Summary: After the Gatelys had filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy and provided written notice, Holly Hills Hospital sent the Debtors ten (10) billing statements and also threatening telephone calls for several weeks. As Mrs. Gately suffers from mental health issues (for which she had presumably received treatment from Holly Hills Hospital), these letters and telephone calls “informed the debtors that bankruptcy was futile” and caused Mrs.

Summary: Following City of Perth Amboy v. Custom Distrib. Serv., Inc. (In re Custom Distrib. Serv., Inc.), 224 F.3d 235, 243-44 (3d Cir. 2000), the bankruptcy court held that a Debtor must “must have properly requested [a] tax refund ... in order for [a bankruptcy] court to have the jurisdiction to determine and order the payment of such refund.” The Debtor applied for a tentative carry back adjustment to the IRS pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6411, by completing Form 1139.

Summary: Debtor brought an Adversary Proceeding against Defendants alleging unpaid invoices a little more than two months after its Chapter 11 plan was confirmed. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b) and 157(a) a matter “is within the jurisdiction of [a Bankruptcy] Court if it is ‘arising under,’ ‘arising in,’ or ‘related to’ the corresponding bankruptcy case.” Citing to In re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619, 625 (4thCir. 1997) (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3rdCir.

Summary: In a “vigorously litigated case”, the Debtor proposed to surrender certain parcels of real property to satisfy the claim of Capital Bank, i.e. “Dirt for Debt”. Based on the valuations of the real property at issue, the bankruptcy court held that those properties had sufficient value to fully satisfy the claim of Capital Bank, leaving it with no unsecured deficiency claim. Capital Bank nonetheless contended that it should not be subject to cram-down under 11 U.S.C. § 1129.

Summary: The Chapter Trustee sought denial of Spiers’ discharge, exemptions, and monetary relief on the grounds that Spiers had intentionally failed to disclose numerous assets and transfers of assets he owned or had an interest in at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, attempted to suborn perjury from another witness, and failed to cooperate with the Trustee to the point that the Trustee forced to expend a substantial amount of time and resources in attempting to obtain an accurate portrayal of Spier’s finances and to recover for the benefit of his creditors.

Summary: Bridgetree successfully sued, among others, Redf Marketing and its president and 50% owner, Roselli, for trade secret misappropriation, obtaining a judgment of $678,292 in federal district court. Following the entry of the judgment, Roselli and Redf made representations to the district court that they could neither post a bond nor continue operating without bankruptcy. In response, Bridgetree filed an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy for Redf and Roselli, who sought dismissal of the involuntary bankruptcy. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.

Summary: In November of 2005, Arlington Hills executed a promissory note and Deed of Trust for $596,345, with such currently being held by Wells Fargo. Thereafter, John & Beverly Cobb, Max & Christy Smith, and Mark Carpenter executed personally guarantees for the note in order to obtain renewals and modifications of the terms. When Arlington Hills defaulted the balance on the note was nearly $2 million, Wells Fargo initiated both a foreclosure and suit against both Arlington Hills and the several guarantors.

Summary: Perry executed a note and Deed of Trust in favor of American Home Mortgage (AHM), with two individuals named as Trustees and MERS named as the beneficiary and “solely as nominee” for AHM. Citimortgage acquired the mortgage through an endorsement by AHM.

Summary: On June 17, 2010, Waddington Ridge HOA filed a claim of lien against Dong’s residence and then filed a notice of foreclosure hearing on July 22, 2010. At that hearing, the Clerk of Court allowed the foreclosure to proceed and the sale was held on November 2, 2010, with the foreclosure deed being recorded on February 17, 2011. Dong filed a motion for relief from the foreclosure order on October 31, 2011, and the trial court ultimately concluded that Dong had not received proper notice and, pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P.

Summary: Under North Carolina’s New Motor Vehicles Warranties Act, N.C.G.S. § § 20-351, a motor vehicle manufacturer is required to either repurchase or refund the purchase price if “after a reasonable number of attempts” the vehicle cannot be repaired to conform with express warranties. N.C.G.S. § 20-351.5 creates a presumption that the manufacturer has failed if it attempts to repair the vehicle four or more times. The consumer must have notified the manufacturer in writing of the defect and allowed up to fifteen (15) days to make repairs.