Summary: The Joneses brought a breach of contract claim against Fulton Bank, alleging that Fulton Bank failed to send them a proper thirty-day pre-acceleration notice. See Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Simmons, 654 S.E.2d 898, 901 (Va. 2008). The Joneses also challenged the appointment by Fulton Bank of a Substitute Trustee with instructions to commence foreclosure as not complying with the Deed of Trust.

Summary: In 2007, Bane’s company, Aequitas-Energy, Inc., purchased fifty acres of land (the Angel Lane Property) in Roanoke County, Virginia, from Bane’s mother, Martha Bane, who was granted at $400,000 mortgage against the property. This mortgage was never recorded and the later mortgage to Community Trust Bank was accordingly superior. Bane, having fallen into default on the Coummunity Trust mortgage and facing foreclosure, had the property transferred into his name and filed bankruptcy in 2010, the day before the foreclosure sale.

Summary: Stephens fell delinquent on her mortgage with HSBC and, prior to HSBC taking any action, sought a declaratory judgment that her mortgage contract was void ab initio, as it contained a waiver of her appraisement rights under South Carolina Code § 29-3-680.

Summary: At issue in this case was first whether the Applicable Commitment period, as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4), was a temporal requirement, i.e. 3 years for below median income debtors or 5 years for those with income above median, or was not applicable if the Debtors had no disposable income under § 1325(b)(1). Agreeing with now all of the Circuit Courts that have answered this question, the 4th Circuit held that the Applicable Commitment Period is, in fact temporal.

Summary: Kellie Ballard co-signed a loan agreement for her husband, Michael Ballard, for a loan (and three subsequent restructuring) from Bank of America (“BoA”) for his business, FoodSwing, even though she has neither an ownership or operating interest in the business. The couple owns, among other assets, a home in Maryland (presumably as Tenants by the Entireties) and a winery in California. In November 2012, Ms.

Summary: Randle brought a complaint against the Defendants for violations of the FDCPA and sought certification of her case as class action. Prior to any class certification, the Defendants settled, agreeing to pay $6,000 “in full final settlement of all her claims,” plus attorney’s fees related to her individual claims. Counsel then submitted requests for $89,083.69, which was reduced by the district court to $76,876.59.

Summary: In this putative class action, prospective luxury home buyers allege that a real estate development company unlawfully refused to return deposits when the prospective buyers could not obtain mortgage financing. Toll Brothers sought to dismiss or stay pending arbitration, but the district court found the arbitration provision to be unenforceable as it only required buyers, and not Toll Brothers, to submit disputes to arbitration. The Federal Arbitration Act “ is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements”, 9 U.S.C.

Summary: Mrs. Holliday primarily asserted that the refinance documents, on which Mr. Holliday allegedly forged her signature in granting a Deed of Trust to Cambridge Home Capital (Cambridge), were void ab initio and thus ineffective to transfer an interest in the Hollidays’ property. The Deed of Trust was ultimately assigned to BAC Home Loans. (BAC.) The Court of Appeals restated that a “deed obtained through fraud, deceit or trickery is voidable as between the parties thereto, but not as to a bona fide purchaser.

Summary: Knox obtained payday loans from loan servicers for Community State Bank (CSB), an out of state-chartered bank, and subsequently brought suit in state court alleging various violations of North Carolina lending and usury laws, as well as unfair and deceptive trade practices. In response, the loan servicers advanced on two fronts- first, the loan servicers sought to have the matters removed to federal court in the Eastern District of North Carolina, arguing that the National Bank Act (NBA) and Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA) completely pre-empted state-law usury

Summary: As an initial matter, the 4th Circuit affirmed, in a published opinion, that pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a) and 1322(b)(2), a junior lien against real estate that serves as the debtor’s principal residence can be stripped-off if there is no equity above the senior lien(s). The Court of Appeals next proceeded to the question of whether a Debtor, who had recently obtained and Chapter 7 discharge and was thus ineligible for a Chapter 13 discharge, could similarly strip-off a junior lien.