While several North Carolina bankruptcy courts have asserted that "[n]ot only is there no legislative history for § 1C-1601, In re Ragan, 64 B.R. 384, 387 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986), this may be merely received wisdom that was not actually researched.
Summary: Ms. Crow filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, but after a creditor raised issue with her exceeding the §109(g) debt limits, converted to Chapter 7. Eight months after the initial filing of her voluntary bankruptcy petition, Ms. Crow sought to amend her schedules to claim an exemption in an individual retirement account (IRA) that had been omitted from her original petition, but would otherwise indisputably have been exempt. The Trustee opposed this amendment, arguing that Ms.
Summary: After the filing of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, Mr. Nevils received a lump-sum Worker’s Compensation award of $235,000. Over the Trustee’s objection, the bankruptcy court previously allowed Mr. Nevils’ exemption of the proceeds, without ruling at that time on whether such constituted disposable income. The Trustee, supported by the Bankruptcy Administrator, then brought a motion to modify, arguing that even though exempt, the award constituted a substantial and unanticipated change in circumstances and should be considered in calculating Mr.
Summary: The Debtor’s great uncle Jennings had, in his waning years, received care and assistance from the Debtor and transferred his Rock Hill, S.C. home to her. When she filed bankruptcy, the Debtor asserted that Jennings was her dependent and claimed the property as exempt under N.C.G.S. § 1C-1601(a)(1).
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4), often called the “Best Interests of the Creditors” or the “Liquidation” test, requires that: the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date; As such, Chapter 13 Debtors must pay unsecured creditors at least as much as those creditors would get in a Chapter 7 liquidation.
Abstract: The division of responsibility between state and federal authorities in bankruptcy is complex. The U.S. Constitution cedes the power to pass bankruptcy laws to the federal government. For political reasons, however, since 1867 the federal bankruptcy law has deferred to one degree or another to the states with respect to the designation of property exempt from administration in a bankruptcy case.
Summary: After consulting with a bankruptcy attorney, the Debtors sold personal property at auction, receiving $14,000 in proceeds. Two days before filing Chapter 7, the Debtors used $12,000 to fund IRAs and the remainder for insurance and vehicle repairs. The Trustee sought to avoid the contributions to the IRAs as fraudulent conveyances. Following, Ford v. Poston, 773 F.2d 52, 54 (4th Cir.
Summary: Debtor was first found by a civil court to be the slayer of Michelle Young, his wife. He later filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, claiming 401k accounts as exempt. While the bankruptcy was pending, he was convicted of the first degree murder of Ms. Young. First the Court found that the Debtor was, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 31A-3 (3)(a) and (b), as slayer to both the civil adjudication and the criminal conviction. As such, he did own the 401k accounts as "[n]o person should be permitted to profit from his own wrong", Prudential Ins. Co v.
Summary: Songwooyarn Trading Company (STC) obtained a judgment against Defendant Ahn, among others. Ahn filed a Motion to Claim Exempt Property, to which STC objected, specifically contending that Ahn had failed to list all non-exempt property, had undervalued property, and attempted to exempt property beyond that allowed by North Carolina law. The trial court held that Ahn had failed to comply with the statutory requirements for claiming exempt property, but allowed Ahn the opportunity to refile his claimed exemptions. STC again objected and subpoenaed documents from seve