Summary: Following the re-opening of Ms. Washabaugh’s Chapter 7, the Bankruptcy Administrator sought revocation of her discharge. Ms. ’s motion to dismiss that complaint, alleging that the Bankruptcy Administrator lacked standing for such action, was denied by the bankruptcy court and Ms. Washabaugh sought leave to bring an interlocutory appeal to the district court. The district court began with 28 U.S.C.

Summary: Mr. and Mrs. Foley each had several life insurance policies which named as the beneficiary a testamentary trust created by virtually identical wills. These directed the estate trustee to use any income and principal from the trust “for the health, maintenance and support” of the surviving spouse or subsequently their son. A later provision, however, authorized the trustee to “compromise claims”.

Summary: Mr. Faison filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy seeking, among other things, to continue to develop real property against which Summit Bridge held several claims. Summit Bridge objected to confirmation of Mr. Faison’s (third) plan of reorganization based on infeasibility at it was a “visionary scheme” that was “based on speculation, hope and desire, and has no demonstrable objective fact or facts as its foundation.” While stating that it believed Mr. Faison could ultimately propose a feasible plan, the bankruptcy court found the current plan infeasible.

Summary: Mr. Daniel, together with the Chapter 13 Trustee subsequently added as a necessary Plaintiff, sought to avoid a pre-petition foreclosure by his homeowner’s association of his residence (in which the upset period had elapsed prior to filing of the bankruptcy) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1), as it had occurred within two years prior to the filing of the bankruptcy, had made the Debtor insolvent and provided less than “reasonably equivalent value” in exchange for the transfer.

Summary: The Trustee sought to recover a transfer made by the Debtor to James Smith, the principal of the Debtor, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 547 and 550(a). At issue was whether the Debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer. The Trustee argued that based on the Debtor’s tax returns and the presumption of insolvency during the 90 days preceding the filing of bankruptcy, that the Debtor was insolvent, whereas Smith asserted that based on the scheduled value of assets and amount of liabilities, the Debtor was solvent. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.

Summary: While Ms. Sparrow’s civil action for equitable distribution was pending in state court, she file a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The primary assets of her bankruptcy estate consist of a fee simple interest in a house and lot located in Durham, North Carolina and a one-half undivided tenant-in-common interest in five tracts of real property located in Granville County, North Carolina, the stated intention being that the plan would liquidate these assets and pay creditors, potentially in full. Ms. Sparrow first commenced an Adversary Proceeding against Mr.

Summary: Following In re: Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors for Dornier Aviation (North America), Inc., 453 F.3d 225 (2006), the Court of Appeals affirmed the recharacterization by bankruptcy court of an equity investment as debt.

Summary: Following the disclosure in more than 4,200 Proofs of Claim by Wake Med of personal identifying information, several Debtors sought sanctions for violations of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9037, HIPAA, and 11 U.S.C. §107. The bankruptcy court held that it was not a “HIPAA compliance tribunal” and might not have jurisdiction to decide such claims. Further, “[t]he case law overwhelmingly holds that there is no private right of action under HIPAA or §107 ”, leaving Rule 9037 as the primary remedy.

Summary: This is the latest of a line of decisions resulting from a complicated set of commercial transactions (which this consumer bankruptcy blog will leave for others to explicate). It does, nonetheless, have few nuggett of use in consumer cases, specifically in Footnote 1 which recognizes that “it is possible that the Counterclaim constitutes a claim filed against the estate.” Cf. Carroll v. Farooqi, 486 B.R. 718, 722-23 (Bankr. N.D.

Summary: This case involved a valuation duel between Ms. Sweeney and Ditech over a 1999 Horton Mirage II 24' x 52' mobile home, which all parties agreed was personal property. At the valuation hearing. Ms. Sweeney testified both as to her belief that the property suffered from “extensive water damage” and general disrepair, having a value of $10,000-$11,000. Ms. Sweeney based this on the county tax value of $9,850. Ditech presented Mr.