Summary:
Mr. Hurlburt sought to cram down the claim of a seller-financed purchase money deed to the value of his principal residence. While this would have been impermissible under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), because the note was due, Mr. Hurlburt argued that 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2) allowed such treatment even though Witt v. United Companies Lending Corp., 113 F.3d 508 (4th Cir. 1997) interpreted that section to allow only modification of the payment and not cram down. As this was a seller-financed purchase money deed, the anti-deficiency provisions of N.C.G.S.
Summary:
Federal Insurance Company, together with other plaintiffs, sought to amend its complaint, which already asserted that the debt owed by Mr. Sorge was nondischargable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), to add a claim of embezzlement and to revive a previously dismissed claim of breach of fiduciary duty, both nondischargable under § 523(a)(4). As “[l]eave to amend should be freely given when justice so requires, but may be denied if undue prejudice would result or if the amendment is futile,” Kozohorsky v. Harmon, 332 F.3d 1141, 1144 (8th Cir.
Summary:
Ms. Crow filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, but after a creditor raised issue with her exceeding the §109(g) debt limits, converted to Chapter 7. Eight months after the initial filing of her voluntary bankruptcy petition, Ms. Crow sought to amend her schedules to claim an exemption in an individual retirement account (IRA) that had been omitted from her original petition, but would otherwise indisputably have been exempt. The Trustee opposed this amendment, arguing that Ms.
Summary:
Mr. Weiss, together with his business partner, purchased land for development in Charlotte by obtaining a $28,290,000 loan from GECMC 2006-C1 Carrington Oaks, LLC (“Carrington Oaks”) conditioned, in part, on their personal guaranties. After the loan defaulted, Carrington Oaks brought suit for payment against Mr. Weiss.
At trial, however, Mr.
Summary:
SunTrust denied the application for credit to purchase a boat made by the Trapps due to issues with Mr. Trapp’s Social Security number being linked to a deceased person. The Trapps brought suit under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C.A.
Summary:
Ms. Burwick denied certain allegations in her answers to Interrogatories but her response to a set of Admissions, sent pursuant to Rule 36, with similar questions was fourteen (14) days late.
Summary:
The bankruptcy court issued a show cause order to the Debtor’s attorney for signing a certification that a reaffirmation would not be an undue hardship for the Debtor. The court held that in regards to a reaffirmation the debtor’s attorney must file an Affidavit stating that the Reaffirmation:
1. Represents a fully informed and voluntary agreement by the debtor;
2. Does not impose an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;
3.
Summary:
The Bankruptcy Administrator moved to dismiss the Debtors case arguing that on the Means Test they were limited to deduction of the lesser of either the actual mortgage and vehicle expenses or the amounts under the applicable National or Local standard. In affirming denial of this motion by the the bankruptcy court, the Court of Appeals held that based on the plan language of 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) “[t]he debtor’s monthly expenses shall be the debtor’s applicable monthly expense amounts specified under the National Standards and Local Standards.” 11 U.S.C.