Summary: Randle brought a complaint against the Defendants for violations of the FDCPA and sought certification of her case as class action. Prior to any class certification, the Defendants settled, agreeing to pay $6,000 “in full final settlement of all her claims,” plus attorney’s fees related to her individual claims. Counsel then submitted requests for $89,083.69, which was reduced by the district court to $76,876.59.

Summary: In 1986, the Smiths acquired title to Lot #184 of Crestview Subdivision, 106 Crestview Terrace, in Davidson County, Thomasville, North Carolina (“the property”) and recorded the Deed. The Smiths executed a promissory note in the principal amount of $96,000 (“the Note”) to New Century Mortgage Corporation (“New Century”) secured by a Deed of Trust on the property that was recorded on 16 December 2002.

Summary: Ussery brought suit against BB&T as a result of a failure to qualify for a government loan, more than six years after a learning of the denial of the loan.

Summary: In this putative class action, prospective luxury home buyers allege that a real estate development company unlawfully refused to return deposits when the prospective buyers could not obtain mortgage financing. Toll Brothers sought to dismiss or stay pending arbitration, but the district court found the arbitration provision to be unenforceable as it only required buyers, and not Toll Brothers, to submit disputes to arbitration. The Federal Arbitration Act “ is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements”, 9 U.S.C.

Summary: Mrs. Holliday primarily asserted that the refinance documents, on which Mr. Holliday allegedly forged her signature in granting a Deed of Trust to Cambridge Home Capital (Cambridge), were void ab initio and thus ineffective to transfer an interest in the Hollidays’ property. The Deed of Trust was ultimately assigned to BAC Home Loans. (BAC.) The Court of Appeals restated that a “deed obtained through fraud, deceit or trickery is voidable as between the parties thereto, but not as to a bona fide purchaser.

Summary: Knox obtained payday loans from loan servicers for Community State Bank (CSB), an out of state-chartered bank, and subsequently brought suit in state court alleging various violations of North Carolina lending and usury laws, as well as unfair and deceptive trade practices. In response, the loan servicers advanced on two fronts- first, the loan servicers sought to have the matters removed to federal court in the Eastern District of North Carolina, arguing that the National Bank Act (NBA) and Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA) completely pre-empted state-law usury

Summary: Plaintiffs had brought suit against Howard A. Jacobson (“Jacobson”), Envision Sales & Marketing Group LLC (“Envision”), CILPS Acquisition LLC (“CILPS”), and the debtor (collectively “business court defendants”) and it was designated a mandatory complex business case and assigned to the North Carolina Business Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A–45.4(b).

Abstract: In The Price of Inequality, Nobel Prize winning economist Joseph E. Stiglitz explores the growing problem of wealth inequality in the United States.1 Stiglitz, riding the momentum of the Occupy Wall Street protests and “the 99 percent” political slogan, argues that economic and political factors have worked in concert to increasingly help shift wealth from the middle and lower classes to those at the top of the American socioeconomic ladder.

Summary: The Debtor sought to have the bankruptcy judge recuse herself, based on an alleged financial interest held by the judge in JP Morgan Chase, a party in an adversary proceeding.

Summary: As an initial matter, the 4th Circuit affirmed, in a published opinion, that pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a) and 1322(b)(2), a junior lien against real estate that serves as the debtor’s principal residence can be stripped-off if there is no equity above the senior lien(s). The Court of Appeals next proceeded to the question of whether a Debtor, who had recently obtained and Chapter 7 discharge and was thus ineligible for a Chapter 13 discharge, could similarly strip-off a junior lien.