo foreclosed (putatively purchasing the property itself), did not describe the actual real property upon which the house was built. The trial court held that as Wells Fargo, having purchased the property at foreclosure, was no longer a lender and lacked standing as a purchaser to seek reformation.
The Court of Appeals disagreed, following Citifinancial Mortg. Co. v. Gray, 187 N.C. App.
By Ed Boltz, 1 April, 2014
Summary:
In February 2003, Currie, serving as the executor for the Estate of Della Brown, brought suit against the Poteats, for conversion of funds which were used to purchase their home, filing a notice of lis pendens on March 13, 2003. This action was subsequently voluntarily dismissed without prejudice in open court on September 7, 2004, so that Currie could be re-qualified as the executor of the estate.
By Ed Boltz, 27 March, 2014
Summary:
Petri originally had a mortgage with Luxury Mortgage Corp., but subsequently Bank of America (“BOA”) commenced foreclosure proceedings. Appealing the order allowing foreclosure, Petri argued that BOA was not the true holder of the note authorized to foreclose.
By Ed Boltz, 22 May, 2013
Summary:
In 1986, the Smiths acquired title to Lot #184 of Crestview Subdivision, 106 Crestview Terrace, in Davidson County, Thomasville, North Carolina (“the property”) and recorded the Deed. The Smiths executed a promissory note in the principal amount of $96,000 (“the Note”) to New Century Mortgage Corporation (“New Century”) secured by a Deed of Trust on the property that was recorded on 16 December 2002.
By Ed Boltz, 22 May, 2013
Summary:
Ussery brought suit against BB&T as a result of a failure to qualify for a government loan, more than six years after a learning of the denial of the loan.