Summary:
Ms. Carson appealed the district court’s order compelling arbitration. The Court of Appeals held that the first step in determining if a dispute is subject to arbitration is determining whether the parties agreed to arbitration.  Finding that Ms. Carson "affirmatively checked the box indicating that she agreed" to arbitration, the court then turned to whether such arbitration requirement was unenforceable due to unconscionability. As Ms. Carson had willing applied for services from Lending Tree, had indicated that she had read, understood and accepted the arbi
By Ed Boltz, 20 January, 2012
Summary:
Ms. Strong was denied Social Security disability benefits by an administrative law judge and appealed to the District Court, which remanded the case finding that the denial was not supported by substantial evidence. The District Court, however, denied Ms. Strong’s request for attorneys fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA") at 28 U.S.C.
By Ed Boltz, 11 January, 2012
Summary:
Mrs. Warren’s husband died, owing a debt on a credit card to BB&T. Despite the credit card only being in the deceased husband’s name, BB&T, through its attorneys, Sessoms & Rogers, attempted on numerous occasions to collect the debt from Mrs. Warren.
By Ed Boltz, 6 January, 2012
Summary:
In a property dispute between a sister, Ms. Lee, and her brother, Mr. Anasti, over real estate in South Carolina, Ms. Lee sought to assert superior title to Mr. Anasti though adverse possession. This matter was first commenced in South Carolina state court, but when Ms. Lee filed Chapter 7, later converting to Chapter 13, and brought an adversary proceeding asserting both adverse possession and seeking to avoid any interest Mr. Anasti had pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
By Ed Boltz, 15 December, 2011
Summary:
The Debtors refinanced their home original Sun Trust mortgage again with Sun Trust, which provided the Model Form H-8 "Notice of Right to Cancel", which is used for closed-end secured consumer credit transactions. In fact it should have used Model Form H-9, which applies in a refinancing rather than new extension of credit. Form H-9 differs from Form H-8 in two ways- First, instead of Form H-8’s disclosure that the borrower is "entering into a transaction that will result in a security interest in your home," Form H-9 provides that "[y]ou are entering into a new
By Ed Boltz, 13 December, 2011
Summary:
National Heritage Foundation, Inc. ("NHF") filed a Chapter 11 reorganization including provisions in its plan that prevented claim not only against NHF, but also its officers, directors and employees (among others), for acts or omissions arising prior to the reorganization. The bankruptcy court affirmed these release provisions, finding that these release provisions were "essential" to the reorganization.
On appeal, Berhman contended that the plan was not proposed in good faith and was "a sham perpetrated by NHF’s officers and directors to secure immunity for thei
By Ed Boltz, 30 November, 2011
Summary:
The Debtors filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy in 2008. Following a Motion to convert or dismiss the case filed by the Chapter 13 Trustee, the Debtors voluntarily converted to Chapter 7. The U.S. Trustee sought dismissal of the case pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
By Ed Boltz, 7 November, 2011
Robert and Octavia Jones filed a joint income tax return for the year 2000. After they legally separated, the IRS audited the return and assessed a deficiency, which Robert Jones agreed to discharge through an installment payment plan. When he defaulted, however, the IRS began efforts to collect the deficiency from both Robert and Octavia Jones. More than two years after the IRS first began its collection activities, Octavia Jones requested innocent spouse relief from her tax liability under I.R.C. § 6015(f).
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The sole question presented is whether I.R.C.
By Ed Boltz, 7 November, 2011
The Fourth Circuit reversed the denial of attorneys fees by the District Court, finding that while only nominal actual damages were awarded, attorneys fees were still allowed.
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The Court of Appeals held that while Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992) and Mercer v. Duke Univ., 401 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2005) held that when a Plaintiff "received only nominal damages, 'the only reasonable fee is . . . no fee at all.'” Quotiing Farrar, 506 U.S.
By Ed Boltz, 7 November, 2011
As the  FDCPA is concerned “with the substance of the transaction as opposed to the form”, the 4th Circuit held that even assuming that the original 2004 debt was a commercial loan, the later 2006 debt, used to satisfy the original obligation, was a consumer loan as it concerned the Plaintiff's personal finances, his personal residence, and was taken out in his own name.
This case may also have value in determining whether a debtor "debts are primarily consumer debts" under 11 U.S.C.