Summary:
After Mr. Taylor and Ms. Miller separated, they executed a deed transferring real property to Mr. Taylor but providing that if Mr. Taylor later sought to sell the property, Ms. Miller would have a right of first refusal, allowing her to either match the sales price or pay $41,500.00, plus subsequent costs of repairs and improvements to the property. In June of 2009, Mr. Taylor wrote to Ms. Miller asking her to forego this right of first refusal. Ms. Miller did not respond. Later that month, Mr. Taylor again wrote to Ms. Miller of his intention to convey
By Ed Boltz, 19 November, 2011
Abstract:
This paper investigates whether homeowners respond strategically to news of mortgage modification programs. The authors exploit plausibly exogenous variation in modification policy induced by U.S. state government lawsuits against Countrywide Financial Corporation, which agreed to offer modifications to seriously delinquent borrowers with subprime mortgages throughout the country.
By Ed Boltz, 19 November, 2011
Abstract:
On March 4, 2011, the New York Times described a settlement ("settlement") proposed by a consortium of state attorneys general (AGs) to large mortgage servicers. The claims to be settled reportedly relate to failures to follow existing procedural rules relating to the foreclosure process. The settlement would make dramatic changes in those rules, and reportedly require a mortgage loan principal reduction program of $20 to 25 billion.
By Ed Boltz, 18 November, 2011
Summary:
Following an order denying the Debtor’s motion to dismiss, the Debtor sought certification of his appeal directly to the Court of Appeals, bypassing the District Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(B). Direct certification is allowed under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A) if the court before which the matter is pending determines:
(i) the . . . order . . . involves a question of law as to which there is no controlling decision of
By Ed Boltz, 18 November, 2011
Summary:
The Debtor sought to employ James McElroy & Diehl, P.A. ("JMD"), as counsel under 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) for representation in various other matters, including litigation and other "future, discrete matters" in the bankruptcy cases.  Because JMD had received substantial compensation from two equity owners of the Debtor, who were also substantial creditors, the Court found that JMD could not be deemed to be disinterested as required under 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) and could not be approved. Nor could JMD be approved under 11 U.S.C.
By Ed Boltz, 18 November, 2011
Summary:
The Court examined the three options for determining household size for Means Test calculations. Rejecting both the Census Bureau "heads on beds" approach and the IRS dependency test, the Court instead found that an analysis of "economic unit" was appropriate.
"Head on Beds" could be inaccurate "[i]f the debtor’s household includes an individual who purchases these items from his own separate income, and contributes nothing to the debtor’s household for these items, then the deduction will include an unwarranted extra amount that wouldotherwise be part of the deb
By Ed Boltz, 15 November, 2011
Summary:
The Debtors granted a Deed of Trust originally to Associates Financial, which was eventually sold or otherwise assigned to Citifinancial.  The Deed of Trust included a legal description of the collateral, but did not include an address. Debtors later defaulted on a Deed of Trust. The Substitute Trustee instituted foreclosure proceedings and attempted personal service by Sheriff at three different addresses. When that failed, the Sheriff posted service at an address that was not for the collateral described in the Deed of Trust. Unaware of the defects in service,
By Ed Boltz, 15 November, 2011
Summary:
Coastal Federal Credit Union (CFCU) filed suit against the Debtors in May 2010 for following an alleged default on a retail sales installment contract for the purchase of a vehicle. On June 18, 2010, after no answer had been filed, CFCU sought an entry of default and default judgment, both of which were allowed by the Clerk of Court pursuant to North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(1).
The Debtors subsequently sought to set aside the default judgment, arguing that they had made payment arrangements with the attorneys for CFCU. As such, the Debtors argued t
By Ed Boltz, 15 November, 2011
Summary:
The Debtors had initially disclosed in their petition that they anticipated receiving tax refunds for 2008 totaling $3,000.00. The actually received $11,194.00, but failed to notify either the Chapter 13 Trustee or their attorney.
After failing to obtain confirmation of their original Chapter plan, which sought to strip-off a junior mortgage held by State Employee's Credit Union, a the Debtors proposed a plan releasing their residence to SECU. Under the new plan, no funds would be paid to SECU, which accordingly sought and obtained an order allowing for adequate
By Ed Boltz, 15 November, 2011
Summary:
The Debtor was a personal guarantor of 10 contracts between John Deere and his corporation, PEP, for the purchase of construction equipment.  Prior to filing bankruptcy, the Debtor sold 5 of the pieces of equipment to third parties, without the consent of John Deere.
John Deere then instituted an action pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) to except from discharge this debt, asserting that it arose from a "willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity." Following In re Buck, 406 B.R. 703 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.