Summary: Janice Willis had two sons, Eddie and Anthony. In December 2004 she drafted a will bequeathing “any interest that I may own in my home place” to Eddie, expressing her “wish” that, if she conveyed the property to Eddie before her death and he decided to sell it, Eddie would divide the proceeds with his brother Anthony. The will also bequeathed the residue of her estate to Eddie and Anthony in equal shares, to pass to their children per stirpes if either or both predeceased her. Mrs.

Summary: In 2002, the Toomey sold real property located at 1124 Berwyn Way, Raleigh, to the Postons. At the time of the sale, the Property was encumbered by a deed of trust and, in addition, by a home equity line of credit (“HELOC”) with Central Carolina Bank (“CCB”), which was secured by a second deed of trust. At the closing of the sale, the first deed of trust was paid off and canceled of record. The Toomeys’ HELOC with CCB was paid down to zero but, unfortunately, the deed of trust securing the HELOC was not canceled and the HELOC account was not closed.

Summary: The Debtor had, after purchasing a 3rd parties interest in an Illinois home, been given title to the home by his then fiance, Ms. Ward, subject to an agreement that he would reconvey the real property to her in the event he pre-deceased her or their relationship ended. So, of course, their relationship ended and he declined to reconvey the property to her. Ms. Ward then commenced a lawsuit in Illinois against the Debtor seeking reconveyance of the property and damages for breach of contract. The Debtor filed Chapter 7, during which Ms.

Summary: In the Debtor’s first Chapter 13 case, the Debtor and his homeowner’s association entered into a consent order denying the homeowner’s motion for relief, subject to the Debtor complying with specific conditions. Failure to comply would result in the lifting of the automatic stay. The Debtor’s bankruptcy was shortly thereafter dismissed and the Debtor refiled. The homeowner’s association contended that the consent order in the previous case was res judicata and it was thereby entitled to relief from the automatic stay in the second case.

Summary: The Debtor, following some corrective amendments, had $731.36 of disposable income showing on Form B22. Because of a long commute in a pick-up truck with poor mileage, the Debtor claimed $612.00 a month of additional transportation expenses as a special circumstance under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i).

Summary: In December 2010, the Social Security Administration the Debtor of an alleged overpayment of SSI benefits, seeking repayment of $11,585. In March 2011, the Debtor received a "Notice of Award" for Social Security Disability ("SSD") benefits of $1,001.00 beginning March 2011. Also in March 2011, the Debtor was notified of SSA's decision that she was entitled to receive a monthly payment of $674.00 and retroactive SSI benefits from May 2010 through March 2011 totaling $7,414.00.

Summary: B-Line purchased a charge account that the Debtors originally had with Kay Jewelers, which had been listed as a creditor on Schedule F of the Debtors’ petition, with a balance owing of $860.61. Following the filing of the Debtors’ bankruptcy, B-Line solicited a reaffirmation from the Debtors, including a warning/threat that “If the Jewelry purchased under this secured account have been destroyed, gifted or transferred, or sold, [B-Line] may have a non-dischargeability cause of action against you/your client(s) under 11 U.S.C.

Summary: Debtor filed a reaffirmation agreement with Ally for a vehicle with the bankruptcy court, despite showing that her monthly income minus monthly expenses resulted in a negative net income, indicating a presumption of undue hardship. The reaffirmation stated that the Debtor intended to adjust her expenses to afford the car payments. The Debtor’s attorney did not complete the certification in the reaffirmation that there was no undue hardship. Due to the absence of the attorney certification, the bankruptcy court set the reaffirmation for hearing.

Summary: Epes was the guarantor of a lease on behalf of the lessee, CRC Management. CRC eventually sold its assets to Fuddruckers. In April 2010, Fuddruckers filed bankruptcy. In July 2010, Epes brought an action for a declaratory judgment that he no longer had any liability under the guaranty, however summary judgment was granted to the Defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment for the defendants, finding that the lease included the filing of bankruptcy.

Summary: Dorothy Vogler died testate, with her debts exceeding the value of her real and personal property. Chris Vogler, the executor of her estate, initiated a special proceeding for the purpose of obtaining authorization to sell the real estate that Ms. Vogler had owned at the time of her death and to use the proceeds to pay her debts. Such sale was authorized and subsequently confirmed on January 12, 2011, with the Clerk authorizing payment of the costs of the proceeding and the remaining balance on the mortgage owed to Bank of America (“BOA”) on the real property.