Summary:
Doral agreed in an Interim Servicing Agreement ("ISA") to take over servicing of Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac") mortgages previously serviced by R&G Mortgage Corp. (R&G). R&G, however, successfully block this assignment. Even though it never actually serviced these mortgages and incurred actual costs of only $124,588.00, Doral then sought 24-months of servicing fees as compensation, as required under the ISA. Freddie Mac argued that Doral was not entitled to such fees, as Freddie Mac had never determin
Summary:
Epps purchased a vehicle from Thompson Toyota subject to a retail sales installment contract ("RIC") that provided, among other things, that it was subject to federal and Maryland law, including the Maryland Closed End Credit Provisions ("CLEC"). The note was later assigned to Chase. When Epps later defaulted, Chase repossessed the vehicle and notified Epps of its intent to sell the vehicle. Contrary to the provisions of CLEC, however, Chase did not notify Epps of the current location of the vehicle or where and when it was to be sold. E
Summary:
While working as a bookkeeper for Teague & Glover, P.A., (T&G) Ms. Gibbs embezzled substantial amounts. In addition to criminal prosecution and imprisonment, in 2010, T&G obtained a civil judgment against Mr. and Mrs. Gibbs for $800,000. T&G subsequently agreed to accept all of the Gibbses real and personal property in exchange for a reduction in the amount of the judgment.
The property at issue in the present dispute consists of Tract A (0.6 acres) and Tract B (0.7 acres and the Gibbses primary residence). In 1999
Summary:
Songwooyarn Trading Company (STC) obtained a judgment against Defendant Ahn, among others. Ahn filed a Motion to Claim Exempt Property, to which STC objected, specifically contending that Ahn had failed to list all non-exempt property, had undervalued property, and attempted to exempt property beyond that allowed by North Carolina law. The trial court held that Ahn had failed to comply with the statutory requirements for claiming exempt property, but allowed Ahn the opportunity to refile his claimed exemptions. STC again objected and subpoenaed docu
Summary:
TD Bank filed suit against Mirabella (rather than foreclosing) for amounts owed on a promissory note, originally entered into by Mirabella and Carolina First Bank (CFB). TD Bank contended that, following its merger with CFB, it stood in the place of CFB. No evidence, however, was presented at trial of the merger, instead TD Bank argued that the court should take judicial notice of the merger.
The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, finding that judicial notice is appropriate for "facts generally known with the territorial jurisdiction." While
Summary: The Youngbloods are guarantors of several loans between Youngblood Construction and BB&T. Following the filing of the Chapter 11, Youngblood Construction brought a Motion to Extend Stay for the Youngbloods individually.
The Bankruptcy Court recognized that in "unusual circumstances" the Debtor and a third party may share such common identity that judgment against one may "in effect be a judgment or finding against the debtor." Kreisler v. Goldberg, 478 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing A.H.
Summary: Relying on In re Beaudet, 455 B.R. 671, 673 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011), the bankruptcy court held that while Ocwen was entitled to include future escrow amounts in the on-going monthly payment, the pre-petition escrow shortage should instead be included in the arrearage claim.
Summary: Vericrest sought relief from the automatic stay and the Chapter 7 Trustee objected. In the present case, the note contains two allonges purporting to transfer the Note by indorsement. The first purports to transfer the Note from Flagstar Bank, F.S.B. To LSF7 Bermuda NPL V Trust. The second allonge is blank indorsement from Bermuda Trust.
To prevail on a Motion for Relief from Stay where there is no issue as to the sufficiency of equity to adequately protect it interests, the moving party must show "[t]he [d]ebtor owes a
Summary: 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) has a list of third-parties with a statutorily defined relationship with the Debtor, which are called "statutory insiders". This definition, however, use the word "includes", which makes the list non-exclusive, with such being considered "non-statutory insiders." (The District Court notes the oddity of the Bankruptcy Code statutorily providing for non-statutory insiders.)
Summary:
ECP was retained, prior to the bankruptcy filing by the Debtor, to sell certain of the Debtor's properties. The listing agreement included a provision that the Debtor would seek to employ ECP in the event bankruptcy was filed. ECP was, in fact, approved by the Court to sell the properties. Unfortunately, following the objection by the lienholder, the sale of the properties was ultimately not approved, as it did not satisfy the requirements of 11 U.S.C.
