Summary: Lendmark financed the purchase and installation of an HVAC unit for Ms. Hudgins’ home. All parties agreed that the HVAC unit was a “consumer good” as defined by N.C.G.S. § 25-9-102, that Lendmark held an automatically perfected purchase money security interest in the HVAC as chattel pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 25-9-309(1) and that Lendmark did not record a fixture filing. The Trustee argued that without the fixture filing Lendmark’s security interest fell to the hypothetical judgment lien creditor status of bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 544.

Summary: Mr. and Mrs. Foley each had several life insurance policies which named as the beneficiary a testamentary trust created by virtually identical wills. These directed the estate trustee to use any income and principal from the trust “for the health, maintenance and support” of the surviving spouse or subsequently their son. A later provision, however, authorized the trustee to “compromise claims”.

Summary: After the filing of her Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the Debtor found a cashier’s check payable to her ex-husband in the amount of $11,000.00. This check was not listed as an asset in the Debtor’s schedules, but her ex-husband was listed as holding a priority claim for $0.00 for alimony. The Debtor contended that this was for unpaid alimony and her ex-husband, in fact, had the sole allowed DSO priority claim for $15,000.00 in the case.

Summary: Ms. Banner filed a ‘bare bones’ Chapter 13 petition signed by her attorney, Joseph Kosko, who was a local partner in the law firm of Volks Anwalt, which solicited Banner as a client through direct mail. After missing numerous deadlines for filing the completed petition, ultimately the bankruptcy court held multiple contempt hearing regarding the representation by Kosko, Volks Anwalt, and its sole owner and managing partner, Jessica McClean.

Summary: In her Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, Crawford listed several parcels of real property as “held” for other parties, when, in fact, these parcels (and two additional undisclosed parcels) were hers. Crawford also did not disclose in her Statement of Affairs that prior to filing her case, she had received $80,000 in insurance proceeds from a robbery, using $47,500 to pay debts to friends and family.

Summary: In order to provide for attorney's fees and allow for filing of a Chapter 7, Mr. Pace's attorney took a voluntary lien against Mr.

Summary: PHH Mortgage assessed $472.25 in post-petition fees against the Debtor’s loan, but did not file and serve a notice pursuant to Rule 3002.1(c) of these fees within 180 days, asserting that these fees were not presently recoverable against the Debtor or their residence and will not be collectible unless the Debtors’ Chapter 13 case was dismissed or converted. PHH asserted that it was required by N.C.G.S.

Summary: Debtors sought authority to quitclaim their previous residence in Florida to the SBA, which held a mortgage against the property but had declined to foreclose. The bankruptcy court first held that 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a), while property may be “surrendered”, the Bankruptcy Code does not define that term but it has “has been described as the relinquishment of all rights in property, including the right to possess the collateral.” IRS v. White (In re White), 487 F.3d 199, 205 (4th Cir. 2007); 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1325.06[4] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.

Summary: In the bankruptcy of Garlock Sealing Technology, allegations were raised that national counsel for mesothelioma victims had engaged in fraud, deceit, and other activities prohibited by the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, in settling their clients’ claims. After the bankruptcy judge ordered the hearing closed, Legal Newsline filed an emergency motion to keep the hearing at which these issues were raised open to the media and the public. Following Media General Operations, Inc. v.

Summary: The Debtor’s great uncle Jennings had, in his waning years, received care and assistance from the Debtor and transferred his Rock Hill, S.C. home to her. When she filed bankruptcy, the Debtor asserted that Jennings was her dependent and claimed the property as exempt under N.C.G.S. § 1C-1601(a)(1).