Summary: Lee and Patsy Hilliard were married in 1975 and both served as officers of Royal Tours. Following their separation in 2008, the couple entered into a Separation Agreement whereby Patsy Hilliard resigned her position with Royal Tours and accepted a cash payment from Royal Tours in lieu of an Equitable Distribution consisting of 108 monthly payments of $3,500. The Chapter 7 Trustee alleged that the twelve payments made prior to the bankruptcy filing were preferences pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 547.

Summary: Following Hice v. Hi-Mil, Inc., 301 N.C.

Abstract: The Supreme Court’s ruling in Stern v. Marshall has signaled a need to alter the bankruptcy court’s jurisdictional structure. In Stern, the Supreme Court ruled that bankruptcy judges, who lack the life tenure and salary protection of Article III, cannot issue final rulings in bankruptcy proceedings previously believed to be within their core jurisdiction.

Abstract: Since the price peak in 2006, home values have fallen more than 30%, leaving millions of Americans with negative equity in their homes. Until the Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, the bankruptcy system would have provided many such homeowners with a remedy. They could have filed bankruptcy, discharged the negative equity, committed to pay the mortgage holders the full values of their homes, and retained those homes.

Summary: Following a Motion for Relief from Stay filed by ASC, the Debtor argued that ASC was not a a “party in interest” and lacked standing as there was neither an endorsement on the note nor an allonge affixed and presented in support of the Motion. \ Avoiding this issue, the Bankruptcy Court held “that a confirmed Chapter 13 plan, which represents a new contractual agreement between debtors and their creditors, is res judicata on the issue of a creditor’s rights as a party in interest with standing to seek relief from the stay.” In re Jeter, No.

Summary: In addition to a misstatement regarding their residency in the Western District of North Carolina, the Debtors failed to disclose in their Chapter 7 petition that they had transferred real property to their daughter within one year of their bankruptcy filing. Upon discovery by the Trustee (and likely facing avoidance of the transfer) the Debtors sought to convert to Chapter 13, amending their petition to include the transfer and also including additional income from the Female Debtor. Beginning from Marrama v.

Summary: McCauley raised state law claims against Home Loan Investment Bank (“Home Loan”) for unconscionability and fraud, due to multiple factors, including a hurried closing, the inducement by inflated appraisal, the disparity between the size of the loan and the value of the home, and an “exploding” ARM. Home Loan moved to dismiss on the basis that the Home Owner’s Loan Act (“HOLA”) and related regulations at 12 C.F.R.

Summary: The standard for a stay pending appeal requires a showing of all of the following: (1) That the movant is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) That the movant is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction; (3) That the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) That the injunction is in the public interest. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2009) vacated on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 2371 (2010).

Summary: The Debtor had filed four case within nine months. The first was dismissed for failure to obtain credit counseling, although no schedules had been filed either nor had the Debtor attended the §341 Meeting of Creditors. The second case was dismissed for failure to file schedules, attend the §341 Meeting of Creditors, or make any payments. The third case was voluntarily dismissed following partial payment of the filing fee and filing of schedules, but still without attendance at the §341 Meeting of Creditors or any plan payment.

Summary: In a “Dirt for Debt” Plan, the Chapter 11 Debtor’s proposed to surrender real property to Gateway. The Bankruptcy Court held that the proper basis for valuation for such tender was the fair market value standard, where Gateway had urged a liquidation value. On appeal, the District Court held that while 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) mandates use of the fair market or “replacement” value where the Debtor intends to retain the collateral for its own use, the same is not true where the Debtor intends to surrender the property.