Summary: The pro se Debtor attacked a foreclosure on several fronts, first appealing the Clerk of Court authorization of the foreclosure to the Superior Court and then to the Court of Appeals.  The Debtor did not file a motion to stay the foreclosure pending the appeal and the property was sold at auction. The Court of Appeals held that the foreclosure auction mooted the subsequent appeal, leaving nothing to be heard. For a copy of the opinion, please see:

Summary: Plaintiff Harris did not disclose any ownership interest in T-WOL, which had been incorporated in 2000,  when he filed bankruptcy in 2001.  Following suit in 2009, the Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that Plaintiff Harris should be judicially estopped from asserting ownership in T-WOL. The purpose of judicial estoppel is "to protect the integrity of the judicial process by prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment."  Whitacre P’Ship v.  Biosignia Inc., 358 N.C.

Summary: The Chapter 11 plan, confirmed in 2001,  provided that the liability of the guarantors was capped at the amount of the Recapitalized Debt.  The creditor, originally Wachovia, however, argued that this provision was impermissible and should not be given effect now. The bankruptcy court found that this argument was fallacious.  First, the terms of the confirmation order had been fully negotiated by a sophisticated creditor with an experienced attorney from a large law firm. That aside, pursuant to both A.H. Robins Company, Inc. v Mabey, 880 F.

Summary: The Debtor was filed in an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy, which was eventually dismissed.  The bankruptcy court, later affirmed by the district court, awarded the Debtor $24,678.41 in attorneys’ fees and costs. After the award was affirmed, however, BB&T a creditor, asserted that as a judgment creditor it was entitled to the money.  The bankruptcy court found to the contrary, holding that while a "judgment creditor acquires a lien on the judgment debtor’s real estate by docketing.

Summary: Debtor was first found by a civil court to be the slayer of Michelle Young, his wife.  He later filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, claiming 401k accounts as exempt.  While the bankruptcy was pending, he was convicted of the first degree murder of Ms.  Young. First the Court found that the Debtor was, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 31A-3 (3)(a) and (b), as slayer to both the civil adjudication and the criminal conviction.  As such, he did own the 401k accounts as "[n]o person should be permitted to profit from his own wrong", Prudential Ins. Co v.

Summary:

The Debtors executed an adjustable rate mortgage note on May 5, 2006, and received several disclosures, including a Truth in Lending Disclosure Statement, a Notice of Right to Cancel, a Variable Rate Mortgage Program Disclosure, a HUD-1 Settlement Statement and a First Payment Letter.

Summary: Following shortly after the opinion by Judge Leonard in In re White (See:  http://ncbankruptcyexpert.com/?p=686), Judge Doub similarly held here that the attorney for the mortgage servicer had made no showing that the filing of Notice of Mortgage Payment Change required the assistance of an attorney. For a copy of the opinion, please see:

Summary: Piedmont Equine Associates, Inc., and its debt collector, Madison Credit Bureau Associates, Inc.,  continued to contact the Debtors about payment of a debt, not only after notice of the bankruptcy,  but after it had filed a Proof of Claim.  The contacts included letters, telephone calls and direct contact by their daughter’s horse trainer. The Court found that Piedmont had violated 11usc 362 and that recovery for actual damages under § 362(k) included emotional distress.  Evidence of emotion distress "need not rise to the level necessary to prove

Summary: Plaintiff in a non-dischargability action sought summary judgment based on judgment entered by Judge Jolly on August 17, 2009.  The Debtors/Defendants, however, produced the entire state court file, showing both that Judge Stephens had dismissed the action on May 19, 2009, and that there was nothing showing the Debtors/Defendants received notice of the litigation pending before Judge Jolly. Finding that the Debtors/Defendants had not had "an adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial action."  Metropolitan H

Summary: Creditor filed a Notice of Mortgage Payment Change and contemporaneously filed a Notice of Post-Petition Mortgage Fees, asserting a $50.00 fee for filing the Notice of Mortgage Payment Change. On the objection of the Chapter 13 Trustee, the Court disallowed this fee, finding that the Notice of Mortgage Payment Change was "nothing more than a clerical duty" and did not require the assistance of legal counsel. Commentary: This opinion apparently independently comes to the same conclusion as did Judge Mayer of the Eastern District of Virginia, in&nbs