Summary: Through the lense of cases,  Prof.  Mann examines how the Supreme Court has interpreted Bankruptcy Code in recent decades, positing that while bankruptcy cases are not among the “big questions” that attract the attention of law clerks and the media, they are not quite the “dogs” of the  Supreme Court docket that tax cases might be.  P.  2.  Using the briefs, news archives and the available papers of the Justices themselves, Prof.  Mann concludes that the Supreme Court decisions are “replete with back-and-forth negotiations about the

Summary: Reserve Homeowners Association commenced a foreclosure against residential rental property owned by Ms. Ackah for unpaid homeowner’s association dues. Notice of the sale was left at the property and notices sent (and returned unclaimed) to other family members. Ultimately, the property was purchased by the Jones Family Holdings a the sale. Finding that Ms. Ackah did not receive actual notice of the foreclosure , the superior court accordingly set aside the sale. The majority of opinion of the Court of Appeals held that N.C.G.S.

Summary: After nearly 35 years of marriage,  Thomas Leviner and Kathy Leviner divorced and negotiated a Settlement where the parties prior marital residence was retained jointly for their children to inherit,  but with Mr.  Leviner to make the mortgage payments and Ms.  Leviner to retain the property during her lifetime (unless she remarried.)  Mr.  Leviner was also pay alimony of $300 a week until Ms.  Leviner turned 67 years old.  In 2015, after refinancing the house, Mr.

Summary: The bankruptcy court denied Mr.

Summary: Grand Dakota Partners (“GDP”) and Grand Dakota Hospitality (“GDH”) filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the Western District of North Carolina, largely because its owners and management were located in Charlotte.  The hotel, bar and restaurant operated by GDP and GDH are located in Dickinson, North Dakota. Venue in North Carolina was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1408, as Charlotte was the “principal palce of business” for the corporations, since that is where the “decision makers are located”.  See The Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010).

Summary: Ms. Mergentime received $62,417.80 as a lump sum payment for retroactive Social Security benefits, approximately 4 months after filing her Chapter 7 bankruptcy. She had not disclosed those potential funds in her petition. Pursuant to her equitable distribution agreement, she paid half of those funds to her ex-husband. The Trustee sought to recovery those transferred funds and to deny Ms.

Summary: Ms. Jones brought suit against the College of Southern Maryland under the Family and Medical Leave Act and subsequently filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, eventually listing the lawsuit as an asset in her schedules. The Trustee then settled the lawsuit with the College of Southern Maryland for $75,000, with $25,000 to the attorney, as she was the only party having standing to pursue the claim. Ms.

Summary: Mr. Hutton’s vehicles were seized in a levy by the Onslow County Sheriff’s Department in executing on a judgment obtained by Principis. After filing bankruptcy, Mr. Hutton sought turnover of the vehicle and asserted that the possessory lien held by Principii had not been perfected by recordation with the North Carolina DMV. In narrowly construing and distinguishing several decisions from the North Carolina Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, the bankruptcy court rejected the argument by Principis that recordation is required to perfect a lien under N.C.G.S.

Summary: After the death of her Melvin Clayton, Wells Fargo accelerated the reverse mortgage note and sought to foreclose on the residence still owned by Mrs. Clayton. The Court of Appeals held that even though Mrs. Clayton was identified as a “borrower” on the Deed of Trust, Melvin Clayton was “the only contemplated borrower to the reverse-mortgage agreement, as he alone executed [those] documents and was obligated under them.” Mrs. Clayton was, due to her age, ineligible to be a borrower under the reverse mortgage, which, pursuant to N.C.G.S.

Summary: In determining whether Mr. Green was eligible, under 11 U.S.C. § 109(e), to be a Chapter 13 debtor due to debt limitations, the bankruptcy court reviewed several types of claims to determine whether each was “noncontingent” or “liquidated”. While determination of whether a debt is “noncontingent” or “liquidated” is a question of law, See In re Goralnick, 81 B.R. 570, 571 (9th Cir. BAP 1987) the amount of a debt is a question of fact.