Summary: KGC Homeowners, Inc. (“KGC”) brought suit against William Douglas Management, Inc. (“WDM”) alleging breach of contract, negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.

Summary: Following the entry of a discharge in 2011 of his Chapter 13 case, First Federal Bank (“FFB”) continued to report on Mr.  Myrick’s credit report with Equifax that he owed an outstanding balance of $41,603 that was past due by $2,000.  In November 2014, Mr.  Myrick submitted a dispute with Equifax regarding this balance, raising his bankruptcy discharge.  Equifax sent a Automated Consumer Dispute Verification (“ACDV”) to FFB, which responded that the balance information was correct.  Later in February 2015, Mr.

Summary: The Chapter 7 Trustee alleged that the defendants' misrepresentations to the debtor regarding expansion opportunities constituted unfair or deceptive acts or practices, as these induced the debtors to transfer their valuable business assets to the defendant's competing businesses . The Trustee alleged that, in fact, the true purpose of the transfers was to force the debtors into bankruptcy. In ruling on the defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the bankruptcy court began with restating the elements of the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act at N.C.G.S.

Summary: Melvin Clayton obtained a reverse mortgage, granting a Deed of Trust against his home. His wife, Jackie, was ineligible for the reverse mortgage (presumably because she was not old enough), so did not sign the note, but did sign the Deed of Trust. The note included a provision that accelerated the debt upon his death, unless a “surviving borrower” continued to reside in the home. Upon Melvin Clayton’s death, Wells Fargo sought to foreclose. The Court of Appeals held that as N.C.G.S.

Summary: Jessica Whitaker was injured in an automobile accident and incurred, with $1,515 in costs to other medical providers, $757 for treatment at Nash Hospitals. State Farm, the insurer for the driver of the other vehicle, received notice of Nash Hospital’s medical liens under N.C.G.S. §§ 44-49 and 50. After questioning the necessity of all of the medical treatment, State Farm settled with Ms. Whitaker, who was unrepresented, for a total of $1,943, providing her with a check payable to Ms. Whitaker, Nash Hospital and the other medical provider.

Summary: As part of its Chapter 11 reorganization Bally Total Fitness of the Mid-Atlantic assumed a lease with Friday Investment, which had originally included a guaranty by Bally Holding. When Bally Mid-Atlantic later defaulted, Friday Investments sought to enforce the guaranty against Bally Holding. Bally asserted that while the lease had been assumed, the guaranty was discharged. In a divided opinion, the majority of held that under North Carolina law a guaranty is a separate contract from the underlying obligation, Tripps Rests. of N.C., Inc. v.

Summary: Bio-Med obtained a default judgment against Ms. Strongs for breach of contract and conversion, alleging that she had improperly retained insurance reimbursement checks totaling $88,767.75, using those funds to purchase two luxury vehicles, which were subsequently transferred to family members. Ms.

Summary: Mr. Hurlburt sought to cram down the claim of a seller-financed purchase money deed to the value of his principal residence. While this would have been impermissible under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), because the note was due, Mr. Hurlburt argued that 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2) allowed such treatment even though Witt v. United Companies Lending Corp., 113 F.3d 508 (4th Cir. 1997) interpreted that section to allow only modification of the payment and not cram down. As this was a seller-financed purchase money deed, the anti-deficiency provisions of N.C.G.S.

Summary: Federal Insurance Company, together with other plaintiffs, sought to amend its complaint, which already asserted that the debt owed by Mr. Sorge was nondischargable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), to add a claim of embezzlement and to revive a previously dismissed claim of breach of fiduciary duty, both nondischargable under § 523(a)(4). As “[l]eave to amend should be freely given when justice so requires, but may be denied if undue prejudice would result or if the amendment is futile,” Kozohorsky v. Harmon, 332 F.3d 1141, 1144 (8th Cir.

Summary: Ms. Crow filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, but after a creditor raised issue with her exceeding the §109(g) debt limits, converted to Chapter 7. Eight months after the initial filing of her voluntary bankruptcy petition, Ms. Crow sought to amend her schedules to claim an exemption in an individual retirement account (IRA) that had been omitted from her original petition, but would otherwise indisputably have been exempt. The Trustee opposed this amendment, arguing that Ms.