Summary: The Debtor contested large portions of the Domestic Support Obligation (DSO) claim filed by his ex-wife, who was also seeking dismissal of his Chapter 13 plan. The bankruptcy court held that the Indiana Superior Court where this claim originated was best suited for deciding the issues, See Caswell v. Lang, 757 F.25 608, 610 (4th Cir.

Summary: Quicksilver purchased an apartment complex in 1992, with $4.6 million in financing from the seller and $550,000 from the Charlotte Falk Irrevocable Trust (Falk Trust). Quicksilver later executed a promissory note and Deed of Trust to the Falk Trust, which was recorded on October 28, 1994. Quicksilver defaulted on the note in December of 1994 and, despite several payments in the intervening years, failed to remedy the default. On July 2, 1999, Quicksilver entered into a promissory note and Deed of Trust with Wachovia Bank.

Summary: The first indorsement in a chain of transfers of a mortgage note was simply a stamp, without an accompanying signature or initials. After falling behind on mortgage payments, Bass, relying on Econo-Travel Motor Hotel Corp. v. Taylor, 301 N.C. 200 (1980), challenged the standing of U.S. Bank as the holder of the note, arguing that it had not been properly indorsed. The North Carolina Supreme Court rejected this argument relying on the broad definition of “signature” in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), at N.C.G.S.

Summary: The Debtors filed Chapter 7 and indicated on their Statement of Intentions they intended to retain the real property, with an estimated value of $430,000. U.S. Bank sought relief from the automatic stay, asserting that the Debtors owed $639,365.25 in total, with a delinquency of $145,703.92. Sua sponte, the bankruptcy court held that U.S. Bank (and/or its servicer, Select Portfolio Services) had failed to establish that it owns or has the right to enforce the promissory note secured by the Property.

Summary: Sea Horse Realty, which is wholly owned by Richard Mercer, is the owner of a parcel of real property located in Nags Head. In 2005, Mercer executed a promissory note, currently held by Citimortgage (to whom reference will be made, regardless of whether the party was Citimortgage or its predecessors), for $1.5 million, pledging the property as collateral. The Deed of Trust was originally to list Sea Horse Realty as the grantor, but this was changed at the request of the mortgage broker to list Mercer as the grantor. Mercer filed Chapter 11 in 2009.

Summary: Around the time of the Confirmation of the Debtors’ plan, the Male Debtor was injured in a motor vehicle accident. Subsequently, he amended his schedules to disclose the personal injury claim and his exemptions to claim the d claimed the full $10,379.35 settlement as exempt property per N.C.G.S. § 1C-1601(a)(8). The Trustee failed to object to the exemption but did seek to have this amount determined to be disposable income. Relying heavily on In re Graham, 258 B.R. 286 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.

Summary: The Debtor’s Chapter 11 case was converted to Chapter 7, following a hearing, at which neither the Debtor nor Debtor’s counsel attended, based on testimony presented by the bankruptcy administrator elaborated on the basis of her motion to convert, that despite being granted generous opportunities for amendment, inaccuracies and confusion continued to plague the debtor’s monthly operating reports.

Abstract: Loss mitigation actions (e.g., liquidation, renegotiation) of delinquent mortgages might be hampered by conflicting goals of lenders at different seniority. In particular, a servicer has less incentive to take certain actions to reduce losses of investor-owned first lien mortgages if the servicer happens to own the second lien claim secured by the same property. Rather, the servicer has an incentive to hold up loss mitigation as it seeks to preserve the values of its own, junior, claim.

Summary: Shortly before their divorce, the Plaintiff’s then wife obtained a credit card in his name, without his knowledge. Several years later, the Plaintiff discovered the credit card on his credit report and also began to receive collection letters and calls. These ceased until there was renewed collection activity (which is not described in the opinion) starting in January 2011, in response to which the Plaintiff retained counsel to demand verification of the debt.

Summary: The Mecklenburg Clerk of Court authorized a foreclosure sale on September 29, 2010. There was no appeal of that order. Nearly a year later on August 8, 2011, the homeowner brought suit alleging that the foreclosure order had been premised on fraudulent documents, that the parties initiating the foreclosure had lacked any interest in the debt and lack of notice.