Summary: Cashcall sought to withdraw its previously filed proof of claim and the Debtor objected, as such withdrawal would deprive the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction to hear the objection to claim and other matters brought in an Adversary Proceeding. Applying Bankruptcy Rule 3006, the bankruptcy court held that as the Debtor had filed an Adversary Proceeding, withdrawal of the Proof of Claim would prejudice the Debtor by eliminating any jurisdiction the bankruptcy court had, subjecting the Debtor’s counterclaims to litigation in state court and arbitration.

Summary: Prior to filing Chapter 13, the Debtors entered into an Offer in Compromise (“OIC”) with the IRS, agreeing to make four installment payments of $1,000.00 each. After making the first due payment, the Debtors filed bankruptcy four months later and the IRS filed a secured claim for $21,033.15 and an unsecured claim for $83,289.35. The Debtors objected asserting that the IRS should remain bound by the terms of the OIC pursuant to the anti-discrimination provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 525(a).

Summary: The Chapter 13 Debtors owned 26 lots in the Waterside Villages, secured by a Deed of Trust to the Bank of Currituck, which had foreclosed on the properties on July 29, 2009. Waterside Villages filed a Proof of Claim asserting homeowners dues of $77,844.00. The Debtors objected to the Proof of Claim on basis that they had been denied access to the properties after Wachovia Bank foreclosed on the subdivision developer, preventing the Debtors from marketing the properties.

Summary: Chapter 13 Debtor brought an Adversary Proceeding against Cashcall, seeking a declaratory judgment that the debt owed to Cashcall (resulting from a $1,500.00 payday loan) was in violation of the North Carolina Consumer Finance Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 53-164 to -191 (2012) and alleging that Cashcall engaged in acts that qualify as Prohibited Acts by Debt Collectors under N.C. Gen. Stat.

Summary: The Debtor filed Chapter 13 and his plan was confirmed, with property of the estate re-vesting with the Debtor at that point. Subsequently, the Debtor fell into default with his homeowner’s dues. The Homeowner’s Association (“HOA”) file a Motion for Relief from the Stay seeking both relief from the stay and attorney’s fees. The Debtor admitted the default, but contested the attorneys’ fees as being unnecessary. Relying on In re Jones, 339 B.R. 360, 365 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.

Summary: On September 26, 2008, Luther Bateman transferred, subject to retention of a life estate, property located at 106 Sanderline Road, Shawboro, North Carolina to his children, Carol Bateman Cooper, Timothy Ross Bateman, Louis Eugene Bateman, and Robert Charles Bateman (“the Defendants”). On August 4, 2010, Mr. Bateman filed Chapter 7 and valued his life estate in the Property to be approximately $186,000.00, subject to a mortgage in the amount of $15,395.99.

Summary: New Bern Riverfront Development filed suit in state court against nine defendants, but, after New Bern Riverfront Development filed Chapter 11, the state court action was remanded to the bankruptcy court. One of the nine defendants, Davis Architects, filed a third party complaint against McKim, who (after its motions to dismiss were denied) sought to have the bankruptcy court abstain or remand the proceeding to state court. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

Summary: Previously, the bankruptcy court granted the Debtor’s Motion to Employ Jones and DJP (the “Special Counsel Motion”) for the “limited purposes” of representing the Debtor “with respect to such corporate and securities matters as may be requested.” The Special Counsel Motion disclosed the fact that DJP was prepetition counsel to the Debtor and was owed a prepetition debt, but did not state the amount owed, which was in excess of $500,000.

Summary: The Male Debtor, who was the sole provider for the family, secured new employment in Colorado, and soon thereafter, the debtors and their children relocated accordingly. Subsequently, the Debtors sought a hardship discharge under 11 U.S.C.

Summary: Ms. McLean was first admitted to ManorCare, a nursing home, in July 2006, signing a contract (through her son, James McLean, who held her Power of Attorney) agreeing to all costs, including attorneys’ fees, for collection of unpaid amounts. The contract provided that it would remain in effect if she was discharged but re-admitted within 15 days. In 2007, following her discharged from the nursing home, Mr. Ray sued Ms. McLean on behalf of ManorCare, with the matter being resolved by the parties. Ms.