Summary: The Debtor filed Chapter 7 in 1998 and received a discharge shortly thereafter. In 2009, the Debtor commenced litigation in Florida regarding 24,000 shares of SafeCard, Inc. stock, purchased for approximately $120,000.00 in November 1977, upon which the Debtor had never received distributions or dividends. The Debtor had not listed this asset in his petition and accordingly, the Chapter 7 Trustee reopened the case in September 2012, but took no subsequent steps to administer the asset.

Summary: The Debtor had since 1998 complied with the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 105-306 to list for taxes the personal property owned in Wake County. The Debtor was required to file such a disclosure between January 1st and 31st of 2009, but failed to do so, instead filing bankruptcy on February 18, 2009. On September 30, 2009, Wake County subsequently sent the Debtor a notice that it had assessed taxes at a “discovered value” of 125% of the value from the previous year and that the Debtor had, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 105-312(d), thirty (30) days to contest this value.

Proposed opinion examines the ethical duties of a lawyer representing both the buyer and the seller on the purchase of a foreclosure property and the lawyer’s duties when the representation is limited to the seller. Editor's note: This opinion supplements and clarifies 2006 FEO 3. Inquiry #1: Bank A foreclosed its deed of trust on real property and was the highest bidder at the sale. Bank A listed the property.

Proposed opinion rules that a lawyer/trustee must explain his role in a foreclosure proceeding to any unrepresented party that is an unsophisticated consumer of legal services; if he fails to do so and that party discloses material confidential information, the lawyer may not represent the other party in a subsequent, related adversarial proceeding unless there is informed consent. Inquiry: Lender requests that Lawyer’s Firm serve as the substitute trustee under a note and deed of trust to commence foreclosure proceedings based on an alleged event of default.

Summary: Many months after the trustee’s sale of the partnership’s sole asset had already occurred and been approved by the court, Rahmi, an owner of the debtor, asserted as a reason to invalidate the sale that a conflict of interest had previously arisen, as the Trustee’s law firm was involved in a separate debt collection action against Rahmi. The 4th Circuit rejected this, holding that, pursuant to 11 U.S.C.

Summary: Randle brought a complaint against the Defendants for violations of the FDCPA and sought certification of her case as class action. Prior to any class certification, the Defendants settled, agreeing to pay $6,000 “in full final settlement of all her claims,” plus attorney’s fees related to her individual claims. Counsel then submitted requests for $89,083.69, which was reduced by the district court to $76,876.59.

Summary: In 1986, the Smiths acquired title to Lot #184 of Crestview Subdivision, 106 Crestview Terrace, in Davidson County, Thomasville, North Carolina (“the property”) and recorded the Deed. The Smiths executed a promissory note in the principal amount of $96,000 (“the Note”) to New Century Mortgage Corporation (“New Century”) secured by a Deed of Trust on the property that was recorded on 16 December 2002.

Summary: Ussery brought suit against BB&T as a result of a failure to qualify for a government loan, more than six years after a learning of the denial of the loan.

Summary: In this putative class action, prospective luxury home buyers allege that a real estate development company unlawfully refused to return deposits when the prospective buyers could not obtain mortgage financing. Toll Brothers sought to dismiss or stay pending arbitration, but the district court found the arbitration provision to be unenforceable as it only required buyers, and not Toll Brothers, to submit disputes to arbitration. The Federal Arbitration Act “ is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements”, 9 U.S.C.

Summary: Mrs. Holliday primarily asserted that the refinance documents, on which Mr. Holliday allegedly forged her signature in granting a Deed of Trust to Cambridge Home Capital (Cambridge), were void ab initio and thus ineffective to transfer an interest in the Hollidays’ property. The Deed of Trust was ultimately assigned to BAC Home Loans. (BAC.) The Court of Appeals restated that a “deed obtained through fraud, deceit or trickery is voidable as between the parties thereto, but not as to a bona fide purchaser.