Summary:

Answer a Complaint filed by Wells Fargo in North Carolina Superior Court, Stonebridge asserted several counterclaims.  When Stonebridge later filed Chapter 11,   the state court action was removed to bankruptcy court.  Following the heightened pleading standards of Iqbal/Twombley,  Wells Fargo sought dismissal of the counterclaims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failing to state claims for relief that were facially plausible.  Stonebridge   argued that the more permissive North Carolina pleading standards sho

Summary: In a dispute regarding a failed real estate development, Stonebridge asserted a breach of contract claim.  In response, NVR argued that a liquidated damages provision limited its liability for damages.  The Bankruptcy Court found that Stonebridge could not complain that a negotiated liquidated damages provision was insufficient or invalid.  The Bankruptcy Court also rejected the assertion by Stonebridge that NVR was required to indemnify economic damages, finding that the contract between the parties required indemnification of "damage to property and

The Debtor acquired a piece of real property in 2001 solely in his name.  In 2007, three months after the Plaintiff/Creditor file a lawsuit against the Debtor, the Debtor transferred the property to himself and his wife as Tenants by the Entireties.  Four months later, the Debtor filed Chapter 7. The Plaintiff brought an action against the Debtor under 11 U.S.C.

After a very tortured procedural history, the summary of which runs until the tenth page and includes two removal to the federal district court for the EDNC and the involvement in class action cases decided by the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals, the North Carolina Court of Appeals ruled that the federal Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDA) did not preempt North Carolina law regarding fees charged in connection with a loan, rejecting (as had the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals) the argument that limitations on interest were preempted as the term "interest" cou

Pete Wall Plumbing (PWP) sought to enforce its materialmen's lien against property developed by Sandra Anderson Builders (SAB), in conjuction with Carolina Bank and the Greensboro Housing Authority. Due to the multiparty nature of a development, SAB was both an owner of the properties under Chapter 44A, Article 2, Part 1, by virtue of the Subleases, see N.C. Gen. Stat.

Creditor objected to cram-down of mobile home and land under §1322(b)(2). The Debtors contended that §1322(b)(2) did not apply since the mobile home still had its wheels, axles, and hitch attached and never had its DMV Certificate of Title cancelled. The Court turned to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105- 273 (13) (d) to determine if the mobile home was real or personal property, finding the pertinent requirements to be all of the following: 1. It is a residential structure. 2. It has the moving hitch, wheels, and axles removed. 3.

In determining if the 60-day wages of the debtor were exempt, the Court determined that the Debtor's fiance and her son were part of his "family". “North Carolina courts understand the word ‘family’ to imply that the debtor has other dependents who rely on the debtor for support.” The use of the word 'dependent' here implies an actual situation of dependency, rather than a potential legal dependency.

A finding that a debt is non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C.

The Debtor had obtained a series of loans from Creditor, pledging three automobiles as collateral for those loans.