Summary: The Trustee alleged fraudulent conveyances by the Debtor to his non-filing spouse and sought to recover the transfers. In her answer, Ms. Houseman asserted, and the Trustee disputed, her 7th Amendment right to a jury trial. Her answer did not explicitly raise any counterclaims, but did assert a right of “setoff” or “credit” for funds she contributed, as well as asserting both that the transfers were made in good faith and for value under N.C.G.S.

Summary: At issue in this case was first whether the Applicable Commitment period, as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4), was a temporal requirement, i.e. 3 years for below median income debtors or 5 years for those with income above median, or was not applicable if the Debtors had no disposable income under § 1325(b)(1). Agreeing with now all of the Circuit Courts that have answered this question, the 4th Circuit held that the Applicable Commitment Period is, in fact temporal.

Summary: Petri originally had a mortgage with Luxury Mortgage Corp., but subsequently Bank of America (“BOA”) commenced foreclosure proceedings. Appealing the order allowing foreclosure, Petri argued that BOA was not the true holder of the note authorized to foreclose.

Summary: The District Court held that while there is a clear “federal policy favoring arbitration”, Moses H Cone Mem'l Hasp. v. Mercury Canst. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983), “[t]he tension that exists between the policy favoring enforceability of agreements to arbitrate and the paramount interest of the bankruptcy courts in resolving bankruptcy matters is well recognized, see e.g. In re National Gypsum, 118 F.3d 1056, 1065-1070 (5th Cir. 1997).

Summary: Chapter 13 Debtors had fallen behind on payment under their confirmed plan, wherein the mortgage held be Wells Fargo was paid directly by the Debtors. Instead of following the more customary path of seeking relief from the automatic stay, Wells Fargo instead sought dismissal of the Chapter 13 case. The Motion to Dismiss was resolved by bringing the payments “inside” the Chapter 13 plan, but the parties could not agree on the allowance of attorney’s fees in the amount of $350.00.

Summary: McGinnis brought suit in state court against Fantone for two notes that Fantone had guaranteed with MSC. Following court ordered mediation, the parties agreed that Fantone would execute a modification of loan agreement for $200,000.00 with interest at six percent (6%) per year, would substitute himself as the obligor debts owed by executed by MSC, and would sign a Confession of Judgment for $200,000. Less than three weeks later, Pantone filed a voluntary Chapter 13 bankruptcy.

Summary: Prior to her bankruptcy, Ms. Mitchell and the defendant, Mr. Keesee, were involved in divorce litigation in the District Court for New Hanover County, North Carolina, wherein they agreed to an equitable distribution of their property which provided that Ms. Mitchell transfered her interest in specific property to Mr. Keesee, who agreed to pay Ms. Mitchell $750,000 from any future sale of that property. Following filing her Chapter 11 bankruptcy, Ms. Mitchell brought an adversary proceeding against Mr.

Summary: Prior to the Stephenson’s bankruptcy filing, Camp Flintlock filed an action in state court against asserting claims of fraud, constructive fraud, conversion, and unfair trade practices. The bankruptcy court granted a motion for relief from stay to allow entry of a judgment reflecting the previously rendered jury verdict, but reserved the enforcement of any monetary judgment.

Summary: Trustee brought an adversary proceeding seeking to avoid two payments to Open Grounds Farm allegedly made by the debtor for land rent owed by the debtor’s president, James H. Winslow. Defendants answered and the Trustee sought leave to amend his complaint in two regards. The first was to correct a misstated date in the complaint, which was an obvious and harmless error, to which the Defendant did not oppose correction. The second amendment sought by the Trustee was to include of additional payments potential subject to avoidance under 11 U.S.C.

Summary: The debtor brought adversary proceeding against Vanderbilt and its agent Mr. Gibson, alleging that they had violated N.C.G.S. §§ 75-51 through 54, by making harassing phone calls that caused an employment demotion and loss of pay, mental and emotional distress, panic attacks, and medical expenses and were, under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1, unfair and deceptive trade practices, subjecting Vanderbilt to treble damages.