Abstract:
Since the price peak in 2006, home values have fallen more than 30%, leaving millions of Americans with negative equity in their homes. Until the Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, the bankruptcy system would have provided many such homeowners with a remedy. They could have filed bankruptcy, discharged the negative equity, committed to pay the mortgage holders the full values of their homes, and retained those homes.
Abstract:
Loss mitigation actions (e.g., liquidation, renegotiation) of delinquent mortgages might be hampered by conflicting goals of lenders at different seniority. In particular, a servicer has less incentive to take certain actions to reduce losses of investor-owned first lien mortgages if the servicer happens to own the second lien claim secured by the same property. Rather, the servicer has an incentive to hold up loss mitigation as it seeks to preserve the values of its own, junior, claim.
Abstract:
This Article explores a significant market-based threat to the Truth in Lending Act’s (“TILA”) right of rescission, a remedy that attempts to deter lender overreaching and fraud during one of the most complex financial transactions of a consumer’s lifetime.
Summary:
This is another in the serious of the Inside the Minds books from Aspatore Books, here attempting to provide perspective from experienced Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 Trustees on how to administer consumer bankruptcy cases.
Summary:
Judge Ahart revisits his 2005 article, The Limited Scope of Implied Powers of a Bankruptcy Judge: A Statutory Court of Bankruptcy, Not a Court of Equity, 79 Am. Bankr. L.J. 1, in light of the Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct.
Households often rely on professionals with specialized knowledge to make important financial decisions. In many cases, the professional’s financial interests are at odds with those of the client. We explore this problem in the context of personal bankruptcy. OLS, fixed effects, and IV estimates all show that attorneys play a central role in determining whether households file under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 of the bankruptcy code.
Abstract:
This Article considers the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall, which limited the power of a bankruptcy judge to decide a common law claim. Stern is best understood as a combination of three arguments drawn from the Court’s prior Article III cases. The first is an argument from history — the past division of labor between the Article III judiciary and non-Article III adjudicators. The second is an argument from expertise — the appropriate selection of disputes that benefit from a specialized non-Article III forum.
Abstract:
Congress regularly makes judgment calls of constitutional dimension. One important example of the interaction between the constitutional analysis of the Court and that of Congress involves disputes over the broad grant of jurisdiction exercised by untenured bankruptcy judges. The legislative history preceding the Supreme Court’s decisions in Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. and Stern v. Marshall suggest that Congress’s constitutional interpretation is different in kind from that of the Supreme Court.